to the articles of the Christian faith. As these articles were more or less disputed, it came to signify the articles which were authoritatively ratified as expressing the belief of the Church; and it is now commonly used of the doctrines. which have been sanctioned by the proper public authority as the binding creed of some particular church or sect. This limitation, indeed, is not universally accepted; but it is best to observe it, and thus to distinguish dogma from doctrine, the latter not implying any authoritative ratification. Thus every dogma is a doctrine; but not every doctrine is a dogma, and it is quite unwarrantable to infer that those who have no dogmas have therefore no doctrines. We may here subjoin a similar caution in regard to the word 'Creed.' A Creed is not properly what any individual believes, but an authorized summary of the belief accepted by some church or sect. Accordingly the Nicene and other Greek Creeds begin, not with 'I believe,' but with 'We believe.' A neglect of these plain distinctions, in order to represent others as without convictions because they have no dogmas, belongs to the claptrap of controversy. A Creed enlarged, as was so often the case after the Reformation, into a complete conspectus of theological dogmas is called a 'Confession.'

Auguste Sabatier, in a very interesting work, while recognizing that dogmas result from the decision of a competent authority, maintains that they are as necessary to a religious society as laws to a political society.1 In his arguments, however, he clearly confounds dogma and doctrine. Religion undoubtedly demands intellectual expression; but this expression need not be in the authoritative and exclusive form of dogma. Science cannot exist without formulated statements, but it has no dogmas; and so religion may have a body of well-established truth, and yet be without dogmas. The Congregations commonly known as Unitarian

1 Esquisse d'une Philosophie de la Religion d'après la Psychologie et l'Histoire, 1897, pp. 263 sq., 308.

have existed as religious societies, many of them for more than two hundred years, without any dogmas; but they have had both doctrine and worship. To this day they have no authoritative standard, and whatever agreement of opinion there is among them is the result of independent, though concurrent, thought. This allows a wide latitude; and when controversies arise among them, the questions at issue are freely discussed, with all earnestness indeed, but with no breach of fraternal union. The teaching function is committed to men who are expected to set forth, not dogmas which are a condition of membership, but what, after conscientious study, they earnestly believe; and if a divergence of view becomes so wide as to render fruitful cooperation impossible, and so lead to a voluntary separation, this takes place without bitterness, and without the intervention of any kind of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Owing to this absence of dogma, theological doctrine has been able to meet inevitable changes without shocks and convulsions; and the primary question always is, not What does the sect teach? but What is true?' and in studying or writing, all thought of the sect, or of the expectations which it might be supposed to entertain, or of agreement with authoritative standards, is wholly absent from the mind. Sabatier claims an equal freedom and mobility for Protestant dogmas;1 but certainly that freedom has not existed in fact, as Sabatier himself admits ;2 and a dogmatic statement, even if intended to apply only to the present time, inevitably tends to become inflexible, claims control of the future, and sets up an obstacle to progress.

The difference is now apparent between dogmatic and doctrinal theology. Dogmatic theology starts with the assumption that the dogmas of some particular church or sect are true; and it is the duty of the dogmatist to present these with scientific precision, and to establish them rationally as part of the knowledge of the time. Thus Roses defines. Dogmatics as a methodical exposition of the dogmas of the 2 pp. 287, 297.

1 pp. 251, 272, 284 sqq.

Christian religion, dogmas being the doctrines defined in Councils of the genuine Catholic and Orthodox Church of Christ.1 Hagenbach gives it a wider extension, The methodical and connected exposition of Christian doctrine.'2 Others, like F. A. B. Nitzsch, confine themselves to Evangelical Dogmatics'; and Kaftan distinctly maintains that every exposition of Dogmatics must be based on the accepted views of some definite confessional Church.3 There is, however, some justification for this mode of treatment. It is assumed that the work of ' Apologetic' has already been done, and the aim of the dogmatist is not to convince a hostile world, but to give intellectual satisfaction to believers. through a systematic exposition of the articles of their faith. But this, if it qualifies, does not remove our objection. Such a procedure seems to rest on the very questionable assumption that there is one particular church which is the custodian of Divine truth, while all others are more or less involved in error. And further it overlooks the fact, to which attention will be called presently, that, even if this has been rendered probable by a course of reasoning, the evidence can never be so demonstrative as to exempt the several articles of belief from criticism, and possible rejection, in detail. Thus the mind loses its freedom, and moves from the first within a charmed circle which it can quit only at its peril. The most independent investigation may, no doubt, result in establishing the tenets of some particular school; but when the whole purpose of the work is to expound and defend such. tenets, Greek, Roman, or Evangelical, the judgment is committed to foregone conclusions, and has some other aim than pure truth, whatever the evidence may prove that to be. But doctrinal theology has no aim but truth, and therefore seeks to construct its body of doctrine in a perfectly scientific way, and with no fear that it may transgress

1 Σύστημα Δογματικῆς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου καθολικῆς ἐκκλησίας, 1903, pp. 23 sq. 2 Encyklopädie u. Methodologie der theologischen Wissenschaften, ed. 1869, § 79. 3 Dogmatik, 1897, p. 2.

certain limits which have been laid down beforehand, and are protected by penalties. It is of course impossible for any individual to start without some prejudgments; and our investigation necessarily begins with the religion in which we have been brought up, and which is associated with our deepest feelings and convictions. This, in the present instance, is Christianity; but unless we find reason to the contrary, we shall treat Christianity, not as standing in exclusive contrast to all other faiths, but as the highest expression of the religious consciousness of man, and some of our principles will be found applicable, in their degree, to various forms of religion. Our inevitable prejudgments are freely open to the appropriate tests, and there is no presumption of religious faithlessness if, in the course of the inquiry, some of them come to be regarded as unsound.

This agrees with the method which is pursued in all branches of study that are not under the control of some coercive authority. The historian or the astronomer starts with the supposition that there is an assured body of knowledge, or at least of probable hypotheses, which he contentedly accepts till he sees reason for doubting it; and then the legitimate bias with which he started induces him to apply the most rigorous tests, and weigh the evidence with the most scrupulous care, before rejecting what has long been accepted by the most competent judges. Nevertheless, his object is not the maintenance of current views, but historical or scientific truth, and his mind is swayed simply by the internal laws which govern the investigation of truth. Similarly a man may have profound religious convictions, and duly honour the great theologians of the past; and nevertheless in his investigations aim simply at truth, whether or not that should ultimately prove to be in accordance with his present belief. He may walk in the serene light of a holy faith, and yet never be surprised to find that the realms of knowledge are wider than his thought, and the truth of God deeper than he can sound.

In this work, then, we aim at reaching a system of theological doctrine, not at the establishment of given dogmas; and howsoever the doctrines at which we arrive may come to be classified, the classification will result from the doctrines, and not the doctrines from a prior classification. It is mine to lay before the readers, with as fair a statement and estimate of the evidence as I can command, the results which approve themselves to my own mind; it is theirs, like merchant-men seeking goodly pearls, to weigh the evidence with caution and impartiality, and aim only at the purest truth.1

1 For a fuller treatment of my view of the place and method of Doctrinal Theology I may be permitted to refer to section V. of my Introduction to the Study of Theology, pp. 165 sqq. I may also quote, as representing a long-cherished principle, the charge which Dr. John Taylor was in the habit of delivering to his pupils at Warrington, and which I sometimes read to my class at Manchester College at the beginning of the doctrinal course, to impress upon them the spirit in which I desired the lectures to be listened to:

'I. I do solemnly charge you, in the name of the God of truth, and of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, and before whose judgment-seat you must in no long time appear, that in all your studies and enquiries of a religious nature, present or future, you do constantly, carefully, impartially, and conscientiously attend to evidence, as it lies in the Holy Scriptures, or in the nature of things and the dictates of reason; cautiously guarding against the sallies of imagination and the fallacy of ill-grounded conjecture.

'II. That you admit, embrace, or assent to no principle or sentiment by me taught or advanced, but only so far as it shall appear to you to be supported and justified by proper evidence from Revelation or the reason of things.

'III. That if, at any time hereafter, any principle or sentiment by me taught or advanced, or by you admitted and embraced, shall, upon impartial and faithful examination, appear to you to be dubious or false, you either suspect or totally reject such principle or sentiment.

'IV. That you keep your mind always open to evidence; that you labour to banish from your breast all prejudice, prepossession, and partyzeal; that you study to live in peace and love with all your fellowChristians; and that you steadily assert for yourself, and freely allow to others, the inalienable rights of judgment and conscience.'