This is also confirmed by our blessed Lord and only Law-giver: For (saith he) and why even of yourselves judge ye not what is right ? As if he had said, you have a light within you, by which you may discern what is right and wrong, and just and unjust; that is, you have a rule, by which, you may, if you will, measure and square your actions, or a law, which plainly doth decree, and judiciously determine of these matters, which is that light which enlighteneth every man which cometh into the world,' or the Law of Reason."*

Now I am ready to think, it will appear, that in the following passage from Dryden, the word Reason has a more distinct and appropriate signification, than it has in some of the preceding illustrations.

Dryden supposes "that the principles of natural worship, are only the faint remnants or dying flames of Revealed Religion in the posterity of Noah; and that our modern philosophers, nay, and some of our philosophising divines, have too much exalted the faculties of our souls, when they have maintained, that by their force, mankind have been able to find out that there is one supreme Agent or intellectual Being, which we call God: that praise and prayer, are his due worship; and the rest of those deducements, which, I am confident,” he adds, " are the remote effects of revelation, and unattainable by our Discourse (Reason);—I mean, as simply considered, and without the benefit of divine illumination: so that we have not

* See the Origin of Laws, ubi supra.

lifted up ourselves to God, by the weak pinions of our Reason, but He has been pleased to descend to us; and what Socrates said of him, what Plato writ, and the rest of the Heathen Philosophers of several nations, is all no more than the twilight of Revelation after the Sun of it was set in the race of Noah."*

Notwithstanding what is above stated, it seems to have been Dryden's opinion that that portion of revealed truth which was communicated by Noah to his descendants, was carried down by tradition until it was gradually "eclipsed to the greater part of mankind, when the light of nature, as the next in dignity, was substituted; and that is it which St. Paul concludes to be the rule of the Heathens, and by which they are hereafter to be judged." Dryden does not seem to have entertained the question, whether this light of nature, as it is called "the rule of the Heathen," be not itself a spark of divine revelation, though greatly obscured by the depravity of human nature. He has not clearly explained, whether, according to his ideas, this twilight of Revelation, with which some of the wise men of old were favoured, has been diffused by tradition only; or whether it is still emitted from the fountain of Light through an

"Dim as the borrow'd beams of moon and stars,

To lonely, weary, wand'ring travellers,

Is Reason to the soul: and as on high,

These rolling fires discover but the sky,

Not light us here: so Reason's glimm'ring ray
Was lent, not to assure our doubtful way,

But guide us upward to a better day."

Dryden.

obscured atmosphere of the mind, and in greater or smaller measure distributed to mankind universally, as the privilege of a being created after the similitude of God himself. The latter, I apprehend, after what has been said, must be viewed as the true state of the case.

I have thus endeavoured, in this Section, to point out, not only what has been commonly received among the learned as the authorised, but what appears to be the true signification of the word Reason. Yet I am aware that in producing passages from different authors to illustrate the meaning of words, the attention is apt to be distracted and turned away from the immediate object in view. It appears, however, to be more necessary to have clear ideas on this point, because we so frequently hear of debates on the use and province of Reason in religious matters; as by some, it is contrasted with, and opposed to, revelation; by many too much exalted, as if it needed no other helper, and by many undervalued, as if any of the Lord's gifts-and especially the moderating principle of our outward conduct and instrument of the sciences -was bestowed upon us in vain.

* With regard to the universal consent of mankind on a very important truth, Maximus Tyrius, a Platonic philosopher, affords us a very striking testimony:-speaking of the existence of the Deity, he says, "In such a contest, and tumult, and disagreement, (about other matters of opinion) you may see this one law and language acknowledged by common accord. This the Greek says, and this the barbarian says, and the inhabitant of the continent, and the islander; and the wise and the unwise.". See the original quoted by Stewart-Elements, vol. 2.

p. 80.

We see, then, that Reason is sometimes used for the light of the intellect, or for the perfection of human intellect, howsoever enlightened, comprehending the rational as well as moral powers of the mind, cultivated to the highest pitch of excellence : and in this sense, perhaps it may be said, that Reason and Revelation cannot justly be placed in opposition. But when the word is employed, as it commonly is, in modern speculations, for the Discursive faculty alone, or to designate what is meant by the strength and power of human wisdom, unaided by divine counsel, or unassisted by revelation,-which seems to be its proper place, then it becomes essentially necessary to distinguish them.

For, it is clear, from some of the preceding quotations, that, if the term be rightly used, to Reason belong the highest court and office in the human mind. I cannot therefore but freely confess my own opinion, that to include in the word Reason, while it is liable to such an ambiguity of meaning, all that excellence of the human character, which arises from the cultivation of our highest endowments, is far from being conducive to the interests, much less the diffusion, of a pure and vital Christianity.

As I shall have to consider this subject more fully hereafter, it will be necessary to enter a little more into the nature and office of the Reasoning faculty, than I should otherwise have done. No one, I apprehend, can doubt, that, when the word Reason is employed in modern discourse, as applicable to

P

matters of religion, it is never meant to include Revelation mediate or immediate-however it may be supposed, according to Locke, to be invested with legitimate right to take cognizance of revelation.

Now, it may be observed, that Reason, in the enlarged acceptation to which I have alluded, embraced three powers or principles very necessary to be distinguished.

First. It included that power of the mind, which enables it to investigate and find out Truth speculatively, as in science and the common business of life, by observation and experience, and to distinguish it from falsehood, by means of propositions, comparisons, and deductions; hence properly called the Discursive faculty or power of Reasoning.

Secondly. It comprehended the elements of Reason itself the rudiments, seeds, or principles from which all natural reasoning must spring; denominated by Judge Hale "rational instincts,"-by Boyle "the innate Light of Reason, or primitive ideas and rules of true and false,"-by Cudworth "innate cognoscitive power," by Stewart," the fundamental laws of human belief, or primary elements of human reason," by Reid and Beattie, "the principles of common sense," as being common to all mankind;-by others, "self-evident truths, axioms, common sentiments, and intuitive principles."

Thirdly. The power or source of moral sentiment from which man receives primarily the emotions which give rise to the knowledge of right and wrong, good