capacities, and the end of our being, the law of that universal empire. From this obligation no lapse of time, no change of place or of circumstances can set us free. It is an obligation founded on the nature of things, which nothing ever can dissolve. Should a doctrine then professing to be from God, tend, in its legitimate consequences, to warrant an inference that any obligation of this kind had not hitherto existed, or might hereafter in any proportion be relaxed; such a tendency would in itself disprove the pretensions of the doctrine to divine authority, and would constitute sufficient grounds for rejecting it as false and spurious; as an invention of man, an erroneous deduction from the word of God. But is such the tendency of the doctrine in question? Can any inference of this nature be fairly drawn from it? On the contrary, is not the pre-supposed existence of man's obligation to obey the moral law, one part of the foundation on which this doctrine stands? Why should a method be devised of delivering him from the penal effects of offences committed against the law, but on the supposition of his antecedent obligation to obey the law? The very circumstance of a provision being made for remitting the condemning power, establishes the previous obligatory power of the law. And does reconciliation with God diminish this obligation to obey him? Is the sinner less bound to render obedience, when he is pardoned and taken into favour, than when he was in a state of guilt and under the sentence of the law? Can any such conclusion be reasonably deduced from the doctrine of Justification? So far then as the obligation to obedience is concerned, the charge alleged is destitute of proof; "Faith does not make void the law."

Examine whether in respect to the measure of the required obedience the objection stands on more substantial grounds. The law of God is holy, just, and good: a transcript of the mind of its glorious author, who is "of purer eyes than to behold iniquity." This law requires universal, unsinning obedience. It reaches to the thoughts and intents of the heart. It abates not for the shortest interval of its strictest demands. It makes no allowance for human imperfection for inadvertency, for surprise. It accounts every, the slightest deviation from

its tenor, to be sin. In a word, it is satisfied with nothing short of a perfect conformity, both in body and soul, with all its extensive and spiritual injunctions. Such is the moral law. Should any interpretation then of scripture be advanced, which should proceed, in its legitimate consequences, to reduce this measure of obedience : which should tend to establish a less spiritual and comprehensive rule of moral practice: which should imply that the law exacted a less rigorous service; that it lowers its demands in accommodation to the infirmities of man; that it accepts a sincere and partial, instead of a perfect and a universal obedience. Should any interpretation of such a nature be advanced, what reception would it deservedly encounter? It would be justly rejected, as being in its tendency dishonourable to God and to his holy law, contradictory to the general tenor of the scriptures, and pregnant with the most serious mischiefs to the interests of morality. But is such the tendency of the doctrine before us? Can any conclusions of this nature be reasonably inferred from it? On the contrary, do not the extent and spirituality of the moral law form another part of the foundation on which this doctrine rests? Why does it teach us, that we must be justified by faith? Because the unsinning obedience required by the law renders it impossible that we can ever be justified by works. Were the law less holy, less rigorous in its demands; were it satisfied with less extensive services; did it require only a sincere but defective obedience: there would then be no necessity for this revealed method of Justification. Man in that case might be justified by the deeds of the law. But because the law is holy; because it declares, that the man who doth those things shall live by them; because it denounces, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things, which are written in the book of the law to do them :"* therefore since righteousness cannot be attained by the law, the righteousness of faith is manifested in the gospel. Does faith then "make void the law?" Does not the doctrine of justification by faith only, "magnify the law, and make it honourable?"+ Does it not imply in the strongest + Isaiah lii. 21.

* Rom. x. 5. Gal. iii. 10.

manner, the holy extensive, spiritual nature of that obedience, which the law requires? What foundation then in this instance, can be found for the objection alleged?

But though the doctrine in question neither weakens the obligation to obey the moral law, nor reduces the measure of the obedience required; yet does it not supersede the necessity of any obedience at all? does not the position that we are justified by faith only, contribute in its legitimate consequences, to establish the conclusion that obedience is unnecessary to salvation? Can such a position then be consistent with the general tenor of that gospel, the professed object of which is to turn mankind from their iniquities, and to fit them for an inheritance among them which are sanctified? Doubtless, if such be the effect of this position, the inference deduced from it is just. If while the doctrine of justification by faith only, professes to acknowledge the obligatory power and spiritual nature of the moral law, it at the same time tends to supersede the necessity of obedience to it; if it gives any real countenance to the assertion, that works are unnecessary to salvation; such a tendency must destroy every claim to its being received as a sound interpretation of scriptural truth. But, to recur to our former inquiry, is such the tendency of the doctrine? Can such consequences be fairly deduced from it? In this part of the charge the chief strength of the objection is supposed to lodge. To this point therefore let particular attention be applied.

What, in the first place, are the grounds, on which the necessity of obedience to the moral law is founded? Why is a holy conformity to the will and the image of God necessary to the salvation of man? Because without this holy conformity man would be unfit to enter into the presence of God and unable to participate of the holy felicity of heaven. "Without holiness no man shall see the Lord.-Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God." Under the dominion of evil, selfish, and tormenting passions, destitute of that peace and joy and love, of that devotedness of every power and faculty to the service and glory of the great Creator in which the essence of heavenly felicity consists, the *Heb. xii. 14. Matt. v. 8.

soul would possess no meetness for partaking of the inheritance of the saints in light. Could the proud, the covetous, the sensual, the profane, could such characters experience any pleasure in "seeing God," in contemplating his great perfections? Could they find delight in the society of heaven, in the innumerable company of angels, in intercourse with "the spirits of just men made perfect?" The very language of those blessed mansions would be foreign to their hearts. Could they cordially unite their voices with the acclamations of that enraptured host, who "fall down before him that sitteth on the throne, and worship him that liveth for ever and ever, and cast their crowns before the throne, saying, Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour and power; for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created?"*

Those must be holy whom such holy services engage. How then can man be saved without obedience to the moral law? Is not conformity to its most spiritual injunctions indispensably necessary to his salvation? On this ground the necessity of obedience rests.

Advert next to the particular nature of Justification: and see whether it tends to supersede this necessity. See whether the objection before us does not arise from indistinctness of conception and inaccuracy of expression on this subject. Persons, when urging this objection, frequently speak as if Justification and salvation were synonimous and convertible terms. But this is not a correct statement of the case. True it is that in a loose and popular sense these terms may reasonably admit of such a transposition. The one may occasionally be used for the other. But let it be remembered, that Justification, in its precise and doctrinal meaning, designates only one part of salvation; that part, by which the guilt of sin is removed, and a perfect reconciliation between God and the sinner accomplished. In what respect then does this doctrine tend to supersede the necessity of obedience to the moral law? Does it undermine, does it approach the foundation, on which this necessity is built? Because it excludes obedience from any participation in the office of justifying the sinner, does it therefore imply

*Rev. iv. 10, 11.

A

that obedience is unnecessary to salvation? Because it declares, that no holiness of heart and life has any share in atoning for sin, or in reconciling us to God, but that these glorious privileges are conveyed to us solely through faith in the Redeemer's blood; does it therefore intimate that no holiness of heart and life are requisite to qualify us for the enjoyment of our purchased inheritance? criminal, labouring under a deadly sickness, receives a pardon from his monarch. If we should in this case assert, that the state of his health had no connection with the mercy received; such an assertion could never be construed to imply that his recovery from sickness was unconnected with his future happiness. Because his obligation to punishment has been remitted by an act of grace, it cannot therefore be inferred that health is unnecessary to his enjoyment of the royal bounty. Nay, we should rather form a directly opposite conclusion. We should rather say, that his deliverance from the sentence of death, and his restoration to his forfeited privileges, rendered the removal of his disorder a blessing more than ever desirable. With what colour of truth then can it be said, that the doctrine of Justification by faith only, supersedes the necessity of obedience? How can it be charged in this respect with " making void the law?" It provides a remedy for the penal consequences, which past disobedience has incurred; but it leaves the necessity of personal holiness to rest on the same foundation on which it always had rested, on which it would always have rested, had disobedience never been introduced; on the impossibility of holding communion with God, and of partaking of his felicity, without possessing corresponding dispositions, and being made partakers of his holiness.

Upon the whole, what becomes of the original objection? If, as we have seen, the method of justifying the sinner by faith only, tends in its legitimate consequences, neither to weaken the obligation to obey the moral law, nor to reduce the measure of the required obedience, nor to supersede the necessity of obedience; in what sense does it "make void the law?" Is the alleged charge of introducing and encouraging licentiousness substantiated? Destitute of every solid foundation, does it not necessarily fall to the ground?