The mechanical action of external bodies on the fenfes produces fenfation; and, wherever the impreffion is fufficiently Arong, or the fenfation fufficiently pleafant or painful, motion will be produced in the animal machine. Volition is not an active power, but a mode of perception. When I walk, it is because I have pleafure in the recollected perception of walking. There must be a certain degree of intenfity in the perception of pleasure or pain to produce motion. Love, hatred, and all the paffions, are in proportion to the number, intensity, and duration of the pleasurable or painful perceptions which produce them; fubtracting, in the cafe of recollected perceptions, the diminution which arifes from the imperfection of memory. Hence all fentiments and paffions are capable of being eftimated with mathematical exactness. Call any fet of prefent feelings, S; their intenfity, x; their number, n; their duration, d; and call pleafure, P; and pain D: the proper fymbolical expreffion of the degree of pleasure or pain, experienced in any given cafe, will be P or D=xS Xnx d. To exprefs by fymbols the degrees of pleasure or pain arifing from recollected fentiments, we must add to the preceding formulary the difference arifing from the defect of the force of memory. Call this force F, and the expreffion will be P or DxS X n X d — ¡ F. Memory is the bafis of benevolence. It places me in the fituation of another, by reproducing feelings fimilar to those which I obferve him to experience. Hence I fuffer his pains, and enjoy his pleafures by fympathy, and am led to defire, and to endeavour to advance, his happiness. To wifh evil to any one, is to wifh evil to one's felf, fince we cannot but partake of his feelings. Man is therefore by nature just and virtuous. It is the intereft of all men to feek the happiness of all. This is the ground of all moral obligation, and to this origin may be traced up all the rights of nature in general, of animality, of humanity, of domeftic and civil fociety, and of pofterity. The foundations of all knowlege and opinion are, immediate perception; memory or renewed perception; analogy, or reasoning from what is, or has been, to what will be; and human teftimony. Of thefe, the first affords certainty, the latter different degrees of probability. We have no proof, but from memory, that any thing exifts befide our actual perceptions. It is this alone which convinces me, that what I call external beings, move in an uniform manner, according to certain fixed laws, and confequently makes it probable, that they exift independently of me. Admitting the real existence of external beings, analogy alone can direct our enquiries concerning their nature. Since the infinite divifibility of matter is contrary to all analogy, and wholly inconceivable, it is reafonable to fuppofe that all bodies are an aggregate of indivifible atoms. These we are led by analogy to conceive to be extended, exceedingly fmall, figured, moveable, always in motion, having each its own force, and capable of receiving every kind of impreffion, and confequently capable of perception. I have an individual consciousness that I have, at the fame moment, different perceptions: therefore, my felf, or the fentient principle, is one. Is my fentient felf an extended being? It is agreeable to analogy to conceive, that it is of the fame kind with thofe indivifible parts of which bodies are compofed, and therefore extended, figured, folid, and poffeffed of its own moving force, as well as capable of perception. The fentient prin ciples in different animals refemble mine, and differ only in the place which they occupy, at the center of an organized fyl tem, more or less perfect. All extended beings are in a state of continual agitation, Bodies are alternately dilated and contracted by heat and cold. Motion is then as effential to body as mobility. Every indivi dual atom has its own motion, which it can never lofe; but its effect may be for a time fufpended by the action of a contrary motion; in which cafe the two bodies may be faid to be in nifu. As foon as the obftacle is removed, the motion returns, and, in the mean time, the effort is uninterrupted. It is this union of individual atoms by oppofed motions, which produces all the combinations of matter. Compounded atoms, or bodies, preferve a motion which is feldom in a right line. Befide this first kind of motion which is effential to bodies, and cannot be loft, there is another, which is communicated, and may be ftopped, by impulfe. One of the principal effects of the motion of bodies is, to produce impreffions on fentient beings, which never experience any new fenfation but from external motion. Hence the variety of the perceptions of fentient beings muft depend on the diverfity of the motions which affect their organs of fenfation. All the individual beings of which bodies are compofed being of the fame kind with that which conftitutes the fentient principle in animals, it is wholly owing to its fituation that the latter can experience more perceptions than other atoms. There is no reason to fuppofe that one atom is, in itself, more capable of perception than another. Any individual atom, placed at the center of an organized body, becomes capable of perception, more or lefs varied in proportion to the perfec tion of the machine with which it is connected. My felf be ing feated at the center of motion in a human body, poffeffes from its fituation an internal fenfe, whence if experiences a great variety of motions, and confequently of perceptions, like the fpider at the center of her web. It appears from obfervation, that there is in nature a long continued series of animal life; and it is reasonable to conclude from analogy, that this feries is carried, both ways, far beyond, what is perceptible by human fenfe. Probably the earth itfelf, and all the celeftial bodies, are organized beings, and animated by a fentient principle. To fuppofe fuch vaft maffes of matter unorganized, does not feem to correfpond with the great views of Nature. But we can have no idea of any fentient being, which does not occupy the internal fenfe of fome organized being. All fentient beings have defires and volitions; and those which are most perfect, most completely accomplish their defires. It may therefore be inferred, by analogy, that events commonly happen according to the will of fuperior beings, and always according to that of the Great Being, because his will is always conformed to the laws of motion which animate all beings. All fentient beings, and confequently the Great Being, can only enjoy pure happiness, by feeing and making other beings happy. The fentiment of benevolence, therefore, muft form the first obligation in fuperior beings, and in the Great Being; whence it may be inferred that happiness muft prevail throughout the univerfe. Hence too arifes a probable expectation of a future ftate of rewards and punishments, as a means of executing the will of fuperior beings. From the combination of primary indivifible atoms are formed the four elements of earth, fire, air, and water, each of which preferves more or lefs of the force belonging to firft particles of matter, and confequently has a perpetual activity. Most of the motions we perceive in nature are the effect of impulfe. The doctrine of attraction is contrary to all analogies, and therefore not to be admitted. The combination of effential motions produces cryftallization, by means of which the primary particles of matter cohere, and folid bodies are formed. We know of but two agents in nature, which can overcome the force of cohefion, the elements of water and fire. Of these, water is only a fecondary agent, for it owes its liquidity to fire. Fire, then, is the first principle of all fluidity, the grand agent by which all the phenomena of nature are produced. Since we fee that no bodies in nature are perfectly alike, we conclude from analogy, that the primary particles of matter are different in form from each other, and have different degrees of force, and that the combination or cryftallization of these has has produced the forms of nature. vegetables, animals, and worlds. Hence have arifen minerals, Without attending our philofopher through his whole detail (in which he often forgets his promife, and becomes diffuse and declamatory), it is fufficiently evident, from the preceding ANALYSIS, that this new fyftem of mechanic philofophy contains no very important difcovery. Where the author confines himself to fact and experience, his obfervations, though commonly juft, are feldom original. Before this work appeared, it was very well known, that the fources of human knowlege are perception, memory, analogy, and teftimony; that at leaft one ground of moral obligation is fympathy, and that there are certain forces in nature, by means of which bodies are compofed and decompofed. As to the new opinions advanced, or the exploded doctrines revived, in this work, they reft on no better ground than mere conjecture, or fancied analogy. Every attempt to subject moral principles to mathematical calculation, must be futile, until fome common meafure can be applied, as in quantity, to the things which are to be estimated. Till the degrees of intenfity in pleasures or pains can be as exactly meafured, as the number of fquare yards in a field, to express the degree of any given pleasure or pain by the fymbols P=S XnXd, is faying nothing. To affert, that what are commonly called the powers and operations of the mind are mere paffive effects of mechanical motion;-that all nature confifts of indivifible monads, each of which has in itfelf motion and perception;-that the fentient principle in man, is an atom, which differs from other fimple particles of matter in nothing but its fituation ;-and that the whole feries of animal and intelligent beings, are only fimple monads, placed at the centers of organized fyftems-is to advance pofitions too extravagant to be admitted as data in philofophy. Still more abfurd and prefumptuous is the attempt, from thefe fanciful notions, without fuppofing the agency of a DESIGNING MIND, to account for and explain in detail the phenomena of nature. A fyftem which, at the fame time that it fpeaks of the intentions and the grand views of nature, fuppofes thofe intentions and views carried into execution without a Superintending Intelligence, and afcribes all the wife arrange ments of nature to the neceffary laws of motion, is too contradictory to the common fenfe of mankind to need a serious refutation. We have thus far taken notice of the work, to put our readers on their guard, and to fhew that the Atomic Syftem is still as far from being demonftrated, as it was in the days of Epicurus and Democritus, ART ART. XVI. Veber W. Shakspeare; i. e. On W. Shakespeare. By JoH. JOACH ESCHENBURG, Aulic Counsellor and Profeffor in the Caroline College at Brunfwic. 8vo. pp. 672. Zurich. 1787. PROF ROF. ESCHENBURG, who has poffeffed a confiderable share of reputation in Germany as a man of tafte, learning, and genius, owes it in fome measure to the fpirited and elegant German tranflation of all Shakespeare's plays, which, though begun by the celebrated Wieland, was yet confiderably improved, continued, and publifhed by him. It appeared at different times between the years 1775 and 1782, and confifts of thirteen volumes in octavo. In this additional volume, which may be confidered as a fupplement to the tranflation, the Profeffor difplays the abundance of materials he collected during the profecution of his work. We have in vain endeavoured to recollect any tract or publication concerning our immortal bard of which fome mention is not made in this volume. Its contents are arranged under ten heads, of which the titles are as follow: 1. Of Shakespeare's life; 2. His learning; 3. His genius; 4. His defects; 5. State of the English Stage at his time; 6. Succeffive order of his plays; 7. English editions of his plays; 8. Criticisms on the author and his editors; 9. Catalogue of the foreign translations and imitations of Shakespeare; and 10. Of his other poems, together with fpecimens of them. Even the English reader will, we are perfuaded, meet, especially in the 8th and 9th fections, with fome ftrictures and information which he would in vain feek for in any of the multitudinous publications now extant in this country, on Shakespeare and his works. ART. XVII. Recherches Hiftoriques et Politiques fur les Etats Unis de l'Amerique Septentrionale, &c. i. e. Hiftorical and Political Inquiries concerning the United States of North America. By a Citizen of Virginia. With Four Letters from a Burgefs of Newhaven, on Legislation, &c. 8vo. 4 Vols. Paris. 1788. THE HE late revolution in America is an object of too much importance in the political world not to have engaged the attention of philofophical inquirers; and the prefent Author justly obferves, that the fubject has appeared, to feveral European writers, fo very interefting, that, apparently from the fear of being prevented by others, they have made hafte to publish their ideas concerning it before it was poffible for them to acquire fufficient inftructions, and even without giving themselves the trouble to procure that information which might have been obtained. |