cer, bishop of Norwich, took a very active part. Roused by the idea of a war, in which the name of religion was prostituted, Wickliff, even in the decline of life, thought fit to enter his protest against it. Among many spirited observations, he exclaims, When will the proud priest of Rome grant indulgences to mankind to live in peace and charity, as he now does to fight and slay one another? For this opposition it is thought that Wickliff might have been involved in new troubles, but, being struck with the palsy, he soon after died quietly at Lutterworth, in the year 1384. In the counsel of Constance, 1415, the opinions of Wickliff were condemned, and his bones were dug up and burnt.

With an allusion to the subsequent extension of his doctrines, Rapin happily remarks, "His ashes were thrown into the brook which runs through Lutterworth; the brook conveyed them to the Severn, and the Severn to the sea!" This mean and impotent triumph: over dust and ashes was thus rendered indicative of the diffusion of rational Christianity.

From this brief narrative, it appears that, to attack long established opinions, however erroneous, is attended with danger; that every attempt at reformation will incur the enmity of those who are interested in the perpetuity of the abuses: that the most effectual way of correcting what is wrong, either in doctrine or discipline, is by making an appeal to the scriptures: and finally, that the truth, however oppressed by human additions, will, at length, shake off these adventitious incumbrances, and shine forth in its native purity. Few opinions were more traduced than those of Wickliff; yet over his enemies he has triumphed, and will continue to triumph more completely in the eye of future generatious!

The writer of the topography of Leicestershire informs us that the pulpit of Wickliff is still standing at Lutterworth-that very pulpit whence he declaimed with energy against the obstinate errors and outrageous profligacy of the Church of Rome. Here, like

Noah; this modern preacher of righteousness stood for a time, singly and alone-his cause was the cause of God and truth-his efforts to enlighten and reform were essential to the best interests of mankind.

To use the expressions of a late biographer, with the single addition in the parenthesis, "JOHN WICKLIFF, for his superior penetration, the justness of his sentiments, and the undaunted spirit with which he engaged in the great cause of religious liberty, was a real honor to his country. Wickliff appears to have been a man of exemplary and unblemished morals: and, notwithstanding the number and vigilance of his enemies, they have none of them presumed to tax him with any immoralities. But tho in his private character he appears to have been very respectable, yet it is his public character which principally entitles him to our attention and regard. In an age of ignorance and superstition, he let in such a radiance of light, that all the arts of the Romish Church, and all the terrors of persecution, (the sure resource of a bad cause) could never afterwards totally obscure it. And the propagation of his opinions had certainly the happiest effect in promoting that REFORMATION, which afterwards delivered the kingdom from ignorance, superstition and ecclesiastical tyranny! By every true Protestant, therefore, the memory of Wickliff will ever be held in the highest honor. And the example of those illustrious men, who have nobly and fearlessly labored in the cause of truth and liberty, ought to animate us to exert ourselves to prevent any attempts which may be made by the zealous and indefatigable adherents of popery, to involve us once more in the darkness and bondage of Roman superstition."

The same excellent biographer adds, "The works of Wickliff were very numerous, yet he seems not to have been engaged in any large work. His pieces, in general, might be properly called tracts, and were the greatest part of them on different subjects in divinity, tho some of them were on school questions,

and others on subjects of more general knowledge. Some of them were written in Latin, and others in English. But as Wickliff lived before the invention of printing, there are but few of his pieces which have been printed."

REMARKS ON THE SENTIMENTS OF HOPKINSIANS. The attentive reader will recollect that in our last, we published the sentiments of Hopkinsians. Some of the leading features of these sentiments we now propose to take into consideration; to compare them with scripture, and with each other.

In the first article of the Hopkinsian creed, we find, "that all true virtue, or real holiness, consists in disinterested benevolence." This benevolence is explained, as embracing "universal being, including God and all intelligent creatures. It wishes and seeks the good of every individual so far as is consistent with the greatest good of the whole." But the greatest good of the whole on their plan, does by no means embrace the happiness of each individual, among God's intellectual creatures. For in common with the Calvinists, they hold that some men God "was pleased to pass by, and ORDAIN to dishonor and wrath, to the praise of his vindictive justice." Therefore, the greatest good of the whole is understood in a collective sense, and in such a way as to have no particular regard to individual happiness. This we find further exemplified by the next article that treats of the opposite of benevolence. It is there said, "that all sin consists in selfishness. By this is meant an interested selfish affection, by which a person sets himself up as supreme, and the only object of regard; and nothing is good or lovely in his view, unless suited to promote his own private interest."

We will now suppose it was possible for a man to divest himself of the feelings of individual interest, (which we confess would be a situation we never experienced,) and then attempt to determine how such

a man could regulate his moral conduct. Let him possess such an ardor to promote the general good, as to have no regard to his own destiny, but "approve in his heart of the divine conduct, tho God should cast him off for ever." Now in this situation, let him try to fulfil the great commandment of the law, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." Being divested of all individual interest and love of self, what ground is there left him, whereby he can feel an interest and love for his neighbor?

The man that knows no individual love of self, cannot possibly know how to love his neighbor as himself. It will follow then of undeniably consequence, that one of the great commandments of God's law, is made void by this doctrine of disinterested benevolence.

Now let us suppose the man perceives in his neighbor, the tokens of reprobation, as he has no regard to individual happiness, would he not now begin to rejoice in the hopeful prospect of his neighbor's extreme misery, as his disinterested soul expects it will produce so much good in the intelligent universe. In such a situation how can he wish to have his neighbor saved? But if he does not wish to have him saved, how is he conformed to the will of God "who will have all to be saved ?”

Again, let this man try the Savior's golden rule. How can he do by others, as he would wish them to do by him, when he has no interest in his own particular happiness? When he has no concern whether he is damned or saved; but all his concern is for the glory of God?

The Hopkinsian doctrine, which is generally considered a refinement of the Calvinistic, appears peculiarly calculated to lead a man into difficulty. For when he has travelled in it to the utmost of his power, he is but miserably situated in his relation to his fellow man. He has but a very limited opportunity for the proper exercise of rational and social feelings.

In the fourth article of the Hopkinsian system, we are told "that the impotency of sinners with respect

to believing in Christ, is not natural but moral; for it is a plain dictate of common sense that natural impossibility excludes all blame;" How this idea is reconcileable with their views of "the divine decrees" for which they warmly contend, is utterly beyond our comprehension. If the volitions of the mind are bound by the eternal laws of fate, and are necessarily moved to every thought, in what sense can there be any more moral freedom than natural? That they believe some sinners possess this moral inability, is evident from their being ordained to wrath to the praise of God's vindictive justice. God would surely see that the beings which he ordained to wrath, should never accept of his salvation. Where then is their moral liberty to come to him? The Hopkinsian very rationally says, "that natural impossibility excludes all blame." Why? Because the man is not able to perform what is required of him. Now let us look at moral inability. What is its weakness? Total depravity. Nothing can act out of its proper sphere; of course, we know not how the mind that is totally depraved is able to obey a good requisition. We see no difference then, on the Hopkinsian ground, between natural and moral inability. Both are alike controlled by the irresistible laws of absolute necessity. But it is needful for them to use some plausible pretext to support this difference, or the absurdity of their doctrine would appear too glaring to be well received by their own admirers.

In the seventh article we are told, "that the introduction of sin is upon the whole for the general good," notwithstanding God has an "infinite aversion to sin, and all his inherent perfections." That God should have an infinite aversion to that which is "for the greatest good," is another subject that belongs to the metaphysics of Hopkinsians, and not to us, to explain. Perhaps the reader would wish to know our opinion, why God ever introduced sin into our system, if not for some benevolent purpose. Answer, we deny the position that God ever introduced sin into our world.