This observation, I apprehend, to be intimately connected in principle with that theory of original seeds or elements of thought in the mind, which I am disposed to maintain. I shall now subjoin a few illustrations.

On this head the language of Boyle is particularly appropriate: because he does not argue for one opinion more decidedly than another; I shall, therefore, give several extracts from his writings.

"God hath made us men of a limited nature in general, and of a bounded capacity; and accordingly hath furnished man either with certain innate ideas or models, and principles; or with a faculty or power and disposition easily to frame them, as it meets with occasions to excite them. But, because God intended the mind of man of a limited capacity, his understanding is so constituted, that the inbred or easily acquired ideas, and primitive axioms, wherewith it is furnished, and by relation or analogy whereto, it judges of all other notions and propositions, do not extend to all knowable objects whatsoever; but reach only to such as have a sufficient affinity, or bear some proportion to those primary ideas and rules of truth; which are sufficient, if duly improved, to help us to attain, though not the perfect knowledge of truth of the highest order, yet the competent knowledge of as much Truth, as God thought fit to allow our minds, in their present state of union with our bodies."

"The innate light of the rational faculty, is more

primary than the very rules of reasoning.". "There are some things which the intellect usually judges of in a kind of organical way;-that is, by the help of certain rules or hypotheses”—" but there are others which it knows, without the help of these rules, more immediately and, as it were, intuitively, by evidence or perception." "And it seems

to me that the internal light which the Author of nature has set up in the mind of man, qualifies him, if he makes a right use of it, not only to apply the instruments of knowledge, but also to frame and examine them."

It cannot be doubted that the preceding passage applies exclusively to the elements of reason: as does the following from Sir Matthew Hale. I have already taken notice of the analogy drawn by this writer

* See Boyle's works abridged by Shaw, vol. 2, pages 201, 206, 209, and 220.

"The rational soul that is already furnished with primitive ideas and rules of true and false"-in other words, "when duly excited, is furnished with a light that may enable her to judge, even of many of those original notions, by which she judges of other things." "For, by the help of this light, the understanding is enabled to look about, and both to consider apart, and compare together, the nature of all kinds of things; without being necessitated to employ in its speculations, the rules, or dictates of any particular science, or discipline; being sufficiently assisted by its own light, and those axioms and notions, that are of a general nature, and perpetual truths; and so of a higher order than the dictates or rules of any particular or subordinate science."

These are supposed to be connate-and are assented to upon their own account, without needing any medium or discursive act to prove them: because, that, as soon as they are plainly proposed to the understanding they discover themselves to be true so manifestly by their own light, that they want no proposition to make the understanding acquiesce in them.”

Foyle's works abridged, vol. 2. p. 201–206.

between human and brute instincts. He says that as there are animal instincts in brutes, directing them to what is useful and convenient to the sensible life; so there are engraven in the soul certain rational instincts; implanted and connatural anticipations, antecedent to any discursive ratiocination;—which, though they are not so distinct and explicit as the former (those of brutes) yet they are secret biases whereby it is disposed, and inclined to the good and convenience proportionable to a rational and intellectual life." Besides this, Sir Matthew Hale considers that each individual has a certain congenite stock of rational sentiments and inclinations; implying that he has original instincts determining him to such a way of life as is suitable to his nature.”* And he observes, that "the high exercise of ratiocination might evince the truth and excellency of these connatural principles, because they are in themselves highly reasonable, though there were no such originally inscribed in the mind. But this no more concludes against the supposition, (of their being originally inscribed), than it would conclude against the supposition of implanted instincts in brutes."+ See page 62.

*Hale Prim. orig. sect. 1. ch. 2.

In the 4th section, the same idea is expressed in other words :"As we find in the sensitive natures certain congenite or connatural,instincts, whereby they are secretly and powerfully biassed, and inclined, and carried to their proper sensitive good"-" so there seems to be lodged in the intellective and rational nature certain rudiments and tendencies whereby they are carried to the good of an intellectual life,

The judicious Hooker remarks, "That the main principles of Reason are in themselves apparent. For to make nothing evident of itself unto man's understanding, were to take away all possibility of knowing any thing. And herein, he adds, that of Theophrastus is true, 'They that seek a reason of all things do utterly destroy all reasoning.' In every kind of knowledge, some such grounds there are, as that being proposed, the mind doth presently embrace them, as free from the possibility of error, clear and manifest without proof."*

Aristotle himself, the prince of logicians, admits, "That it is altogether impossible that every thing should be susceptible of demonstration; otherwise the process would extend to infinity, and after all our labour, nothing would be gained."+

says,

Cicero "That unless there were some anticipations of knowledge in the mind, it would not be inquisitive, or discursive, or attain to any knowledge at all." And this is partly explained by an observation of Cudworth, "That where any new ideas are presented to the mind by sense, it cannot understand or know them, except by something of its own,-some active anticipation within itself, that occasionally

certain communes notitiae lodged and implanted in the intellect, which serve as a kind of connatural inward stock for the understanding to work upon, and also as a bias to carry him on to the good of an intellectual life." Page 366.

* Hooker Eccles. Pol. book 1.

+ Stewart's Elem. vol. 2.

De Nat. Deor. lib. 1.

reviving and mecting with it, makes it know it, or take acquaintance with it." "And," he adds, "this is the only true sense of that old assertion of Plato, that Knowledge is Reminiscence, not that it is the remembrance of something which the soul had some time before actually known, in a pre-existent state; but because it is the mind's comprehending of things by some inward anticipations of its own, something native and domestic to it, or something actively exerted from within itself."*

Dugald Stewart observes, "The remark is undoubtedly true that if there were no first principles, or in other words, if a reason could be given for every thing, no process of deduction could possibly be brought to a conclusion." And in reference to this. point, he cites D'Alembert, Boyle, and Dr. Campbell, to prove that all the sciences rest ultimately on first. principles, which must be taken for granted without proof. +

"All reasoning (says Dr. Reid) is from principlesthe first principles of every kind of reasoning are given us by nature. The conclusions of reason are all built upon first principles, and can have no other foundation." Most justly therefore do such principles disdain to be tried by Reason, and laugh at the artillery of the logician when it is directed against them."And in another place, he adds, "How or when I got such first principles, upon which I build all my

* On Morality, p. 129. See also Hale, P. 43.

+ See Elements. vol. 2.