It is to be remarked, also, that of these neuter adjectives with the article prefixed, many, in consequence of being habitually applied as epithets to some particular thing, have, after a time, come to be familiarly used as the name of that thing; as a concrete term for some subject possessing the qualities originally denoted by the adjective. Thus we find To iego used for the temple, το άγιον for the sanctuary, το θυσιατήριον for the altar, το ιλαστήριον for the mercy-seat, το δαιμονιον for a damon, το ήδυ όσμον for mint, το δημοσιον sometimes for taxes, sometimes for the treasury, and sometimes for the common jail, &c. &c. Now this could never have happened, if the article had been prefixed for the purpose of shewing that the quality denoted by the adjective was to be taken in an abstract and general sense. That which declared the quality to be abstract would have prevented it from becoming concrete;-that which declared it to be general would have prevented it from becoming particular.

-as

In those examples which Dr. Middleton and Mr. Veysie have chosen to illustrate this rule, we cannot doubt that the adjec tives το σωφρον, το όσιον, το ωφελιμον, &c. were used in an abstract sense but how do we obtain our knowlege of the fact, or what does the article effect towards the discovery? Exactly what it does on every other occasion, and no more. - Let us attend a little to the process by which we arrive at the conclu Observing that the words are adjectives, we see that some substantives must be understood; as these adjectives are neuter, the substantives must denote not persons but things; and as articles are prefixed to the adjectives, the substantives must denote things that are numbered and definite among other things:- but there is no limit to the number of such things, and nothing is here expressed either by word or circumstance except the adjectives themselves to icad and confine us to any one of these things more than another. Yet unless we fix on some particular one among the endless number, we can make no sense of any of the passages. Now the only way in which we can fix on any one of them, and make it particular, is by ascertaining those qualities and properties which distinguish it from the rest; and nothing here is indicative of quality or property but the adjective itself. The mind, there fore, is compelled, by the absence of every other word, to have recourse to the adjective, and to understand for its substantive any thing whatever which is distinguished by the qualities and properties denoted by the adjective; or, in other words, to understand the adjective in an abstract sense. The article only shews that the writer means to speak definitely of this abstract quality. To awggo shews that he means to speak definitely

definitely of σωφροσύνη, το όσιον οἱ ὁσιόλης, and το ωφελιμον οἱ ωφέλεια, &c.

When we read the inscription on the statue of Isis recorded by Plutarch, Εγω ειμι παν το γεγονός, και ον, και εσόμενον, &c. (De Isid. p. 631. Vol. i. edit. Steph. 8vo. 1572.) we see that TO YEYOVOS indicates past, and sooμEVOV future existence, in the general and abstract idea of it:- but when we read in Luke, (xxiv. 12.) Sauralwv to yeyovos, and in the same evangelist, (xxii. 49.) does TO EσOμEVOV, we see that particular events are indicated; the resurrection, and the apprehension of Jesus. Is it the article, then, that shews us when the adjective is used in a general and abstract sense? or do we contribute towards explaining the nature and use of the article by saying that it is often prefixed to adjectives so used? Most assuredly, not.

After having explained his eight cases, Mr. Veysie says a very few words on the use of the article with the subject and the predicate of a proposition, where he considers it as being purely demonstrative; and he then concludes his dissertation with some observations, more at length, on Mr. Sharp's rule: without noticing, however, either Mr. Sharp himself or any of the parties in the controversy which the rule has occasioned, and without applying it to any of those texts of scripture for the sake of which the rule itself, or rather its restrictions and limi-, tations, were invented by their worthy and benevolent, but mistaken, author.

In the case of subject and predicate, we have already shewn (see Rev. Vol. Ixii. p. 267-270.) that nothing peculiar is ascribable to the use of the article; which is inserted, or omitted, before either of them indifferently, according as they are used definitely or indefinitely; and that the only reason for its being commonly inserted before the one, and omitted before the other, is because the one is commonly definite and the other indefinite, for causes which we assigned. In this conclusion, Mr. Veysie seems nearly to coincide with us, by his saying that the subject commonly assumes the article, but the predicate in more instances rejects it; because the word denoting the subject has a determinate signification, but the predicate is commonly of another nature.'

In his observations on Mr. Sharp's rule, Mr. V. puts on so much of the scholastic logician, and talks so learnedly about

*This rule, as it was originally worded by Mr. Sharp himself, was given in Rev. Vol. xliv. p. 403; and, as it was mended, or rather marred, by Dr. Middleton, was amply detailed in Rev. Vol. Ixii, pp. 81 and 151-159. For Mr. Veysie's observations on it, and our opinion of those observations, see the pages immediately ensuing.

the

the relate and the correlate, and about relatives which are in eodem but not ad idem, that, if other parts of his writings had not persuaded us to think better of him, we should be almost tempted to suppose that he meant to make "the unlearned stare." Let the effect intended be what it may, the effect produced by such displays is always to make the truly "learned smile."

The artificial limitations (for they are not natural, since they cannot be shewn to have any foundation either in the nature of things or in the nature of language,) which Mr. Sharp invented for the purpose of making his rule absolutely inviolable and proof against all possibility of exception, were that the nouns must be personal, singular, and not proper names. All these Mr. V. comprehends, as Dr. Middleton had done before him, under the term attributives in the singular number. Of such attributives, Mr. V. says that if there be no express attribution of them to any subject,' and no joint reference of them to one and the same correlate,' (that is, if we find such an expression, for instance, as o deos xa Barthes without the ad. dition of any person to whom the title of Baotus is attributed, and without any previous mention of a Barisia, or any thing else, to which the epithets have a joint reference,) then, though it is most certain that such attributives often may, it perhaps may be doubted whether they always must, denote one and the same person. His own opinion is that, though such a combination of plural attributives denoting different things frequently occurs, yet if no such combination of singular attributives denoting different things can be produced, he should say that in all cases and under all circumstances, singular attributives, so combined must, according to the invariable usage of the Greek language, belong to one and the same subject.'

Now to require singular attributives, after the frequent production of plural attributives, seems to us like requiring examples beginning with a particular letter of the alphabet, after the production of those which begin with other letters of the alphabet; or like requiring dissyllables after the production of monosyllables and trisyllables.

Mr. Veysie adds that he does not know that any clear and indisputable instance of singular attributives, thus combined and denoting different things, has ever been produced.' If so, we cannot help considering him as unfortunate; and as having overlooked what is to be seen in every writer concerned in the controversy (except Mr. Sharp himself), whether writing for or against the rule. The only difference between them is that those who are for the rule have endeavoured to explain away the instances, while those who are against it have defended

them,

them. In his examination of Dr. Middleton's work,' did Mr. Veysie overlook the instance which that gentleman has produced in his note on 1 Pet. ii. 13. viz. po68 ToV GEOV, VIE, nat Barna. Prov. xxiv. 21.? Or could he satisfy himself with the poor reasons there assigned for deeming this instance inconclusive; an instance first produced, among many others, by Mr. Winstanley, of whose pamphlet we gave an account in our 52d Vol. p. 326. but which Dr. M. chose rather to keep out of sight than to notice? Did Mr. V. overlook the clear and indisputable instance produced by Dr. M. from Herodotus, lib. iv. p. 313. edit. Wesseling. Tov ovoxoov, nas pavelgov, καὶ ἱπποκόμον, και διηκονον, και αγγελιηφόρον, κ. τ. λ. ? Did he overlook all that learned writer's other instances? If he did, we would refer him to our 62d volume p. 156. where they are quoted; and to p. 158. where several additions are made to them.

Be this, however, as it may, whether Mr. V. did or did not overlook all these instances, it seems to us that he did not feel his mind entirely at ease respecting the security of the rule; for if the mounds erected round it by Mr. Sharp had rendered it impregnable, what need was there for additional outworks to make it still stronger? Yet Mr. Veysie has added farther Jimitations to those which were invented by Mr. Sharp. Perhaps,' says he, it may be doubted' whether the nouns as limited by Mr. Sharp absolutely must denote one and the same thing, unless they have this farther limitation that they jointly refer to one and the same correlate;' that is, to recur to our former example, unless a Barina, or something else, be premised to which the 90s and the Baseus jointly relate. Unless this new limitation be added, there may be doubt: but if we go a step farther still, and add one more limitation so as to have attribution to some subject implied or actually expressed,'—that is, if we have any person necessarily implied or expressly named as the Bartheus,in that case the matter will not admit of doubt or dispute; there the combined attributives necessarily belong to one and the same thing, and not to dif ferent things.'

This reasoning appears to us to be as good and valid as it would be for a man to say, that he knew that " the heads and senior fellows of colleges" in the plural number frequently denoted different persons, but that, if he did not see an instance produced before him, he should say that in all cases, and under all circumstances, "the head and senior fellow of a college," in the singular number, must, according to the invariable usage of the English language, describe one and the same individual; and that, though perhaps it might be doubted whether "the

provost

provost and senior fellow of Oriel" absolutely must denote one and the same individual, unless where the attributives were jointly referred to one and the same correlate, such as gift, for instance, or any other, and it were said that "the living of Plymtree is in the gift of the provost and senior fellow of Oriel," yet, if attribution to a subject were expressed, and the senior fellow actually named, thus, "The provost and senior fellow N. or M." * in that case the matter no longer admits of doubt or dispute ;-there the combined attributives necessarily belong to one and the same person, and not to different persons.

Verily, this adding of limitation to limitation appeareth to us to be "all vanity and vexation of spirit!" We would advise the advocates for the rule to be contented with one limitation, which we are rather surprised that they have not long ago adopted; since it requires no great comprehension of mind to see that it will furnish them with all that they seek, will cut off every example that can possibly lift up its head against the rule, and will render it really inviolable. We would recommend it to them to say that, if one of the nouns be 9805 and the other any personal description of Jesus, in that case they must denote one and the same individual. This is a "Short Way," and the only true way, "with the Dissenters."

After having preached so often and so long on the same subject, we have no doubt that all our readers, as well those who have as those who have not had the patience to attend to us, will rejoice to find us adopting the words of the oldest and wisest of preachers, "Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter."

This, then, is our summing up;-that the ARTICLE is an adjective-that its PRINCIPLE is numerical ‡;—that this prin

*We hope that our readers will not fail to observe that these two letters are quoted from the church-catechism, every letter of which, whether more or less intelligible than N. or M. (whose rationale, we are forced to confess, we do not thoroughly comprehend, though, as all the world knows, and has known for more than half a century, we understand every thing else,) we have felt the utmost anxiety to disseminate ever since we have been told, as we lately were, in the public papers, by authority which we have been accustomed highly to respect, and from which we should be very sorry to "dissent without a real cause," that this national catechism is so essential to the salvation both of church and state, that, if it be not invariably taught in the national education, church and state will both be ruined, and “the world turned upside down," (Acts xvii. 6.) by that wicked Quaker, Joseph Lancaster. Forbid it! oh! forbid it, N. or M. ! See ibid. p. 279.

See Rev. Vol. Ixii. p. 72.