confolation must arife from the hope of be- SERM. ing acquitted by the great judge of the whole III. world, especially when we confider the folemnity of the judgment, and the confequences of it, as they are described in fcripture, with an intention, as on the one hand, to alarm finners, and bring them to repentance; fo on the other, to comfort good men, by affuring them that their work of faith, their labour of love, and patience of hope, fhall not be in vain. Now, if it be so, that the experience of the best men affureth us, that the study and practice of religion is pleasant; if the experience of all men, who are in the least degree attentive, and even of the greatest sinners, proves that the contrary crooked ways of vice and wickedness have always a mixture of uneafinefs and bitterness in the review; and if both reafon and fcripture make it evident, that the exercife of true religion and virtue is the only foundation upon which we can have good hope towards God, then it must be acknowledged to be true, which Solomon fays in the text, that the ways of wisdom are pleasantness, and her paths are peace.

But yet farther to confirm us in this perfuafion, we may confider the pleasures which F 4

accom

SER M. accompany the practice of fincere religion
III. that is, which arise from the testimony of

an approving conscience, and the hope of
the glory of God; we may confider these,
I fay, in comparison with other pleasures
which are oppofite to them, and which
continually folicit our affections and our pur-
fuit. For feeing the human nature is not
capable of all kinds of delight at once, it is
reasonable for us to make the beft our choice;
and fecing the pleasures of wisdom and of
fin are utterly inconfiftent, fo that of necef-
fity we must hold to the one, and refuse the
other, the true queftion, in order to our be-
ing rightly determined, is, which of the two
kinds are the moft worthy, and in all re-
fpects the most eligible? It would be a vain
attempt to perfuade men that there is no
real pleasure in the gratification of their
fenfes and the appetites of human nature;
to argue that the hungry feel no fatisfaction
in meats, and the thirsty in refreshing drinks,
is to argue against sense, and experience will
quickly fhow the vanity of such reasoning:
Nay, it
may be acknowledged farther, that
voluptuous men, the lafcivious and the in-
temperate, have by an habitual indulging of
their inclinations, and by vicious customs,

raised

raised in themselves defires of carnal enjoy- SERM, ments, far beyond the demands of nature, III. which yield pleasures in the moment of gratifying them, though at the fame time they are accompanied with a great deal more pain, like quenching unnatural thirst in a fever; let it, I fay, be allowed, that they find pleasure in gratifying these defires, for that is the very bait which allures them to their criminal exceffes, against the fober dictates of their own minds; yet still it will appear that the pleasure of wisdom's ways is far more excellent, and on many accounts to be preferred.

First, it is a juft prejudice against the gratifications of sense, or of the merely animal life; I mean against their being chief in our esteem and affection, that they are common with us to the brutal kinds. We fee the beasts have the outward fenfes to as great a degree of perfection as we; they eat, they drink, and perform all the functions of the animal nature, and, as far as we can judge, with as exquifite a relish, and as high a fatiffaction as ourselves. Now, do not we value ourfelves upon the prerogative of reafon, whereby we are exalted above, not only the inanimate and vegetable, but the fenfative creatures?

I

SERM. creatures? And fhall we fink fo far beneath III. the dignity of our fpecies, as in the choice

of our pleasures, to be upon a level with the beafts of the earth? As every fort of being capable of any happiness at all, hath enjoyments fuitable to its powers and measures of perfection, those which are peculiar to man, must be the moft becoming him; and fuch are the pleasures of wisdom, of their participating in which the brutes give not the leaft discovery. Not only fo, but the pleafures of fenfe, licentiously indulged, and in the forbidden degree, weaken reason, and marr its free exercise, which is a strong objection against them. Can any thing be worthy an intelligent and free agent, which darkens his understanding, and impares his freedom? Now, every man hath too much experience, if he seriously reflecteth, not to be fenfible that carnal gratifications, immoderately pursued, caft a fhadow over the understanding; that they are accompanied with perturbation, and diffipate the vigour of the foul. Set against these the joys of an approving conscience, the peace which arifeth from the love of God's law, and an inward sense of our own integrity, and fee whether they are not of a nobler character? They

are

are pure and ferene, attended with no tu- SERM. mult; and instead of impairing the higher III. powers of the mind, the understanding and liberty, they preserve them in the greatest compofure and undisturbed exercise, and in their most healthful and vigorous state.

2dly, The pleasures of this world are but very precarious; we can have no fure hold of them, nor any certainty in our profpect of a future enjoyment of them; a man hath it not in his power to command them when he will; they depend on external objects which cannot be always prefent, and if they were, could not always please. It is but a poor confolation that lies at the mercy of time and chance, and which therefore muft be fubject to continual disappointments. When one has the keeneft appetites, the ftrongest inclinations to entertain himself agreeably, his hopes are often fruftrated, being liable to many unforeseen incidents and indifpofitions in the object, or a fudden indifpofition in the faculty marrs his expected pleasure But the good man is fatisfied from himself, his joy and peace do not depend on variable accidents, he retireth into his own heart, where he enjoys an inward harmony and tranquility, not interrupted by jarring