as necessarily arises in certain circumstances, as the brick falls down when placed in other circumstances. Such changes in mind are called involuntary, and are owing to a certain constitution and certain causes acting on the mind, in just the same way as causes act on matter when effects are produced.

But there is another question in regard to mind, on which the whole matter of free agency and fatalism rests, and that is, what is the cause of choice or volition?

Here only two explanations are given. The first is the doctrine of free agency, and the second is the doctrine of fatalism or necessity.

According to the first, mind itself is the cause of its own volitions; and objects of choice, or those things that excite desires, are merely the necessary circumstance, or occasion for exercising this power.

According to the second, mind is one link in a chain of causes and effects, so that every act of choice is caused by some object of desire, as necessarily and as inevitably as the emotion of surprise and pleasure was caused in the mind of the child, who witnessed the overthrow of the bricks, or as the brick was made to fall by a blow from the child.

This last is the doctrine of fate, as held by the ancient heathen philosophers, by the followers of Mahomet, by the Atheist school, by the followers of Priestly, and by a small portion of theologians who explain the doctrines of predestination and

regeneration on this philsophical theory of mental constitution. All these different advocates of fatalism, though they use different terms in explaining their views, come to the same result; which is, that volition is owing to a certain mental constitution, by which, when certain objects of desire are presented to the mind, volition or choice necessarily ensues, and so necessarily, that the mind had no power to choose any other way.

On the contrary theory, objects of desire are presented to the mind; and when it chooses, there existed a full power to choose any one of the objects it refused, just as much, and just the same, as it had to choose the object selected.

As an illustration of the two theories, a child strikes its parent, because he is refused an apple ; and as a punishment the father chastises the child.

On the theory of fatalism, the child had no power to refrain from the volition that raised his arm against its parent, any more than he had to refrain from feeling displeased when his wishes were crossed; nor had the father any power to refrain from choosing to return the blow, any more than he had to keep from being excited by the ill conduct of his child.

On the contrary theory, the child had the same power to choose to submit quietly, as he had to choose to strike his father; and the father had the same power to choose to reason and remonstrate, as he had to choose to inflict chastisement. The anger produced in the mind of the parent and child, were necessary effects of a certain consti

tution of mind, and of events that operated on the mind; but the volition, or choice, was an act of the mind itself, choosing freely, in circumstances where it had full power to choose either of two

ways.

The difficulty on this subject has been made, in a great measure, by the use of the word cause, without a clear distinction of the two different senses in which it is employed.

When we say that a blow of the child was the cause of the anger of the father, we mean that anger was caused in such a sense, that there was no other result possible, according to the constitution of nature. When we say that the misconduct of the child was the cause of the father's act of volition to chastise, we mean that it was an opportunity or occasion for exercising the power of choice.

In both cases we mean by cause, "that circumstance without which an effect would not take place;" but in the first use of the term it means a necessary, inevitable cause, leaving no alternative; in the second use of the term, it means a necessary occasion for exercising the power of choosing one of two or more objects, where there was an alternative, and full power to choose what was not chosen.

In the first instance cause means that which necessarily and inevitably produces the event; in the second instance it means an occasion necessary to enable the mind to exercise its power of choice.

All the metaphysics and deep debate that have enshrouded this subject, terminate just in this

place, and every mind engaged in such discussions does take one of these two positions, for there are but these two that can be taken in the nature of things. For either the mind itself is the cause of its own volitions, and motives are the occasions or indispensable means of exercising this power, or else motives and the constitution of mind are the cause of choice, so that the mind has no power to choose any other way than as it does choose. On this last theory the act of choice as necessarily follows the presentation of the motive, as the needle is drawn when the loadstone is presented, or as pain is felt by the mind when hope and desire are crossed.*

Now you have adopted the doctrine of fate, and maintain that you have no power to regulate yourself and your own destiny, but are the creature of chance and circumstances, and dependent on them for virtue and happiness. I am not going to attempt to reason you out of this theory, for I do not believe there is any process of reasoning that can be of any avail. All I aim at is to show that it is contrary to common sense; so much so, that

* Here ought to be mentioned the theory of Dr. Emmons, held by a small number of theologians, by which God is made the direct, efficient cause of each human volition. According to this theory, every act of choice of every mind is preceded by a divine volition, as its necessary, efficient cause; just as every movement of matter is preceded by the volition of some mind as its This differs from the common theory of fatalism, only in making a direct divine interference for every act of choice, instead of an arrangement of constitution and motives operating as secondary causes.

cause.

men cannot act on the assumption that it is true, in the common business of life, without losing their character as possessing reason and common sense.

Now take a single illustration as a test. A man stands beside another on a precipice. A tree falls in such a way as to throw him against his neighbor, whom he thus precipitates to instant death. Here the tree, the man, and gravitation, were causes of death. Another man stands in the same situation. His father stands beside him, whose death will secure to him immense wealth. The desire for this wealth is excited, he chooses to sccure it, and as the means plunges his parent to destruction. Here, instead of the falling tree, an act of volition comes in as the cause of death.

Now what I say, is, that all rational men feel, and believe, and act, as if there was a difference in the two cases, They pity the man who involuntarily caused death. They say he was not to blame, he could not help it. They offer him sympathy and condolence. On the contrary they feel horror struck and indignant at the guilty parricide. They say he could have refrained; they imprecate punishment because he did not refrain, and they act to secure the appropriate retribution. Now I claim that any man who should attempt to punish the one who involuntarily caused death, would be called deranged; and so a man who should pity the parricide, and try to save him from punishment, on the ground that he could not help committing the crime, would equally lose his credit for rationality,