it is his duty, will a man find himself de- SERM. termined to use his utmoft power for reliev- VII. ing one whom he feeth in great extremity and ready to perish, even with danger, trouble, and difadvantage to himself? Nay, there are plain enough difcoveries of fuch affections, or instincts resembling them, in the inferior kinds of animals, who are not capable of any moral reflection or abstract thinking at all.

But there are other objects of affection which are brought into the mind after a different manner, that is, by reflection, inquiry, comparing things, and forming general notions of them. There are excellent objects which, when well understood, we cannot but highly esteem, but they do not occur to our fenfes; we are led to the knowledge of them by experience, obfervation, and reafoning. Of this fort is what Solomon calleth wifdom or virtue, which is not an object of sense, but a quality of the mind intirely abstracted from all material beings, and taking none of their properties into the idea of it, as real, however, as any of them, and as truly an object of love and esteem to the mind which difcerneth it. When the affections of piety, reverence for fupreme

moral

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SERM, moral excellence, of gratitude, benevolence, VII. and honefty, are brought into the mind, there is love excited to them, and they appear very amiable and attractive objects. It is this indeed which is ftrictly moral goodness or virtue, not a mere proneness to do good, raised and excited to action by the impreffion which outward things make upon the senses, but a temper formed to goodness, with the understanding and approbation of a felf-reflecting mind, which dif cerneth its excellence; and Solomon very properly calleth it wisdom, because it is peculiar to intelligent beings, and is the juft improvement of their rational powers.

What, therefore, I think is first of all imported in the love of wisdom, is, a high esteem of its fuperior excellence, as the result of mature confideration. Solomon preffeth his disciples to exalt wisdom, chap. iv. 8. that is, to entertain very exalted thoughts of her dignity, for these will naturally command our affections, and engage us to earneftness and diligence in the pursuit of her. And it is for this reafon that he very often compareth her with things which are the most desired by men, and afferteth that she is principal, far tranfcending gold and filver, more excellent than the ruby or the topaz ;

the

the defign of which comparisons is to in- SER M. duce men to an attentive confideration. VII. The beauty of wisdom doth not strike the fenfes as external objects do; it doth not by noife and tumult, or by a glittering fhew, captivate the fancy, which instead of favouring is rather an enemy to its pretenfions; but it addreffeth the understanding, and befpeaketh our affection, by that substantial worth which will abide a ftrict and impartial examination. This is what methinks we should be induced eafily to comply with, because it is fo becoming that reason we boast of as the high prerogative of our nature. Here now is a great difference between the love of wisdom and other affections, that it is always accompanied with the approbation of the understanding, nay, and still the more we confider the more we approve it. It is an affection wherein we fhall always be justified to ourselves, which is a strong argument in its favour, as it layeth a fure foundation of inward peace. Is it not unworthy of intelligent creatures to run blindly into the purfuit of any thing, without having carefully inquired into, and judged of its nature, its worth, and its usefulness? Those creatures are not to be blamed who have no capacity of reflecting and rea

SERM, foning on their own propenfities and incliVII. nations, for being directed wholly by them;

but it is reproachful for us not to fhew ourfelves men, and call to mind, as the prophet fpeaketh, not to compare the objects of our own affections and defires, and give the preference to those which our reason must pronounce the most worthy. Now, wisdom doth not, as many other objects do, folicit our affections, and invite our prosecution indeliberately; she calls upon us to make the exacteft fcrutiny we can, and would have none to be her votaries, but upon the terms of a fair and impartial examination. And indeed a great point is gained when the mind is brought to fuch a difpofition; for it is no fmall difficulty to difengage it from ftrong prepoffeffion in favour of external and fenfible things, and fuch a fair and impartial trial will iffue in the highest esteem of wisdom, and that will even irresistibly draw our affections. It will therefore lead to a just decifion of the great question concerning what ought to have the chief room in our hearts, if we will dwell in our own thoughts upon a deliberate comparison between wisdom, and all those things which stand in competition with it; and if we

fhall

fhall find ourselves obliged to acknowledge SER M. its fuperior excellence, then it followeth,

2dly, That we should defire it above all things. This alfo Solomon proposeth as a qualification and means of attaining to wifdom, Prov. xviii. 1. Through defire a man having Separated himself, feeketh and intermeddleth with all wisdom; a strong prevailing defire in his heart towards its native worth and moft amiable beauty putteth him upon ufing the most vigorous and constant endea vours for acquiring it, which shall be fuccessful. Defire is, in the human constitution, an active spring of our movements and operations; as the weight of bodies deter mineth their defcent towards the center, fo defire carrieth the mind towards its object; its force appeareth univerfally in all the bu finefs of human life, and in the whole com→ pass of our enjoyments; it is that which exciteth every one of the powers of nature to its proper exercise. Seeing it is fo, if the obtaining of wisdom be proposed as our end, we must be engaged in the prosecution of it, just as in the profecution of all other ends, that is by defire. But in the human nature there is a great variety of inclinations, and they cannot all have an equal degree of force; that which is the ftrongest carrieth

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VII.