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to direct his choice, because he cannnot dif- SERM: cern the difference, and may be as ready to catch at a pebble as a jewel, nay, as ready to lay hold on what is deftructive, as on what may be good and profitable to him; fo in the proper sphere of the rational powers, as there is an effential difference between objects, it is abfolutely neceffary we should discern it, in order to our being rightly determined. If this be a juft notion of wifdom, let us apply it to the subject before us, and any one may eafily judge, whether univerfal religion, the fear of God, justice, patience, temperance, goodness, be not more agreeable to the true nature and effential differences of things, and fheweth an exacter judgment concerning them than the contrary. Let any man who hath even the flendereft acquaintance with the system of thefe virtues, determine, whether he who heartily embraceth and acteth according to it, appeareth to have a truer discernment, than he who maketh the oppofite choice. I do not doubt but every one, who reflecteth seriously, will be convinced, that to fear God, to be just, and charitable to men, and to moderate our own appetites and paffions, is to judge rightly, to treat things as they

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SERM, are, according to truth, and to their real nature and importance; in other words, that it is wisdom; and that to abandon our felves to impiety, unrighteousness, and senfual pleasures, is to confound things, to neglect their differences, to treat them quite otherwise than, at leaft if we confidered, we fhould judge them to be; or that it is folly.

Another notion of wisdom is, an ability to improve our reason to the best purposes. All men boaft alike of this high prerogative of their nature, that they are rational; but they have not all the fame dexterity in the use of reason, nor an equal capacity to employ it for the fame valuable ends. The conftitution of the human nature feems to be uniform; we have the fame original determinations, the fame fenfes, or ways of perceiving things, and the fame propensities or affections which conftitute the ends we purfue; but they are various and unequal in their excellency and importance, according to the different parts of our nature to which they relate, and the ufes which the wife author of our being defigned them for. There is, for example, in man, a defire to meat and drink, and other gratifications of

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the external fenfes; there is alfo a defire of SERM. moral excellence, an affection to beings of I. the most perfect characters. Every one must see there is a great difference in point of excellency and importance, between these affections or defires, and the pursuits to which they determine us. It is the province of wifdom to judge concerning the worth and dignity of our ends, that we may pursue them with suitable zeal and application, as well as to find out the best and propereft means for obtaining them. Now, among all the ends which we are determined to pursue by any instinct, appetite, or inclination of nature, it will be no difficulty to judge which are the worthiest, the most excellent in themselves, and the most becoming fuch creatures as we are to pursue, and confequently, which ends true wisdom directeth us to chufe, as the chief and conftantly to be aimed at, in preference to all others; whether that moral perfection, which is the glory of intelligent beings, or the enjoyments of the animal life, which are common to us with the brutal kinds.

One neceffary determination in our nature is, to feek our own happiness; and it will be acknowledged true wisdom which directeth

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BERM. directeth us to the best and most effectual I. way for fecuring that end. Now, not to enter on any large explication of this point, the question concerning the wifdom of religion may be brought to a fhort iffue. Let any man seriously confider, and upon mature reflection answer to himself, whether he really thinks it would be better for him, upon the whole, to be religious or wicked; whether he would find himself eafier, and be better fatisfied in his own mind, and have better hope concerning his ftate hereafter; by fearing God, or not fearing him; by a course of regular ftrict virtue, or licentious immorality? If there be any difficulty at all in answering the question, it arifeth from the vehemence of corrupt inclinations, and the prefent uneafinefs which accompanieth them; whereby men are urged to comply, without confidering the certain, though at prefent diftant, confequences of fuch compliance. But, not to infift on any other arguments, this is a difficulty unworthy of wifdom, because it arifeth from the weak part of our conftitution, originally intended to be guided and directed by reason, which in man ought still to hold the reins; and we turn into folly,

whenever

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whenever we decline a subjection to its em-SERM. pire, or act otherwise than it directeth. Doth not wisdom require us to act with a regard to the future, as well as the present time? Is it not true difcretion to have a greater regard to a more important than to a lefs important intereft, and to have a greater regard to an eternal state, than to that which is momentary and perishing? And if this be taken into the account, the wisdom of religion will fully appear.

It is certain that multitudes of mankind conduct themselves quite otherwife; they take up with the pleasures of the external fenfes, or the gratification of low defires; and they imagine themselves wife in doing fo, devifing fubtile methods for obtaining their ends. But this fatal mistake arifeth from a partial confideration of the human nature, and a narrow view of our existence. If we deliberately confider the whole of our frame, and with difcretion extend our profpects to a future state, of which we have the strongest affurances, we shall be convinced that fenfible objects cannot afford us the trueft felicity; and that it becometh fuch creatures as we are, to provide for a longer duration than the prefent life; that

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