cause he had it not, may as truly say, that he spake against worldly wealth and greatness because he had it not; for the possession, use and knowledge of worldly things, are near of kin. But they knew not Paul so well as Festus, who thought him not unlearned, though he thought him mad. Nor was it the way of worldly wealth and greatness which he chose.

Doubtless neither Christ, nor Paul, did speak against any real knowledge, but, (1.) Against nominal, pretended knowledge, which was set up to divert men from real knowledge; and was full of vanities and falsehoods. (2.) And against the overvaluing of that learning, which is of little use, in comparison of the knowledge of great and excellent, and necessary things. For knowledge is valuable according to its object and its use.

The knowledge of trifles for trivial ends, is itself a trifle. The knowledge of things great and necessary for great and necessary ends, is the great and necessary knowledge. And therefore how unmeasurably must the knowledge of God and our eternal happiness, excel the pedantic philosophy of the Gentiles. However Christians may sanctify and ennoble this by making it a help to higher knowledge. And therefore the Platonists and the Stoics were the noblest philosophers; because the former studied the highest things, and the other the necessary means of felicity, amending of men's hearts and lives.

But in the present text the thing which the apostle reprehendeth is, the esteeming of a man's self to be wiser than he is; and taking himself to be a wise man because of his trifling philosophical knowledge. And he would have them know that till they knew nobler things than those, and were guided by a nobler light, they were very fools'.

I have looked over Hutten, Vives, Erasmus, Scaliger, Salmasius, Casaubone, and many other critical grammarians, and all Gruterus's critical volumes. I have read almost all

b A countryman having sent his son to the University, when he came home asked him what he had learned. He told him he had learned logic. He asked him what that logic was, and what he could do with it; aud it being supper-time, and the poor people having but two eggs for supper be told them that he could prove that those eggs were three: This is one, saith he, and that is two, and one and two are three. The father gave him the better, and told him that his art was useful, for he had thought himself to have gone without his supper, but now, saith he, I will take one egg, and your mother the other, and take you the third. Such kind of logic the world hath gloried in as learning.

the Physics and Metaphysics I could hear of: I have wasted much of my time among loads of historians, chronologers, and antiquaries; I despise none of their learning. All truth is useful; mathematics, which I have least of, I find a pretty manlike sport. But if I had no other kind of knowledge than these, what were my understanding worth! what a dreaming dotard should I be! Yea, had I also all the codes and pandects, all Cujacius, Wesenbechius, and their tribe at my fingers' ends; and all other volumes of civil, national and canon laws, with the rest in the Encyclopædia, what a puppet play would my life be, if I had no more!

I have higher thoughts of the schoolmen, than Erasmus and our other grammarians had: Imuch value the method and sobriety of Aquinas, the subtlety of Scotus and Ockam, the plainness of Durandus, the solidity of Ariminensis, the profundity of Bradwardine, the excellent acuteness of many of their followers; of Aureolus, Capreolus, Bannes, Alvarez, Zumel, &c.; of Mayro, Lychetus, Trombeta, Faber, Meurisse, Rada, &c.; of Ruiz, Pennatus, Suarez, Vasquez, &c.; of Hurtado, of Albertinus, of Lud. à Dola, and many others: but how loath should I be to take such sauce for my food, and such recreations for my business! The jingling of too much and too false philosophy among them, often drowns the noise of Aaron's bells. I feel myself much better in Herbert's Temple; or in a heavenly treatise of faith and love. And though I do not, with Dr. Colet, distaste Augustine above the plainer fathers, yet I am more taken with his Confessions, than with his grammatical and scholastic treatises. And though I know no man whose genius more abhorreth confusion instead of necessary distinction and method; yet I loathe impertinent, useless art, and pretended precepts and distinctions, which have not a foundation in the matter.

In a word, there is a Divine knowledge, which is part of man's felicity, as it promoteth love and union, and there is a solid knowledge of God's word and works, a valuable grammatical knowledge, and a true philosophy, which none but ignorant persons will despise. But the vain philosophy, and pretended wisdom and learning of the world, hath been, and is, the cheat of souls, the hinderer of wisdom, and a troubler of the church and world.

CHAP. II.

What Wisdom and Esteem of it, are not here condemned.

THE order which I shall observe in handling the first doctrine shall be this; I. I will tell you negatively what wisdom, and esteem of our own wisdom, is not here condemned. II. What it is that is here condemned. III. What are the certainties which we must hold fast, and make our religion of. IV. What degrees of these certainties there are. V. What are the uncertainties, which we must not pretend to be certain of; and the unknown things which we must not pretend to know. VI. What are the mischiefs of falsely pretended knowledge. VII. What are the degrees or aggravations of this sin. VIII. What are the causes of it. IX. What are the remedies. X. What are the uses which we should make of this doctrine.

I. What wisdom, and what esteem of our wisdom is not here condemned?

Answ. 1. Not any real useful knowledge at all, whilst every thing keepeth its proper place, and due esteem, as is said.

2. That which of itself primarily is of so small use, as that it falleth under the contempt of the apostles, yet by accident, through the subtlety of Satan, and the viciousness of the world, may become to some men in some measure necessary. And here cometh in the calamity of divines. Of how little use is it to me in itself to know what is written in many hundred books; which yet by accident it much concerneth me to know! And if God restrain him not, the devil hath us here at so great an advantage, that he can make our work almost endless, and hath almost done it already; yea, can at any time divert us from the greatest truth and works, by making another at that time more necessary.

If he raise up Socinians, our task is increased; we must read their books, that we may be able to confute them; so must we when he raiseth up Libertines, Familists, Seekers, Quakers, and such other sects. If he stir up controversies in the church, about Government, Worship, Ceremonies,

Circumstances, Words, Methods, &c., we must read so much as to understand all, that we may defend the truth against them. If Papists will lay the stress of all their controversies on Church History, and the Words of Ancients; we must read and understand all, or they will triumph. If Schoolmen will build their theology on Aristotle, all men have not the wit with the Iberian legate at the Florentine Council in Sagyrophilus, to cry against the preacher, 'What have we to do with Aristotle ?' But if we cannot deal with them at their own weapons, they will triumph. If cavillers will dispute only in mood and figure, we must be able there to overtop them, or they will insult. If the plica, scurvy or other new diseases do arise, the physician must know them all, if he will cure them. And hence it is that we say, that a lawyer must know the law; and a physician must know physic, medicine, &c. But a divine should know all things that are to be known; because the diseased world hath turned pretended knowledge into the great malady, which must be cured: but is the thing itself of any great worth; is it any great honour to know the vanity of philosophical pedantry; and to be able to overdo such gamesters, any more than to beat one at a game at chess, or for a physician to know the plague or leprosy?

3. Yet indeed, as all things are sanctified to the holy, and pure to the pure; a wise man may and must make great use of common, inferior kinds of knowledge: especially the true, grammatical sense of Scripture words, the true precepts of logic, the certain parts of real physics and pneumatology; for God is seen in his works as in a glass: and there to search after him and behold him, is a noble, pleasant work and knowledge. And I would that no Israelite may have need to go down to the Philistines for instruments of this

sort.

4. It is not forbidden to any man to know that measure of wisdom which he truly hath; God bindeth us not to err, nor to call light darkness, or truth error, or to belie ourselves, or deny his gifts. 1. It is desirable for a man absolutely to know as much as he can, preferring still the greatest things, and to know that he knoweth them, and not to be sceptical, and doubt of all. 2. It is a duty for a converted sinner comparatively to know that he is wiser than he

was in his sinful state, and to give God thanks for it. 3. It is his duty who groweth in wisdom, and receiveth new accessions of light, to know that he so groweth, and to give God thanks, and to welcome each useful truth with joy. 4. It is the duty of a good and wise man comparatively to know that he is not as foolish as the ungodly; nor to think that every wicked man, or ignorant person whom he should pity and instruct, is already wiser than he; every teacher is not to be so foolish as to think that all his flock are more judicious than himself. In a word, it is not a true estimate of the thing or of ourselves, that is forbidden us; but a false. It is not belying ourselves, nor ingratitude to God, nor a contradiction, to know a thing, and not to know that I know it, nor an ignorance of our own minds, which is commanded us under the pretence of humility; but it is a proud conceit, that we know what we do not know, that is condemned.

CHAP. III.

II. What Pretended Knowledge is condemned, and what Philosophy and Learning it is that Paul disliked.

MORE distinctly, 1. It is condemnable for any man to think himself absolutely or highly wise: because our knowledge here is so poor, and dark, and low, that compared with our ignorance it is little: we know not what or how many, or how great the things are which we do not know; but in general we may know that they are incomparably more and greater than what we do know; we know now but as children, and darkly, and in a glass or riddle. (1 Cor. xiii. 11, 12.) In the sense that Christ saith, none is good but God, we may say that none is wise but God. For a man that must know (unless he be a very sot) that he knoweth nothing perfectly in the world; that he knoweth but little of any worm, or fly, or pile of grass which he seeth, or of himself, his soul or body, or any creature; for this man to assume the title of a wise man, is arrogant, unless comparatively understood, when he is ignorant of ten thousandfold more than he knoweth, and the predominant part denominateth. The old inquirers had so much modesty, as to arrogate no higher name than Philosophers.