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(a) The existence of the Religious Element, 20-32: Proposition,

20-21. Sense in which Religion is used, 21; Definitions

to be avoided, 21-23. The evidence-1. Our consciousness,

23-24. 2. Universality, 24-31. Objections to the argument

(a) religion may be an invention, 25-26; (b) it may be due to

traditional beliefs, 26-27. Answers (1) that only can be

developed which exists in germ, 27; (2) our judgment of

religious motives, 27-28; (3) not probable that accidental

transmission could secure universality, 28-29; (4) when

religion has been discarded, it has always revived, 29;

distinction from religious prejudices, 29-30. (c) Religious

knowledge may be derived from other knowledge, 30; but

religion includes emotion, 30-31. 3. Special phenomena

in the manifestation of religion, 31-32.

(b) The Religious Element points to an Object or Objects

answering to it, 32-37: Nature of the inquiry, 32. Religious

feelings exist only in relation to an object, and tend to

create a belief in the existence of the object, 33. Objections:

emotions lead to delusions; but delusions are temporary,

34-35; the thing to be proved is assumed; but there must

be an ultimate assumption, 35–36. The conclusion confirmed

by the whole analogy of our nature, 36-37.

(c) Testimony of the Religious Element to doctrines, 37-45:

Proposition stated, 37. The satisfaction of an inward want

an evidence of truth, 37-38; for (1) it follows from what

has been said about the Religious Element; and (2) the

proposition is supported by the facts of consciousness, 38-41.

Objections (1) beliefs maintaining themselves in this way

may be mere prejudices, 41; but (a) they are more persistent,

(b) they tend to recur, (c) they are felt to have a divine claim

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upon us, (d) they are often opposed to our prejudices, 41-43; 41-81

(2) many such beliefs have been mere errors, 43; but these

errors may be partially true (instance, the idea of sacrifice),

43-44; (3) We have the same tendency to believe what

satisfies a prejudice; this undoubtedly shows liability to

error and need of care, 44-45.

(d) Nature of the Religious Element, 45-51: to be learned by

an examination of facts, 45-47. It includes feeling, knowing,

and doing, 47-49. Resulting classification of the kinds of

religion, 49-51.

(e) Catholic self-knowledge, 51-61: two modes of regarding

the capacity of the religious nature, 51-54: recognition of

spiritual truth, 51-53; discovery and construction, 53-54.

Source of knowledge, our own consciousness, 54-55; difficulty

arising from this, 55-56; self-knowledge must be catholic,

56-57. Lines of tendency described, 57–61.

(f) Sources of error, 61-74: (1) incapacity for intellectual

formulation, 61-62; (2) failures in the religious consciousness,

(a) want of proper balance in its contents, 62-64; (b) absence

of some of its constituents, 64-65; (c) reliance on a prejudice

or idiosyncrasy, 65-66, nevertheless an idiosyncrasy may

anticipate the universal, 66-68. Hence spiritual discernment

has various degrees, and is susceptible of cultivation and

growth, 68-74. Examples: belief in the existence of God,

68-69; in his attributes, 69-70; knowledge of the human

soul 70-71; recognition of spiritual relations, 71-73. Two

resulting facts, 73-74.

(g) Confirmatory facts, 74-78: (1) diversity of theological belief,

74-75; (2) men have a power of seeing the truth of a doctrine

which they could not have discovered, 75-76; (3) dependence

on authority, 76; (4) revolts against authority, 76-77; (5)

men cling to a creed after they have ceased to believe in it

literally, 77.

(h) Revelation, 78-81: (1) might be given of truths which the

human mind normally could not have discovered, 78-79;

(2) might be given of truths which the mind normally reaches

only by a tedious process, 79; (3) might be given of the

spirit which is the ground of doctrinal truth, 79-81.

Traditional view, 82-89: Catholic dogma, 82-83; doctrine of

the Church of England, 83-84; doctrine of the Westminster

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