the innocence and the virtues of an illustrious individual; the rights and security of the royal family of France, the laws of justice, which reprobate murder, and the laws of neutral nations, had all one neck, which more fortunate in gratifying diabolical rancour than Caligula, the Corsican tyrant was able to strike at one blow. The import of this savage massacre was comprehensive and clear; it unequivocally spoke the following language: "I, Buonaparté, will murder whom I please; in whatever country or nation I please, whether at peace or war. What I, Buonaparté, command, however contrary to rights, or shocking to humanity and justice, must be executed: it is commanded by me. Buonaparté."

Such language, and such acts, could receive no effectual answer and correction, but from the point of the bayonet. The sovereigns of Europe did not venture to unite and employ their force for stopping the progress of spreading despotism and destruction. The most spirited contented themselves with remonstrances, and the rest acquiesced in the enormity without any expostulation or complaint. Thus, uninterrupted in his career of iniquity, Buonaparté rushed on to new acts. Fortune did not present him with an opportunity of perpetrating another deed so atrocious in its circumstances; yet he found means to commit a fresh outrage, which no less flagrantly, though less bloodily, violated the rights of neutral nations.. The seizure of Sir George Rumbold, the representative of the British Sovereign in the neutral territory of Hamburgh, continued to manifest his total disregard for the rights of neutral states, and the laws of nations. His tyranny, as we formerly remarked, "had known no bounds, and experienced no opposition. He had satiated every wicked propensity, every brutal passion of his ferocious mind. He had broken every treaty which he had himself concluded. He had violated every right that was hitherto deemed sacred by the civilized world. He had sacrificed every principle and every law, consecrated by religion, morality, justice, or general assent, to his own vanity, arrogance, and ambition." All this he had done with impunity; and he was impressed with a notion, that he might proceed to any length which he chose with continued impunity, The torpor of the continent was not not to be removed

A 4

1

moved without unparalleled provocatives. But Buonaparté himself afforded the stimulative which appears destined to rouse the powers of the continent to a sense of their interest, and the vindication of their independence. There now existed predisposing causes which facilitated this salutary effect of unexampled despotism. The councils of Britain were changed, the objects of our belligerent policy became much more energetic and comprehensive; and a project of a confederacy for repulsing the enormous power of Buonaparté, and restoring the independence of Europe, began to be in agitation. Sweden and Russia openly and magnanimously avowed their determination. Even Prussia seemed to be so far alive to the common danger, as strongly to reprobate the lawless act which had recently taken place in her near vicinity. The iniquitous apprehension of the British Ambassador was the occasion which, though late, called salutary sentiments into action. The language that had been long spoken by Russia, and that was now adopted by other princes, seems, for the first time, to have impressed Buonaparté with a notion, that for the present his will was not to continue the paramount law of the continent; that nations began to recover from their palsy, and were likely to resume their former vigour. The manifest futility of his boasted preparations against England more strongly impressed this idea; because it strengthened the grounds on which opposing powers might hope for success. In short, he very plainly saw, that his imperious despotism, and atrocious iniquity were no longer, without controversy or interruption, to govern Europe. A project of extensive coalition was carrying on against his tyranny, and not unlikely to be matured into a regular and consistent league. Russia breathed a spirit worthy of a Peter and a Catharine. Sweden entered into the scheme with an ardour, a magnanimity, and a heroism worthy of that heroic kingdom which, under Gustavus Adolphus, shook the overgrown power of the House of Austria in those days preponderant in the European seats. The conduct of Prussia was less determinate; but there were not wanting grounds for conceiving that the court of Berlin would renounce the politics of the last ten years, and join in a system, not only conducive to its interest, but necessary to its preservation. Austria, indeed, afforded little indication, of

any

any disposition, at least any intention to join in the common cause, but without it a powerful combination seemed on the eve of being formed

As confederacy is the obvious policy of the continental powers to maintain, or rather recover their independence, so it is the obvious policy of Buonaparté to dissolve and crumble such a confederacy. Thence he has recourse to separate negociation. Buonaparté is as versatile as he is enormously wicked. He can craftily assume any disguise that suits a crooked purpose, as well as proceed with flagrant openness in direct iniquity. He can assume the appearance of a mussulman as easily as poison an hospital. He can speak the language of peace and moderation as well as bluster out the bravadoes of violence and outrage. These are circumstances and facts which are to be taken into account, in estimating any proffers of negociation which he may make. First, is Buonaparté changed in disposition and character so as sincerely to accede to terms which may restore the independence of Europe, and secure other states against the return of usurping ambition; or does he only pretend to change, that he may break the concert, and find a future opportunity more favourable than the present for executing his schemes of universal dominion? Are such changes in the human character frequent, or to be regarded as probable, or even credible events? After such an experience, it would be more than imprudence; it would be frantic madness to trust to any compact that was to depend upon the integrity of Buona-. parté. What other security can be obtained? One might, and one only would be sufficient, a great reduction of his power; the abandonment of recent conquests; and the contraction of France within her ancient limits. With such a government, and such a ruler, we have our doubts if even such a reduction would render the continent secure. WE are fully convinced that nothing short of the restoration of the lawful monarchy can ever give a secure peace to the neighbouring nations. Waving, however, our own peculiar sentiments as Anti-jacobins, let us consider the question as Anti-Gallicans, as men desirous of restoring the balance of power, by ending the overwhelming preponderancy of France. Is Buonaparté probably disposed to relinquish the command of Holland, Belgium, Western Germany, and Italy; and to

renounce

renounce the direction of Spain. All these sacrifices are necessary to the security of Europe; and every peace will, and must be false and hollow, which leaves such a mass of power and influence in the hands of France. We have unquestionable evidence that Buonaparté will not concede those important points; and that evidence is his own speech at opening his senate, in which he lays down a fixed principle, that he will not, as he phrases it, break the integrity of the French Empire; but as common sense and common honesty would express it, that he will not part with any acquisition of unprovoked aggression, and lawless usurpation. This is by no means an indication of conciliatory intentions. Here we are not taking into the account the individual situation of the adventurer; but considering simply the relation of the ruler. He who holds in France the supreme power of peace and war declares he will make no peace which shall deprive France of territories, her possession of which places in imminent danger the independence of Europe. Instead of an usurper, had the lawful sovereign of the Bourbon family made such conquests, and declared his fixed determination to retain them, no wise British statesman could agree to such a preliminary' if he had any hopes of effecting or maintaining a confederacy for restoring the balance of power, the security and independence of Europe.

A concert, firm, vigorous, and extensive, might prove efficacious to the contraction of France within her ancient boundaries; and such a confederacy only could produce a consequence of that magnitude. Respecting a new confederacy, we know many will draw unfavourable inferences from the termination of the grand alliance in the last war. On this subject, Dr. Bisset's history contains some pertinent observations introduced on the secession of Prussia and other powers, after the rapid victories of the Republicans in 1794. We shall the more readily quote these remarks since the Doctor in his politics is sometimes more an Anti-gallican than an Anti-jacobin; and agreeing with us on all the great constitutional points, differs with us concerning the expediency of several measures; and may therefore be cited as impartial.

"From such an issue (says he) to the efforts of the confederation, persons that did not exactly consider the specific

case,

case, might very naturally draw unjust inferences. Such might conclude, because the combination in question had been unsuccessful, that no future union for suppressing dangerous ambition could be successful; and therefore that the attempt would be vain. Were a concert to be proposed for reducing the exorbitant power of France, the events of 1794 might be quoted as warnings, that the scheme would be impracticable, and assuredly the same means and conduct in similar circumstances would be unavailing. If the continental powers, pretending to join, were really to pursue different, and even contrary objects; and if the French were inspired by the same spirit which, during the republic enthusiasm, animated and invigorated their exertions, the issue would certainly be discomfiture to the nominal coalition of really discordant parts. But if they were to unite in head, heart, and hand, to pursue an object infinitely more important to their ultimate safety than paltry indemnities; it would by no means follow, that their efforts would be unavailing as in 1794." The object which the historian in this part of his narrative had in immediate contemplation, was the reduction of French power within limits consistent with the independence of Europe. Leaning to the political views of Mr. Pitt, more than with us to the political views of Mr. Burke; and admitting (we think wrongly) that peace was practicable, even with regicides, this historian very clearly demonstrates throughout the latter part of his work, that combination only uniform in purpose, consistent in plan, and energetic in execution, could save or restore Europe. For this conclusion, however, we cannot bestow on him the praise of extraordinary sagacity; it being so very evident, that where one nation very greatly preponderates beyond any other, and manifests a determined resolution to spread its conquests, either several states must join for common defence, or all successively bend under the yoke. We rejoice that the truth of this doctrine appears to be practically felt by Britain and the Northern Powers; and we repeat our hopes that Prussia may be induced to act with similar energy. Concert only among the continental potentates is wanting to call into action various dissolvents of Buonaparte's power. The Corsican, for even he is proverbially entitled to his due, has been, we must acknowledge, extremely serviceable to the

objects