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CHAP. XIV.

ON THE STABILITY OF EMPIRE.

$ 1.

W the inftability of the throne

E have already confidered

under the Roman Emperors and the Turkish Sultans; the former being often depofed and murdered by the Prætorian bands, and the latter by their Janizaries. The Emperors of China are not more fecurely feated. Such is the weakness of that government, and fo little affection have the fubjects for their fovereign, that the leader of a fuccessful gang of robbers, marching to the capitol, is able to dethrone the Emperor, and take his place *. Baron Montefquieu well obferves, "all our hiftories are full of civil wars without revolutions, while the hiftories of defpotic go

* Montefq. 1. viii. ch. 21.

vernments

vernments abound with revolutions without civil wars *." If abufes have crept into a free government, men of rank, men of fortune, men of principle may step forwards and expoftulate, and their expoftulation will often be fufficient to obtain redrefs; but fuppofing they have expoftulated in vain, and that they are obliged to have recourfe to arms, they take the lead, they keep their object still in view, and, knowing that it is not their intereft to fubvert the government, they seek only redrefs of grievances, and haften to a reconciliation. In a defpotic government, men of rank and fortune dare not step forth, because they would be inftantly facrificed to the blind refentment of the fovereign; the people therefore take the lead; none but the most violent counfels are liftened to; each hurries on the other to take revenge rather than to feek redrefs, 'till, excited to the highest pitch of fury, they destroy by fire and fword, not only the perfons, but the

Montefquieu, lib. v. ch. 11.
U

very

very manfions of their governors. Virgil's defcription of Polypheme is applicable to an enraged people, hurried away by the brutal paffion of revenge.

Monftrum horrendum, informe ingens; cui lumen ademptum.

§ 2. In order to defend themselves from the blind fury of this monfter, defpotic fovereigns have had recourfe to standing armies and foreign mercenaries; and to fecure themfelves from thefe, the princes of Europe have multiplied their forces, and feparated them under. fubordinate commanders, referving to themselves the command in chief. Formerly, indeed, the fovereigns of Europe were liable to be depofed, like those of Asia, by their foldiers. As our German ancestors elected their own generals, and gave them the command of armies independent of the fovereign, fo likewife did the Franks and Saxons; the former fettled in Gaul, the latter in Britain.

Thefe generals, called in France mayors of the palace, and in England dukes,

having the fupreme command of the military force, could eafily dethrone the monarch; but now, every fovereign is generaliffimo over all the forces of his dominion, and has little therefore to fear from his own fubjects. Notwithstanding these precautions, their empire is precarious, and from the very nature of their government must be fo. The principle of defpotic government is fear; it has no occafion for virtue, and honour would be extremely dangerous *. From the jealousy of this government, the fubjects are difarmed, and in confequence must be unacquainted with military difcipline; they are oppreffed, and in confequence their fpirits must be broken. Men who fight for their religion, their liberty, their laws, will fight like men; but it never can be expected that flaves will fight, who have nothing to fight for: they may be compelled to enlift, they may be driven to the field of battle; but

Montefq. lib. iii. chap. 9.
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they

they will not fight. Even veteran foldiers have fuffered themselves to be cut in pieces, rather than obtain laurels for those by whom they thought themselves illused. How then can it be expected, that men who have been robbed of their liberties, plundered of their substance, degraded and oppreffed, fhould freely fhed their blood to maintain the empire of a defpotic fovereign? Have they an enemy more to be dreaded than the tyrant who fubverts their liberty, and who knows no other law but his own capricious will, his avarice, his cruelty, his luft, or his ambition? Can they be in a more humiliating condition, or does it matter to them who wears the crown, or to whom they pay their tribute? If they are invaded by a Caligula, a Nero, a Caracalla, they may dread the most atrocious acts of wanton cruelty, and therefore may refift; if the invader be a prince of milder difpofition than their own sovereign, they muft look upon him as a deliverer; if they are uncertain of his difpofition, it will be a matter of indifference to them,

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