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ways of producing happinefs, and the greatest fum of it that can be wifely produced: and this, therefore, is the happiness that may reasonably be expected fhould be produced by him; that is to fay, all the happiness to the whole, and every part of the creation, that can be, not in refpect of omnipotence, confidered as a natural power, but in the way of fit and reafonable conduct. What this comprehends, is not diftinctly and fully known by creatures, formed with fuch narrow capacities as our's: for which reafon, in all perplexed cafes (as to us there muft neceffarily be many) it becomes us to be modest and cautious; ever taking care that we do not rafhly determine that to be inconfiftent with goodnefs, wifely and reafonably dif penfed," which, in reality, may be a good argument in proof of it, and would appear to us to be fo, had we one entire view of the whole cafe, in all its connections and dependencies."

They who admit, as fatisfactory, the mode of analogical reafoning, from the qualities of men to the attributes of God, will find little to object to, in this paffage.

Dr. Chauncy, before entering formally into argument on the main fubject of his fecond fection, defires the following remarks, which might have been ftyled poftulates, may be well confidered. We can only transcribe them without their feveral illuftrations, which extend to many pages.

1. This fyftem of ours is not to be confidered fingly and by itself, when we are arguing about the benevolence of the Deity. And for this plain reafon; because there are other systems of beings, to whom God has made manifeftations of his goodnefs.

2. In arguing concerning the divine benevolence, we ought not to confider its difplays as they affect individual beings only, but as they relate to the particular fyftems, of which they are parts. All particular fyftems are probably related to fome univerfal one, and, properly speaking, are so many parts conftituting this great whole, defigned by the Deity for the full manifeftation of his infinitely perfect benevolence.

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3. We must not judge of the benevolence of the Deity merely from the actual good we fee produced; but fhould likewife take inte confideration the tendency of thofe general laws, -conformably to which it is produced; because the tendency of thefe laws may be obftructed, and lefs good actually take place than they are naturally fitted to produce.

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4. We muft, in judging of the divine benevolence, carry our thoughts beyond the prefent to fome future ftate of exi ence, and confider them as connected in the divine plan of ope tation for good?'

The author, after having fufficiently expatiated upon thefe poftulates, to leave little doubt of their reafonablenefs, pro

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ceeds to take a comprehenfive view of the natural and moral world; and endeavours to make it evident, from what is there to be seen, that we are obviously and fairly led to form an idea of the perfect and absolute benevolence of the Deity. As it would be impoffible, within our limits, to purfue the writer through the various fteps of his argument, we fhall refer our readers to the book itself, and content ourselves with transcribing two short paragraphs, to fhew the plan on which the argument is conducted.

I have it not in my view, here, minutely to confider all the effects of benevolence apparent in the conftitution and government of this world of our's. This would be beyond the reach of my ability, and a needlefs labour. It will be a futhcient enforcement of the prefent argument, if fo much is faid as to make it plain, that all the good, fuitable for fuch a fyftem as this, is apparently the tendency of nature, and the divine adminiftration; and that it actually prevails fo far as this tendency is not perverted by the creatures themfelves, whom God has made; for which he is not answerable, as has been hinted already, and will be more fully fhown hereafter.

The way in which I fhall endeavour to illuftrate this important fubject fhall be by giving, in the first place, fome general touches on the vifible frame of inanimate nature; then by taking some tranfient notice of the inferior creatures made capable of happiness; and finally by viewing more critically and fully the intelligent moral beings, in this world, towards whom the divine goodness has been displayed, in the largest

meafures.'

On the whole of this fection we must remark, that the author has difplayed confiderable ability, and has prefented his argument with force and perfpicuity.

Although we cannot follow him through the train of his reafoning, our readers will not be difpleafed to fee here fome particular paffages of this fection. Dr. Chauncy's account of the different degrees of perfection, in the intellectual powers of different men, is worthy of attention.

This difference in men's capacities, whatever it is owing to, whether a difference in their original implantation, or a difference in the body's mechanifm, either of which amounts to precifely the fame thing, in the prefent argument: I fay, this inequality of powers is fo far from arguing want of goodnefs in the Deity, that it ftrongly illuftrates the glory and perfection of it.

Poffibly, the gradation in beings, by means of which all fpaces are filled up, could not have been fo accurately complete, unless there had been a difference between the individuals in each fpecies as well as between the fpecies themselves.

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Some difparity between men compared with one another, and between the creatures in every other clafs confidered, in the like comparative view, might be neceffary to link together the feveral fpecies, fo as to make one coherent chain, without any

void or chafm.

• Or however this be, it is eafy to fee the preferableness of the prefent conftitution to its contrary; as being better fitted to promote the happiness of fuch an order of creatures as we are. Were our mental powers fo exactly alike, as that one man could not go beyond another, 'but every man muft have within himfelf the whole fource of intellectual furniture, there would be no room for that converse between man and man, which is, in the prefent ftate of things, one of the chief pleasures, as well as improvements, of the mind: to be fure, it could not be carried on with that mutual fatisfaction it now may; nor could it turn out to fo great advantage. Befides, if there was no fuch thing as one man's excelling another, as there could not be upon the prefent fuppofition, the ftrongeft ftimulus, that now prompts us to exert ourselves in order to enlarge our intel lectual powers, would be wanting; and by means thereof our very powers themfelves, fo far as we can judge, must be in danger of being rendered inactive, and of decreafing in their fitness for exercife. And farther, if our capacities had been precifely the fame, that fubordination in the human fpecies, thofe fuperiorities and inferiorities could not have taken place, without which life itfelf could not have been enjoyed, in fuch a world as our's, with tolerable comfort. And what is of yet greater importance, there would not have been the occafion for thofe interchangeable offices of humanity and focial kindness, which, upon the prefent fcheme, not only enlarge our sphere of mutual ferviceablenefs, but give opportunity for the exercife of many virtues perfective of our nature, and fitted to yield us high degrees of happinefs we muft otherwife have been ftrangers. to. The plain truth is, the conveniences and pleafures, pof fible to be enjoyed by the human kind, do not feem to have been attainable, in a world conftituted as this is, by an union of counfels and endeavours; every one doing his part in order to promote the good of the whole: and different capacities are the requifite expedient to this purpose. These not only fit the feveral individuals for reciprocal fervices, but fecure their mus tual dependance on each other; hereby properly, linking them together, and making way for thofe various exertments which are neceffary for the common benefit. If mankind could at all have enjoyed the advantage of fociety, without this inequality of powers, it is very evident that they could not have enjoyed it to fo good a purpose as with it. Their being variously endowed, is that which puts it in their power to be variously ufeful to each other, fo as that the happiness of every indivi dual may hereby be increafed beyond what it could otherwife V 3

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have been. And it is the infufficiency there is in every man for his own happiness by himself fingly, and alone, and his being obliged to depend on others for many things, without which he must be very uncomfortable, that is, in reality, the only effectual bond that unites the human fpecies, fecuring their attachment to each other, and ftimulating them to thofe mutual fervices, upon which the good of all the individuals does very much depend.'

The following paragraphs fet in a ftrong light the power of common sense in the difcernment of moral good and evil, in fome effential respects.

The firft power in our nature [call it common fenfe, moral fenfe, moral difcernment, or give it any other name that may be thought better] is that by which we are enabled at once, without the labour of a long train of reafoning, to diftinguish between moral good, and moral evil, in all inlances that are of primary importance, and effentially connected with the good of the moral world.

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There is an unalterable difference between virtue and vice, or, what means the fame thing, between moral good and moral evil. They have their respective natures, and are unchangeable oppofites. Vice cannot be made virtue, nor, on the contrary, can virtue be made vice. They are in themselves what they are, and will remain fo without variation, or the shadow of turning. It is, on the one hand, fit and right, that we hould be picus towards God, righteous towards our fellow, men, and fober with refpect to ourselves; and, on the other, unfit and wrong, that we should be impious towards the Deity, unjuft in our treatment of men, and intemperate in the gra tification of our animal appetites: nor is it poffible this moral order fhould be inverted. No will, no power, either of men or angels, or even the Supreme Ruler himself, can make it right to be impious, inftead of pious, towards God; or unrighteous, instead of righteous, towards men; or intemperate, inftead of fober, in regard of ourselves. To fuppofe this, would be to erafe the foundation of the moral fyftem, to detroy the relation that fubfifts between the Creator and his crea tures, and between the creatures with refpect to one another, and to make virtue and vice nothing more than arbitrary names, having in themselves no certainly fixed nature,

And as virtue and vice, moral good and moral evil, are thus different from each other, fo is this difference obviously, and at once, perceivable by all morally intelligent minds, unlefs they have been greatly corrupted. There may indeed be inftances of moral conduct, in matters of compasatively small importance, with refpect to which it may be difficult to diftinguish between the right and wrong. And the analogy here, it may be worthy of notice, is very exact between the natural, and the moral world. Light and darkness may be fo mixed,

that

that one can scarce know which to call it. Sweet and bitter may be fo blended together, that it may be difficult to fay which is prevalent. Colours may be fo dilated, and placed on a portrait, that the eye of a kilful painter may not be able to difcern the precife point where one begins, and another ends. But, notwithstanding thefe mixtures, light is never the fame thing with darkness, nor bitter with fweet, nor one colour that of another; and they are, unlefs in fuch complicated cafes, readily and at once diftinguifhed from each other. In like manner there may be, and often are, in the moral world, cafes wherein the boundaries between good and evil, and the spot -that divides them, may not be eafily, if at all, difcerned, fo as to be able to say, with precision, here virtue runs into vice, and vice into virtue. But this hinders not but that, in the main and effential branches of morality, the virtuous, and the vicious conduct may obviously be perceived, where the mind's perceptive power has not been, in a great degree, vitiated, and hurt. And, in very truth, the God of Nature has, in his abundant goodness, fo formed our minds, and given us fuch a power of difcernment, that it must be owing, unless we are ideots, or madmen, to fome heinous faultinefs, we ourselves are juftly chargeable with, if we are not able, without difficulty, to dif cern the difference between right and wrong, in the more important points of moral obligation. Will any man, who has not ftrangely perverted the proper ufe of his perceptive powers, pretend, that he cannot, or that he does not, fee it to be fit and right, on the one hand, that fuch a creature as he is, fo related to God, and dependant on him, fhould yield to him the love of his heart, and the obedience of his life; and, on the other, that it would be unfit and wrong to withdraw his affection from him, and behave with difrefpect towards him? Will any man, in the due ufe of his difcerning power, calmly and deliberately fay, that he cannot perceive it to be right, that the thould do to others, as he would they fhould do to him, in like circumftances, and wrong, unalterably wrong, that he fhould do otherwife? Will any man, not having darkened his heart, declare, fpeaking the truth, that he does not fee it to be right, that he fhould govern his paffions, and keep his fenfual appetites within the restraints of reafon; and wrong, evidently wrong, to give way to anger, wrath, malice, and to take an unbounded liberty in gratifying his animal nature? That man, be he who he may, if not void of common fenfe, is wholly inattentive to its dictates, who perceives no moral difference between revering, and mocking his Maker; between being honest and knavish in his tranfactions with his neighbour; between being chafte and lewd; between living foberly and in the practice of drunkennefs; or if he does not perceive the former to be amiable virtues, and the latter deteftable, infamous vices. The moral difference, in these ways of conduct, is

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