LETTER XVII.

(TO ANOTHER PERSON.)

MY DEAR SIR,

It seems to me that the difficulties you suggest, when I urge you to examine for yourself, and come to some definite result in regard to Unitarian doctrines, appear to you of much greater magnitude than the reality warrants. I do not think "it is necessary to explore tomes of angry controversy, nor to examine disputed passages in Greek and Hebrew, nor to dive into all the profounds of metaphysics, nor to trace back history and the fathers to the days of the apostles." I think all the plausibility and success of Unitarianism may be resolved into two general causes, of which you can judge without all this research. The first is, unfairness in argument; and the second is, a violation of the laws of evidence, in regard to the interpretation of language.

When I charge unfairness of argument, I do not intend to impeach motives, or to imply that it is knowingly and wilfully perpetrated. There are many cases in which men reason incorrectly and unfairly, without at all knowing or intending it; I

leave motives and intentions out of the question, and only aim to establish the fact.

As both Unitarians and their opponents acknowledge the Bible as the source of their faith, the whole controversy turns on the interpretation of language. The chief difficulties encountered here, arise from this fact, that a great part of the words and expressions of language have two or more uses, so that the question always must arise, as to which of the several meanings that are attached to the same expression in its different uses, is to be adopted as the true one.

Now the peculiarity which distinguishes Unitarians from all other sects is the denial of the supreme divinity of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Ghost. It is this point, therefore, which I will select to exhibit what I deem the unfairness of argument which the defence of Unitarianism always has involved.

Now almost the whole matter turns on the use of the terms one, only, alone, and similar terms denoting unity; and I will premise, therefore, with an exhibition of the use and signification of such terms.

Unity or oneness means, that which gives no cause or ground of distinction into two. Thus our minds are said to be one and indivisible, because there is no foundation for any distinction that makes two. All the emotions, thoughts, and acts of choice, pertain, so far as we can perceive, to the same thing. We have no proof that there are two thinking, feeling and acting agents in our bodies, and therefore as there is no foundation for a distinction into two, we say there is one. The term one, or unity, is

the same as saying "not two or more ;" and saying that "one is two" in the same sense, is saying that existences are "two and not two," which is an exact contradiction, inconceivable, and therefore beyond the possibility of belief; for we cannot believe that of which we cannot even conceive. Whenever the term one, then, is used, it means that in the particular respect to which it is applied, there is no foundation for distinction into two or more. Thus when a man and his wife are declared one, it signifies that in certain respects there is no foundation for considering them two. When an assembly is said to have "only one mind," it means that in a certain respect there is no foundation for considering them as two. When an army is said to be "one body," it means that though composed of thousands of bodies, there is one respect in which they cannot be considered as two. From these illustrations it appears that all existences can be regarded as one in some respects, and as two or more, in other respects; and that when a thing is said to be one, it signifies that in some respects there is no foundation for considering it

as two.

Now both sides agree that it is common to apply the term one to things which in some respects are plural, while in others there is a unity. Both agree that when the term one is used, the question always must arise, "in what respect is there unity?" When, for example, Christ says, "I and my Father are one," both agree that there is a sense in which they are one, and a sense in which they are two, and not one.

In regard to the term God also they both agree that two distinct persons are called God; namely, Jesus Christ, and the being styled in distinction "the Father." Both agree that the term god is applied to beings who are men. Thus Moses is called a god to Pharaoh, and magistrates are called gods to those whom they govern. Both agree that Jesus Christ is in some respects God, so that in those respects, it is proper to call him God, and that in other respec s he is a man, and is called a

man.

Now there is a sense in which one is a contradiction to two or more. For example, when we say our own mind is one mind, it would be a contradiction to say it was two minds, in that sense in 'which we call it one mind. But when we speak of a number of minds who think and feel alike, although there are many of them, and in one sense it is absurd to call them one mind, yet in another sense it is proper and in common use to say, "they are all one mind," or "but one mind animates them," meaning that in some respects they are one, that is, in some respects there is no foundation for regarding them as two or more.

The question then is this; when Jesus Christ and the Father are called one, is it that oneness which we attribute to our own minds, and which makes it absurd and a contradiction to call them two? Now both Unitarians and Trinitarians agree here also. Trinitarians expressly and in all cases say that they do not attribute that oneness to the Father and the Son which makes it an absurdity

and a contradiction to call them two. They say they regard them as two in one sense, and one in another sense, that they never regard them as one in the same sense in which they regard them as two.

It appears, then, that Unitarians and Trinitarians agree thus far, that both allow two uses to the term one; that both allow that this term is applied to two beings; the Father and the Son; and that both say that this oneness is not the unity which we predicate of our own minds, which makes it an absurdity to say that in this same respect they

are two.

What, then, are the respects in which they differ? They differ in this. The Trinitarian says that in the Bible there is a person called the Father, to whom the names of God, Lord, and Jehovah are given, to whom the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and eternal existence are ascribed, and who is presented as the object of love, worship and obedience.

That there is another person called the Son, to whom the names of God, Lord, and Jehovah are given, to whom the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence and eternal existence are ascribed, and who is presented as the object of love, worship and obedience.

And that there is a third divine person called the Holy Ghost, to whom these same names, attributes and claims are given. And inasmuch as each of these have the same names, attributes and claims, they are each to be regarded as distinct di