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ceeding in a mere natural way, there can be no infallible CHAP. certainty in either of these; for the perception of the mind, in reference to the existence of things, being caused so much through those ideas or phantasms which are conveyed to the understanding through the impressions of sense, if these may be demonstrated to be fallacious, I may well question the certainty of that which I am certain I have been deceived by. Supposing then I should question the truth of every thing which is conveyed in an uncertain way to my mind, I may soon outgo even Pyrrho himself in real scepticism. Neither can I conceive how clear and distinct perception of any thing, though not coming through the senses, doth necessarily infer the existence of the thing; for it only implies a non-repugnancy of it to our natural faculties, and consequently the bare possibility of it: for otherwise it were impossible for us to have a clear perception of any thing any longer than it exists, nay, than we know it to exist; for existence or non-existence is all one to the understanding, while it is not assured of either. And it is withal evident, that things imaginary may clearly affect the mind as well as real; for I may have as real and distinct perception of a phoenix in my mind, as of a partridge; doth it therefore follow that the one is really existent as well as the other? And it will be a very hard matter to assign a certain difference between imagination and pure intellection in such things, which though not actually existent, yet imply no repugnancy at all to the faculties of men's minds. It is evident, then, that there cannot be so great certainty of the existence of things, as there may be of mathematical demonstrations.

And if that principle be supposed as the foundation of all physical certainty as to the being of things, viz. that there is a God, who, being infinitely good, will not suffer the minds of men to be deceived in those things which they have a clear and distinct perception of, (without which supposition we cannot be assured of the certainty of any operations of the mind, because we cannot know but we were so made, that we might be then most deceived when we thought ourselves most sure:) if this principle, I say, be supposed as the foundation of all certain knowledge, then from it I infer many things which are very much advantageous to our certainty in matters of faith.

1. That the foundation of all certainty lies in the necessury existence of a Being absolutely perfect. So that un

III.

BOOK less I know that there is a God, I cannot be assured that II. I know any thing in a certain manner; and if I know there is a God, I must necessarily apprehend him to be absolutely perfect; because the grounds of my knowledge that there is a God, are from those absolute perfections which there are in him; and if I could suppose him not absolutely perfect, I must suppose him not to be God; for that is necessarily implied in his definition. Now then if all certainty doth suppose the existence of a Being so absolutely perfect, I must, before I can know any thing certainly, conclude that there is an infinity of knowledge, wisdom, power, and goodness in this God; for those are things which all who understand them will grant to be perfections; and if they be in God, they must be absolute, i. e. infinite. And if they be infinite, it necessarily follows that they must transcend our apprehensions; so that now we have gained this principle in order to faith, that we must grant something to be unconceiv able before we can come certainly to know any thing. From whence it follows, that those who will not believe any thing to be true because it is above their apprehensions, must deny the foundation of all certainty, which (as we have proved) doth suppose something to be infinite, or above our capacity to comprehend.

IV.

2. That we have as great certainty of whatever is revealed to us from God, as we can have of the truth of any thing which we most clearly understand. For the truth of knowledge depending on this supposition, that there is a God, whose goodness will not suffer us to be deceived in the things we clearly understand; there is the same foundation for the act of faith as for that of knowledge, viz. that God will not suffer us to be deceived in matters which himself hath revealed to us. Nay, there seems to be greater on these accounts. First, That there is not so great danger to be deceived in reference to objects of sense, as there is in reference to objects of Divine revelation: because objects of sense make a continual impression upon the organs of sense; and as to these things we see, the whole world agrees in them so far as they are necessary to life; and withal, they bear a greater correspondency to the present state of imperfection which the soul is now in. But now matters of Divine revelation are of a more sublime and spiritual nature, which men's minds on that account are more apt to doubt of than of things obvious to sense; and withal, they call the mind so much off from sense, that on these accounts the

prone

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ness to doubt is greater; and therefore the foundation of CHAP. certainty from God's not suffering us to be deceived must be stronger. Secondly, There is not so great danger in being deceived as to matters of sense or knowledge, as there is in things of Divine revelation. For we see, granting sense to be deceived; and that we have no certainty at all in natural things, yet affairs of life are managed still. Men's outward welfare depends not on the judgment of sense. The merchant hath never the less gold in his ship, because his sense deceives him in judging that the earth moves from him, when the ship moves from it. The sun doth never the less enlighten the world, though our senses be all of Epicurus's mind, that the sun is no bigger than he seems to be: but now as to matters of Divine revelation, they are things of the most unspeakable weight and importance, which depend upon our believing or disbelieving them and therefore if the goodness of God be such, as it will not suffer us to be deceived in our judgment of material and sensible beings, how much less in reference to the foundation of our certainty as to things divinely revealed? We see then what rational evidence there is not only consistent with, but necessarily implied in, the foundation of faith; even as great as in any thing which we do most perfectly know; so that the in-evidence, which is so much spoken of as an ingredient of the nature of faith, must not be understood of the foundation whereon the act of faith doth stand, but of the condition of the object, which being a matter of Divine revelation, is a thing not obvious to our senses. In which sense the Apostle speaks, that faith is gμév ὑπόςασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος & βλεπομένων, the firm expectation Heb. xi. 1. of things hoped for, and strong conviction of things which are not seen in which words, as Erasmus observes, is contained only an high encomium of faith, and no dialectical definition of it, viz. that faith soars above things of sense or present enjoyment; yea, though the objects of it be never so remote from either: yet where there is sufficient evidence of Divine revelation, faith boggles at no difficulties, but is firmly resolved that that God, who hath revealed these things, can and will bring them to pass in his own time. There is not then any such contrariety between the foundation of faith and knowledge as the schoolmen have persuaded the world. We see both of them proceed on the same foundation of certainty. All the difference is, faith fixeth on the veracity of God immediately in reference to a Divine testimony;

BOOK knowledge proceeds upon it, supposing no Divine revelation as to the things it doth discover.

II.

V.

3. We hence infer, that if the certainty of our knowledge depends on this principle, that God will not suffer us to be deceived, then we are bound to believe whatever God doth reveal to us, though we may not be able to comprehend the nature of the things revealed. For as to these things, we have the same ground of certainty which we have as to any natural causes: for as to them, we now suppose from the former principles, that, setting aside the existence of God, we could have no certainty of them, but that the formal reason of our certainty is resolved into this, that God's goodness will not suffer the understanding to be deceived as to these things: the same I say as to spiritual mysteries revealed by God; the ground of our certainty lies not in the evidence of the things, but in the undoubted veracity of God, who hath revealed them. All that I can imagine possible to be replied to this, is, that God's veracity assures us in natural causes that we are not deceived, only where we have a clear and distinct perception of the things; but now in matters above our reason to comprehend, there can be no clear and distinct perception. To this I answer,

First, It is evident, in the foundation of all certainty of knowledge, that there may be a clear and distinct perception of that which we cannot comprehend, viz. of a Being absolutely perfect; for if we have not a clear and distinct perception of God, the foundation of all certainty is destroyed, which is the necessary existence of such a Being; and he that shall say he cannot have a clear perception of God without comprehending him, doth contradict himself; for if he be a Being infinite, he must be incomprehensible; therefore there may be clear perception where the object itself is above our capacity. Now whatever foundation there is in nature for such a perception without comprehension, that and much more is there in such things as are revealed by God, though above our apprehension: for the idea of God upon the soul of man cannot be so strong an evidence of the existence of a Being above our apprehension, as the revelation of matters of faith is, that we should believe the things so revealed, though our understandings lose themselves in striving to reach the natures of them, and the manner of their existence.

Secondly, That which is the only foundation of a scruple in this case, is a principle most unreasonable in itself,

that we are to embrace nothing for truth, though divinely CHAP. revealed, but what our reason is able to comprehend as VIII. to the nature of the thing, and the manner of its existence; on which account the doctrine of the Trinity, Incarnation, Satisfaction, and consequently the whole mystery of the Gospel of Christ, must be rejected as incredible, and that on this bare pretence, because although many expressions in Scripture seem to import all these things, yet we are bound to interpret them to another sense, because this is incongruous to our reason. But al

though Christianity be a religion which comes in the highest way of credibility to the minds of men, although we are not bound to believe any thing but what we have sufficient reason to make it appear that it is revealed by God, yet that any thing should be questioned whether it be of Divine revelation, merely because our reason is to seek as to the full and adequate conception of it, is a most absurd and unreasonable pretence; and the assertors of it must run themselves on these unavoidable absurdities.

First, Of believing nothing, either in nature or religion, to be true, but what they can give a full and satisfactory account of as to every mode and circumstance of it: therefore let such persons first try themselves in all the appearances of nature, and then we may suppose they will not believe that the sun shines till they have, by demonstrative arguments, proved the undoubted truth of the Ptolemaic or Copernican hypothesis; that they will never give credit to the flux and reflux of the sea, till they clearly resolve the doubts which attend the several opinions of it; that there is no such thing as matter in the world, till they can satisfactorily tell us how the parts of it are united; nor that there are any material beings, till they have resolved all the perplexing difficulties about the several affections of them; and that themselves have not so much as a rational soul, till they are bound to satisfy us of the manner of the union of the soul and body together. And if they can expedite all these, and many more difficulties about the most obvious things, (about which it is another thing to frame handsome and consistent hypotheses, than to give a certain account of them,) then let them be let loose to the matters of Divine revelation; as to which yet (if they could perform the other) there were no reason for such an undertaking; for that were,

Secondly, to commensurate the perfections of God