ly bestow his favors on the faithful depositary, and refuse them to the other. I ask those of my hearers, who are the least acquainted with a meditation of this kind, whether they can help making an essential difference between these two uses of independence? Can you help feeling more veneration and respect for the Supreme Being in the latter case than in the former? Now, my brethren, I repeat it again, the laws, according to which the Supreme Being acts, are the laws to which the person is appointed, or set apart, who, in the holy scriptures, is denominated holy. Conformity to these laws is what we call virtue, rectitude, order; or, as the text expresseth it, holiness. In this manner, it seems to me, the weakest christian (if he avail himself of such helps as are offered to him) may form an adequate idea of holiness.

However, it is no less certain that the ablest philosophers, and the most consummate divines, find it difficult to speak with precision on this subject, and to answer all the questions that have arisen about it. Perhaps its perspicuity may be one principal cause of this difficulty: for it is a rule, of which we inform those to whom we teach the art of reasoning justly, that when an idea is brought to a certain degree of evidence and simplicity, every thing added to elucidate serves only to obscure and perplex it. Hath not one part of our difficulties about the nature of right and wrong arisen from the breach of this rule?

From what we have heard, in my opinion, we may infer, that all mankind have a clear and distinct idea of holiness, even though they have no terms to express their ideas of it with justness and precision. It seems to me that every mechanic is able to decide the following questions, although they have occasioned so many disputes in schools.

On what is the difference between a just and an unjust action founded; on interest only? or, on the will of the Supreme Being only, who hath prescribed such or such a law? For, since we cannot help execrating a man who violates certain laws, though the violation doth not at all effect our interest, it is plain, we cannot help acknowledging, when we reflect on our own ideas, that the difference between a just and an unjust action is not founded on interest only. And since we cannot help venerating the Supreme Being more when he follows certain laws than when he violates them, it is plain, we cannot help acknowledging that there is a justice independent on the supreme law which hath prescribed it.

Should any one require me to give him a clear notion of this justice, this order, or holiness, which is neither founded on the interest of him who obeys it, nor on the authority of the Supreme Being who commands it; this should be my answer.

By justice I understand that fitness, harmony, or proportion, which ought to be between the conduct of an intelligent being, and the circumstances in which he is placed, and the relations he bears to other beings. For example, there is a relation between a benefactor who bestows, and an indigent, person who receives, a benefit; from this relation results a proportion, a harmony, or a fitness, between benefit and gratitude, which makes gratitude. a virtue. On the contrary, between benefit and ingratitude there is a disproportion, a dissonance, or an incongruity, which makes ingratitude injustice. In like manner, between one man, who is under oppression, and another, who hath the power of terminating the oppression by punishing the oppressor, there is a certain relation from which results a proportion, a harmony, or a fitness in re

lieving the oppressed, which makes the relief an act of generosity and justice.

All mankind have a general notion of this proportion, harmony, or fitness. If they are sometimes dubious about their duty, if they sometimes hesitate about what conduct justice requires of them on certain occasions, it is not because they doubt whether every action ought to have that which I call proportion, harmony, or fitness; but it is because, in some intricate cases, they do not clearly perceive the relation of a particular action to their general notion of justice. Every man hath an idea of equality and inequality of numbers. Every man knows at once to which of these two ideas some plain and simple numbers belong. Every body perceives at once a relation between the number three, and the idea of inequality: and every body perceives instantly a relation between the number two and the idea of equality. But should I propose a very complex number to the most expert arithmetician, and ask him to which of the two classes this number belongs, he would require some time to consider, before he could return his answer: not because he had not very clear ideas of equality and inequality, but because he could not at first sight perceive whether the number proposed were equal or unequal. The arithmetician whom I have supposed, must study to find out the relation; as soon as he discovers it he will readily answer, and tell me whether the number proposed be equal or unequal.

Apply this example to the subject in hand. All mankind, according to our reasoning, have a general notion of a fitness, that ought to be between the conduct of an intelligent being, and the circumstances in which he is placed, and the relations he bears to other beings. Always when a man per

ceives that a particular action hath such a fitness, or hath it not, he will declare, without hesitation, that the action is just or unjust. If he hesitate in some cases, it is because he doth not perceive the relation of the action in question to this fitness. It belongs to casuists to solve difficulties of this kind. I perceive at once a relation between him who receives a benefit, and him who confers it, and from this relation I conclude that there is a fitness between gratitude and the circumstances of the receiver: therefore I declare, without hesitating, that gratitude is a virtue, and that ingratitude is a vice. But should I be asked whether it were a virtue or a vice to kill a tyrant, I might hesitate; because I might not at first perceive what relation there is between the killing of a tyrant and the fitness that ought to subsist between the conduct of a subject and his relation to a tyrant..

Should any one still urge me to give him clearer ideas, of that which I call the proportion, the harmony, or the fitness of an action, I would freely own I could not answer his enquiry. But at the same time, I would declare that my inability did not arise from the obscurity of my subject, but from the all-sufficiency of its evidence. I would recur to the maxim just now mentioned, that when a subject is placed in a certain degree of evidence and simplicity, every thing added to elucidate, serves only to darken and perplex it.

Should my enquirer still reply, that he had no idea of that which I call the proportion, the harmony, or the fitness of an action, I should consider him as a being of a species different from mine, and I should not think of conversing with him. There are some common ideas, some maxims, that are taken for granted, even by the most opposite parties, and when those maxims are disputed, and those

ideas not admitted, there is an end of conversing and reasoning.

This is a general notion of holiness. But the holiness, that is attributed to God, and prescribed to men, in the text, cannot belong in the same sense, and in every respect, to such different beings. We are going to examine then, in the second place, in what sense it agrees to God, and in what sense it agrees to man.

II. What hath been said of holiness in general, will serve to explain in what sense God is holy, and in what sense men ought to be holy. The general principle of holiness is common to God and man. The general principle of holiness, as hath been already shewn, is a perfect proportion, harmony, or fitness between the conduct of an intelligent being and his relations to other beings. The holiness of God is that perfect harmony, proportion, or fitness, that subsists between his conduct (if I may be allowed to speak thus of God) and his relation to other beings. The holiness of man consists in the same. But as the circumstances and relation of God differ from those of men, the holiness of God and the holiness of men are of different kinds. And it is the difference of these relations that we must distinguish, if we would give a proper answer to the questions in hand: In what sense, and in what respects is holiness ascribed to God? In what sense, and in what respects is holiness prescribed to men?

The first question, that is, What relations hath God with other beings, is a question so extensive, and so difficult, that all human intelligence united in one mind could not return a sufficient answer. We have been accustomed to consider our earth as the principal part of the universe, and ourselves as the most considerable beings in nature. beings in nature. Yet our