We have been diffuse in explaining the author's design, becaufe we think the work deserves great attention. We fhall now give a short analysis of the various fubjects, and fubjoin fome extracts, chiefly calculated to illuftrate the manner which diftinguishes the prefent volume.

The great ufe of morality is to regulate the rules of life, viz. the law of honour, that of the land, and the fcriptures. Some authors have fubftituted for moral precepts, an instinctive monitor, called the moral fenfe, as a principle of our conftitution, capable of difcerning right and wrong, and of informing us of the nature of our actions, by a fecret, though often a powerful impulfe. Our author thinks, with reafon, that there is no fuch innate principle. The great fource of confufion, in almost every branch of metaphyfics, has been the velocity with which the mind acts, and the readiness with which the appropriates every thing external to herself. By this means we can feldom diftinguish her natural powers from her acquifitions; for qualities apparently inherent, are often the creatures of her own formation. The fcience wants great affiftance from careful and accurate obfervers: Mr. Paley does not add much to it in this light; but he examines with candour, and generally decides with judgment. Human happiness and virtue are the two next objects of confideration, which our author ftyles preliminary. The chapter on happiness is written with great perfpicuity and exactness.

The fecond book is on Moral Obligation;' and Mr. Paley, with fingular addrefs, establishes the union between morality and religion. Indeed, as he has pointed the question, it is difficult to elude it. He himself feems to think that, independent of the declared will of God, there are not fufficient motives to check vice. Without wishing to weaken the inducements, or to diminish one link in this great chain of union, we cannot implicitly follow our author in this opinion. It is enough to agree that, in a well regulated reflecting mind, motives of either kind will add weight to the others; and it is a pleafing reflection, that each mode of reafoning is capable of proving the neceffity of morality. Perhaps no one has, for a moment, doubted it, fince however different tenets and precepts may be, in this great point every fest agrees.

Our author's plan next leads him to confider Divine Benevolence,' which he establishes fo unexceptionably, that we may fafely follow him in his enquiry into the will of God,' concerning any given action, by the confideration of its tendency, to promote or diminish general happiness. This enquiry, and the proper limitations, leads our author to cítablish the necef

fity of general rules, and to diftinguish between the general' and particular confequences of an action.

The connection of obligation' and right, or rather their oppofition, induces the author to close the first book with some remarks and diftinctions of general and particular rights.' Thefe obfervations are extremely juft, and involve fome important confequences, which we would recommend to 'thofé who are eager to fupport monopolies; but unfortunately the defire of gain, or the luft of power, seldom attend to the dictates of morality.

The third book is on Determinate Relative Duties,' as property, its utility, and the various means by which it is acquired; promifes of different kinds, which are accurately. diftinguished, and the remarks on each kind are extremely juft and clear. Contracts of different forts; and from this part of the work we shall felect a fpecimen, because it is less connected with the reasoning of the rest.

"I know few fubjects which have been more misunderstood: than the law which 'authorifes the imprisonment of infolvent debtors. It has been reprefented as a gratuitous cruelty, which contributes nothing to the reparation of the creditor's lofs, or to the advantage of the community. This prejudice arifes priné cipally from confidering the fending of a debtor to jail, as an act of private fatisfaction to the creditor, instead of a public punishment. As an act of fatisfaction or revenge it is always wrong in the motive, and often intemperate and undiftinguishing in the exercise. Confider it as a public punishment, found ed upon the fame reason, and fubject to the fame rules, as other punishments; and the juftice of it, together with the degree to which it should be extended, and the objects upon whom it may be inflicted, will be apparent. There are frauds relat ing to infolvency, againft which it is as neceffary to provide punishment, as for any public crimes whatever; as where a man gets your money into his poffeffion, and forthwith runs away with it; or, what is little better, fquanders it with vi-' tious expences; or ftakes it at the gaming table; in the alley; or upon wild adventures in trade; or is confcious at the time he borrows it, that he can never repay it; or wilfully puts it out of his power by profufe living; or conceals his effects, or transfers them by collufion to another; not to mention the obs ftinacy of fome debtors, who had rather rot in a jail, than deliver up their eftates; for, to fay the truth, the first abfurdity. is in the law itself, which leaves it in a debtor's power to with hold any part of his property from the claim of his creditors. The only question is, whether the punishment be properly placed in the hands of an exafperated creditor? for which it may be faid, that thefe frauds are fo fubtle and versatile, that nothing but a difcretionary power can overtake them; and that VOL. LX. July, 1785. D

no difcretion is likely to be fo well informed, fo vigilant, and fo active, as that of the creditor.

It must be remembered, however, that the confinement of a debtor in jail is a punishment; and that every punishment fuppofes a crime. To purfue, therefore, with the extremity of legal rigour, a fufferer, whom the fraud or failure of others, his own want of capacity, or the difappointments and miscarriages to which all human affairs are fubject, have reduced to ruin, merely because we are provoked by our loss, and feek to relieve the pain we feel, by that which we inflict, is repugnant not only to humanity, but to juftice; for it is to pervert a provifion of law, defigned for a different and a falutary purpose, to the gratification of private spleen and refentment. Any alteration in thefe laws, which could diftinguish the degrees of guilt, or convert the fervice of the infolvent debtor to fome public profit, might be an improvement; but any confiderable mitigation of their rigour, under colour of relieving the poor, would increase their hardships. For whatever deprives the creditor of his power of coercion, deprives him of his fecurity: and as this muft add greatly to the difficulty of obtaining credit, the poor, especially the lower fort of tradefmen, are the first who would fuffer by fuch a regulation. As tradefmen must buy before they fell, you would exclude from trade two-thirds of those who now carry it on, if none were enabled to enter into it, without a capital fufficient for prompt payments. An advocate, therefore, for the interefts of this important class of the community will deem it more eligible, that one out of a thou fand fhould be fent to jail by his creditor, than that the nine hundred and ninety-nine fhould be straitened, and embarrassed, and many of them lie idle, by the want of credit.'

The other fubjects of this book are on Lies and Oaths, or Subfcriptions and Wills. We fhall extract one paragraph from the chapter on Lies, to point out the opinion of the author, on a disputed point, without attempting ourselves to decide on it. Many preliminary steps are requifite to clear it from every difficulty.

Falfhoods, our author obferves, are not lies, where the perfon you fpeak to has no right to know the truth, or more properly, where little or no inconvenience refults from the want of confidence; in fuch cafes, as where you tell a falfhood to a child, or a madman, for their own advantage; to a robber, to conceal your property; to an affaffin, to defeat, or to divert him from his purpofe. The particular confequence is by the fuppofition beneficial; and, as to the general confequence, the worst that can happen is, that the child, the madman, the robber, the affaffin, will truft you no more: which, (befides, that the two firft are incapable of deducing regular conclufions, from having been once deceived, and the two last not likely to come

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a fecond time in your way) is fufficiently compenfated, by the immediate benefit which you propose by the falfhood.'

The next part of this book is on Relative Duties that are indeterminate.' Thefe are charity, including the treatment of our domestics, dependents, and flaves. The fubject of flavery is diftinctly confidered; but it is no imputation to the ingenious author, that he has advanced little that is new on it: we have had fo many treatifes, full of reafon and argument, as well as of declamation, that almost every topic seems o have been exhausted, and every perfon must have been long fince convinced, except thofe for whom the arguments were intended, who are unfortunately too much blinded by interest and neceffity. But what is that neceffity of which so much has been faid? Merely, fays our author, that of buying for fix pence, which, if the work were done by voluntary hired fervants, would coft one halfpenny more. Trifling as this difference is, and diftant from the forcible plea of real neceffity, we are not certain that 'even this would be the refult; perhaps many circumftances would compenfate for the different. prices. The other fubjects are, refentment, anger, revenge, duelling, litigation, gratitude, and flander. They are examined in the most clear and candid manner.

There is another clafs of relative duties which deserves a feparate confideration, viz. those which refult from the conftitution of the fexes. There is no fubject, in which the moralift can more properly interfere, and none in which the voice of the charmer' will be lefs heard, charm he never fo wifely.' Paffions of this kind are firmly rooted, and ufually violent, fo that perhaps the best arguments against the irregular indulgence of them, would be the mifery which ufually attends it. We praised our author's chapter on Human Happiness with more freedom, because we perceived its application to this before us; and, in fome parts, Mr. Paley has followed the train of argument which we have mentioned. The feveral duties which belong to this head are particularly confidered, and deferve attention. But on that of polygamy, though we wish to oppose it with zeal, we must be fo far the friend of truth, as to diminish the force of one argument against it. We have been told, that Providence has defigned the prefent inftitution, by the proportioning the number of females to the males fo nearly that, making allowance for the chances of war and other hazardous profeffions, the numbers may be confidered as equal. But this is the effect of, rather than an argument for monogamy. Where polygamy prevails, the number of females is greater than that of the males; and if fuch arguments were allowed, they may be retorted

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with at leaft equal force. It has been fuppofed a fact, that the fex of the child is determined by the fuperior strength of either of the parents; and, perhaps with particular limitations, it may be true, and account for this variety under different inftitutions. But, independent of the caufe, polygamy certainly increases the number of females, and this fact deferves confideration. There is one view of the fubject which we think has not been fo fully infifted on as it deferves. If. wo man was designed as the friend and the assistant of man, polygamy is unnatural and abfurd; for two fuch friends are incompatible; and that the human mind revolts at the idea, appears from the jealoufies excited by the most distant competition. This is an argument interwoven with the nature of mankind, and connected with our existence; it cannot be controverted, it cannot be eluded, but by degrading woman to a rank, which every man of delicacy and feeling would at once oppose. It is with these that we can only contend; for the libertine who is funk below humanity, and the philofopher who has reafoned himself out of, though not above it, may fafely continue in their opinions. To convince them would not be a victory; to reafon with them would be labour misapplied.

This book is concluded with reflections on the duty and rights of parents, and the duty of children. We have been led fo far, that we can only extract a small portion of our author's remarks; but these we cannot omit.

The most serious contentions between parents and their children, are thofe commonly, which relate to marriage, or the choice of profeffions.

A parent has, in no cafe, a right to deftroy his child's hap pinefs. If it be true, therefore, that there exift fuch perfonal and exclufive attachments between individuals of different fexes, that the poffeffion of a particular man or woman in marriage be really neceffary to the child's happiness; or if it be true, that an averfion to a particular profeffion may be involuntary and unconquerable; then it will follow, that parents, when this is the cafe, ought not to urge their authority, and that the child is not bound to obey it.

The point is, to difcover how far, in any particular inftance, this is the cafe. Whether the fondness of lovers ever continues with fuch intenfity, and fo long, that the fuccefs of their defires conftitutes, or the disappointinent affects, any confiderable portion of their happiness, compared with that of their whole life, it is difficult to fay; but there can be no difficulty in faying, that not one half of thofe attachments, which young people conceive with fo much hafte and paffion, are of this fort. I believe it also to be true, that there are few aver