and consenteth to his covenant, though you may perceive no ascertaining evidence that he saith true, yet you must believe him, because he is the only opener of his own mind, and the laws of God and human converse require it. But what is this believing him? Not taking it for a certain truth, but taking it for a thing probable, which may be true for aught you know, and which you must hope is true; and this in different degrees, according to the different degrees of the person's credibility.

If you hear men confidently report any news in these times, when half that we hear oft proveth false, you may believe the reporter as a fallible person, that is, believe that he doth not wilfully lie, and so not uncivilly contradict him; and yet suspend your belief of the thing itself, and whether he took it up rashly on uncertain rumours.

But if you hear a man speak evil of another behind his back, when the thing is not notorious and certain other ways, the law of justice and charity obligeth you not to believe him, but to suspend your belief till you hear both sides, or have surer proof; yea, and to suspend, not with an indifferency, but with a hope that it is not true which he speaketh.

Object. XIII. 'But then I shall be as uncharitable in judging the reporter (who perhaps is a godly man) to be a liar and slanderer, as I should be in believing that the other is guilty.'

Answ. 1. I say not that you are to conclude that certainly he lieth, and that it is false, but to suspend your belief, and to hope that it is false. 2. He that maketh himself the accuser of another man behind his back, in a way of talk, doth expose himself to that disadvantage, and maketh it our duty to begin our charitable opinion on the side of him that is accused, and rather to hope that he is innocent (cæteris paribus') than the accuser. For God forbiddeth backbiting and slandering, and biddeth us to speak evil of no man. And he that in our hearing backbiteth and speaketh evil, how godly otherwise soever, without a clear necessary cause, doth forfeit our charity and belief, more than a man can do whom we do not see or hear. For if I was bound to judge him innocent before this backbiting, I am bound so to judge him still. Therefore I do but continue that good opinion of my neighbour which I was bound to: And that I must suspect the backbiter of a lie, is the consequent of his own act, and wrong of himself. For I cannot believe con

traries and it is not his backbiting that will disoblige me from my former duty, of judging the other innocent. So that it is the reporter that casteth away the reputation of his own veracity.

Object. XIV. When you have written all this against pretended knowledge, who is more guilty than yourself? Who so oppresseth his reader with distinctions? Are all your large writings evident certainties? Even those controversies in which you have so many adversaries?'

Answ. I put in this objection, because I have a book called "Methodus Theologiæ," which I know will occasion such thoughts in many readers. But, 1. It is one thing to assert uncertainties, and another thing to anatomise, and distinctly, and methodically explain to certain truth. In all my large writings, if you find that I call any thing certain which is uncertain, that is, which I give not ascertaining evidence of, acquaint me with the particulars, and I shall retract them.

2. I never persuaded any man to write or say no more than all men certainly know already, no not all learned divines; for then how should we receive edification? Subjective certainty is as various as men's intellects, where no two are of a size. And objective certainty must be tried by the evidence, and not by other men's consenting to it. Nor must a major vote of dissenters go for a proof of objective uncertainty For Heathens are more than the rest of the world; and Mahometans more than Christians; and Papists more than Protestants; and the ungodly more than the godly; and yet this is no proof of our own, or the things uncertainty.

3. Part of my writings are against uncertainties; and to deliver the Church from false opinions that go for certainties; and these are they that have most contradicters: and may I not write against false and uncertain opinions which religion is corrupted with, and defend the ancient simplicity, without being guilty of the introduction of uncertainties myself.

4. I deny not but I have many things that are uncertain ; but then I acknowledge them uncertain; and treat of them but as they are.

5. Lastly, If really my writings are guilty of that which I here reprehend, false pretended knowledge, the sin is never

the better for that, nor my accusation of it, ever the less true, nor your duty to avoid it ever the less. Think what you will of me, so you will but think rightly of sin and duty. If I go contary to my doctrine, and you can prove it, take warning by me, and do not you the like.

CHAP. XXI.

IX. Directions for the Cure of Pretended Knowledge, or Self

conceit.

THE Cure of this plague of prefidence or pretended knowledge is it which all the rest is written for; and must now be the last in execution as it was the first in my intention P. And could men be persuaded to this following course it might be done: but nature's vicious inclination to the vice, and the commonness and strength of temptations to it, do make me expect to prevail but with a few.

Direct. I. Labour to understand the true nature and principles of certainty before opened. False measures will make you judge certainties to be falsehoods or uncertain, and falsehoods to be certain truths. And when you know the conditions of certainty, try all things by them accurately; and if any would by art, persuade you of the uncertainty of nature's just perceptions, by sense or intellect, remember that be they what they will, you have no better or surer: they are such as our Creator hath given you to trust to for your use, even for the ends of life.

Direct. II. Discern the helps of knowledge from knowledge or certainty itself. Believing your teachers as men, and believing historians according to their credibility, and reverencing the judgment of seniors, and of the church, are all preparative helps to certainty and human faith is such as to Divine faith. But do not therefore think that it is the same: nor give men that prerogative of infallibility which belongeth to God, or to inspired prophets, who prove their word by God's attestation. The belief of logicians is needful to your understanding logic, and logic is a great help to

› Because I must not often repeat the same things, I must refer the reader to what I have more fully said of this in twenty-seven directions for certainty of knowledge in iny Christian Directory, Part iii. chap. 7.

your certain discerning of physical and metaphysical and moral verities. And yet many rules of your logic may be uncertain, and you must not take the helps of your knowledge for evidence itself.

Some think that nothing is known till we have second notions for it, or can define it: when things sensible are better known by sensing them, and usually second notions deceive men and make them doubt of what they better apprehended without them.

Be very suspicious of all words or terms; 1. As ambiguous, as almost all are: and therefore he that cannot distinguish them must needs err by confusion. 2. Lest you take the names for things, most disputes using to carry controversies' de nomine' as if they were ' de re,' or slide from this into that.

Direct. III. Therefore also trust not too far to the artificial forms of argument, without, or instead of the evidence of the truth of the thing itself. For there are many things supposed to the infallibility of your art, which may not themselves be infallibly true and man's wit is conscious of its own fallibility; and therefore is doubtful lest it should be deceived in its collections and ratiocinations; especially when the engine hath many tacklings, and the chain many links, we are still in doubt lest some one should break: but the evidence of the thing in its own reality, which is not wholly laid on the form of an artificial argument, which is of great use, doth satisfy more.

Direct. IV. Take truths in order; the principles first, and the rest in their true exurgence and dependance upon them and take nothing to be well known which is not known, not only in a method but in a method clearly suitable to the things. As words and notions, so rules and methods must be fetched from the things, and fitted to the things, or they are vain. Sense and intellect must first perceive the things themselves, and be your first tutors in somatology and pneumatology; and then these must do much in making your logic. The foot must be the measure of the shoe. And remember that you have but a half, fallacious knowledge, till you know the true place, and order, and respects of the thing, as well as the nature and quality of it in itself; and till you can draw up a true scheme of the things which you know it is dreams that are incoherent.

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Direct. V. Let the great radical verities have your greatest confidence, and not only so, but the most of your thoughts, and estimation, and time; and proportionably let the lesser things have but that share of your esteem, and time, and studies which they deserve; which comparatively will be little. And make them the test of what is further offered to you: and believe nothing which is certainly contrary to them. Argue always 'à notioribus,' and reduce not certainties to uncertainties, but contrarily.

Direct. VI. Keep all your perceptions distinct according to the distinction of their natures. Let both your books and your intellects be like an apothecary's shop, where there are different boxes with different titles for different things. Let sensible perceptions be by themselves: and the intellective perception of things sensate be by themselves: and the intellective perception of its own and the will's acts be by themselves and the collection of the nature of spirits and intellective agents thence, be by themselves: and the knowledge of principles, physical and moral, be by themselves : and the certainty of conclusions be ranked according to the variety of their degrees. The confusion of these different things causeth so confused a kind of knowledge, as is next to no knowledge, and more fit to trouble than to satisfy.

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Direct. VII. Look to all things, or as many as is possible. When half is unknown, the other half is not half known. Respicere ad omnia' is proper to God: 'Respicere ad plurima' is necessary to the competent wisdom of a man to be of a narrow mind and prospect, is the property of the ignorant and erroneous. He that seeth only a hand or foot knoweth not what a man is by it: and he that seeth only a word knoweth not by that what a sentence is. God's works are all one. I know not what we shall see in Commenius's Pansophy, which they say is yet to see the light; how far he hath reduced all sciences to one. But I little doubt but they may and should be all reduced to two, which are as the soul and body that yet make up one man, though not one nature, viz. 1. The ontological or real part, distinguished into that of substances and of modes, where morality cometh in, &c. 2. The organical part, which fitteth words and notions to things. And I am sure that as the knowledge of one thing or of many, much conduceth to further knowledge; so the ignorance of one thing conduceth to