will be the situation of England in such a case; her riches, her industry, her wealth and prosperity, her principles gone; her people impoverished and corrupted, lost to all delicacy, scruple, and morality, and accustomed to luxury and profusion. There is certainly an immense mass of information, of talent, of science and industry in England; but, as in France, all these qualities will have been exclusively applied to the service of the government, or all who join talent to honesty will have emigrated long before.

How much more respectable was the name of England, how much more solid her power, when with a small army, a navy scarcely equal to that of the Dutch, but a government strong by the support of a free, energetic, and enlightened people, she stood the bulwark of European liberty, against the ambition of Louis XIV. Under all her apparent greatness, she is really weaker in the love of her people for their country, in their moral courage and principle, than she was thirty years ago. Thus, when the power of Napoleon stretched from Cadiz to Moscow, when a million of armed veterans stood at his command, and the treasures of Europe were at his disposal, France was really weaker, as was proved by the event, than when confined between Belgium and the Pyreness, divided at home, without an army, without a navy, without finances, almost without a government; but animated by the young enthusiasm of hope, and the love of liberty.

'But it must be remembered, that before the catastrophe of Moscow, the power of Napoleon had repeatedly crushed all opposition from the frontiers of Spain, to those of Russia. It had risen to its acmé, just before its fall, and no human foresight could have fixed the moment of its decline. In the same way England can do incalculable mischief in the world before she falls.

'It behoves America, for her own sake, for the sake of that world, where she stands the last and only asylum of liberty and of its friends and martyrs in every country; the sanctuary, where the flame of freedom is yet cherished and kept alive, to watch the progress and march of this great power, a power infinitely greater than that of Napoleon. The jealousy of England is chiefly directed against her. The English know right well, that their naval supremacy, on which their greatness depends, has ultimately more to fear from America, than from the rest of the world. They cannot reach to the sources of her prosperity, nor finally prevent her progress; it depends on causes which it is not in the power of England, nor even of man, to change; on her geographical position, her immense territory, her free government, and the enlightened character of her people. But they can stop it for a time; they can give it severe checks, and it behoves America to stand upon her guard.

To prove these positions, to show the necessity of organizing an efficient defensive force in America, and to point out some of the principles on which such a force should be founded, such are the objects of the present Essay. I am aware that the very examples which I have just quoted, of France and of England, who both

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lost their liberties by over-augmenting that military force, which they had been obliged to raise for purposes of self-defence; I am aware that these examples may be turned against me, and that they have excited a very just and proper alarm in this free country. But that the situation of America is radically different from that of France or England, and that her military force, founded on different principles, and differently composed and organized, can never endanger her liberties, even when improved and strengthened so as to protect her effectually, I shall also endeavour to prove.'

The second chapter comprises a military analysis of the late war between the United States and Great Britain, in which the author contends that our attack on Canada was very injudiciously managed, and that the strength of our enemy was not fully put forth. This discussion is important, and deserves the serious attention of all the members of our national legislature,-but we must refrain from remarks or citations when the subject appears to belong so exclusively to politicians. He contends in the sequel that the militia is wholly insufficient for our defence, and that no apprehensions ought to be entertained of danger to our liberties from an enlarged standing army. Finally, he proposes as our wisest policy to increase the scale of our military preparations by additional fortifications, roads, canals, and military schools, to amass a collection of topographical surveys, charts, &c. in the war office, to augment our arsenals, founderies, &c. and to promote the study of military science. On this last head he remarks:

The duties of an officer of infantry are not confined to the exercises and manœuvres of his troop; these are intelligible to the most vulgar capacity, easily learned, and easily directed. But his cares must be extended to every thing that concerns its welfare; he must be the father of his company; the cleanliness, temperance, morality, and health of his men are under his daily inspection; their service, order and discipline he should constantly superintend; their instruction direct, nor disdain to enter into all their little interests, and all the details of their clothing, feeding, lodging, armament and equipment, &c. If the captain and officers of every company do not keep a constant and watchful eye over these details, the waste and profusion of the regimental administration can never be remedied by the exactness or vigilance of any superior authority. A good captain should form the spirit of his men, and by attending with zeal and inclination to their interests, he will secure, sooner than by any improper weakness or indulgence, that affection and respect, which a soldier should feel for his chief, in every well regulated army.

'These cares, with the study of his particular service in every situation, and a general acquaintance with the whole theory of the art of war, should be common to every officer. But in the artillery, the previous information required is still more extensive, the details of service are more numerous, and the objects of inspection more important. If indeed the duty of the artillery officer be con

fined to the direction of a fixed battery, or command of a company, he may learn it by rote, and that may suffice for the service of the militia, and the defence of fixed positions on the coast. But if he wishes to understand his profession theoretically, he must acquire much previous mathematical learning, and receive a scientific education. Nor is there any part of the sublimer theory of tactics to which he should be a stranger; the principles of fortification he should understand, either to attack or defend them with success, and the tactics of the field, to co-operate in them with effect. As the ordnance department is a branch of the artillery, the fabrication and inspection of all kinds of arms, makes a part of his attributions, and he must be versed in all the process of their manufacture.* It is absurd to think of creating such a corps at the moment of war; it has required centuries to carry it to perfection in Europe.

'The profession of the engineer requires still more learning and study, as much indeed as those which are called the learned professions, the lawyer's, physician's, or divine's. There is scarcely a branch of natural philosophy which should be totally foreign to his studies; the laws of mechanics, the force

*In the course of this work, I have always considered the ordnance department as distinguished from the artillery; but why they are thus divided in two departments I could never understand. England is the only country of Europe where this disposition exists, either because it was so established at first, or because it was thought that the immense quantity of armament which that country fabricates, required a separate corps occupied with no other functions. But even in England this system is vicious. The advantage of uniting these functions in the artillery is obvious and clear. The best judges of the fabrication of arms are those who use them and try them constantly: the theory of that fabrication which requires such accurate and experimental knowledge, is best improved by practice, and the practice by theory. The corps of the artillery loses much of its value by this division of its labours; it becomes a mere corps of cannon firers.

In France (and the artillery in all the rest of Europe was more or less modelled upon the French) the young officer destined to that service, after two or three years of preparatory studies, spend two years at first in the polytechnic school to acquire general mathematical information, and as many afterwards in the school of application of mathematical science, to the particular service of the artillery. He entered then as second lieutenant into an arsenal, to study and practise the fabrication of armament, powder, projectiles, fireworks, &c. He passed into a regiment of artillery as first lieutenant: when promoted to the rank of captain in second, he returned to the arsenals, and when he rose to the first captaincy, took the command of a company. On his next promotion, he became a sous di recteur of artillery, and superintended the fabrics; he then passed to the command of a battalion or squadron of heavy or light artillery, to the direction of an arsenal, the command of a regiment, &c. The construction of all batteries and military reconnaissances, conjointly with the engineers, the administration of the armament and warlike approvisionment of armies, the erection of temporary bridges on pontoons, made part of his attributions. Thus, in the course of his service, an officer of artillery became perfectly acquainted with the fabrication of armament in the arsenals and all its theory, with its properties and use in the field, with the command and administration of troops, both of horse and foot, and was a finished officer by the time that he had reached the higher ranks of his profession. The artillery furnished excellent staff and general officers: Napoleon, Pichegru, and Marmont were formed in that service. In this point of view it would be of invaluable use in America.

of chemical compounds, the specific weight and gravity of every substance which he may employ, should be familiar to him. He should be acquainted with the whole theory of tactics, to judge, at one glance, of the military properties of a country; he should be fertile in resources and inventions, ready at drawing a survey, and levying a map, prompt in calculating, and accurate in balancing the means and object, expense, time, and materials requisite even for a sudden work. His profession, in short, is one of the most profound and practically useful of the branches of human learning; his talents may be pre-eminently serviceable in time of peace, applied to those internal improvements by which commerce, agriculture and manufactures are equally benefitted, and in time of war his services are indispensable. Exact surveys, by pointing out the proper places, and proper means of defence, save at such moments an incalculable expense to the nation, which would have been thrown away on useless and ill-designed works. England, with laudable spirit, is endeavouring at present to form a good corps of engineers; but in America, the fruits of such an establishment would be incomparably greater; for in no country can works be erected of such magnitude, of such benefit to posterity, and to the world; works to immortalize the name, and excite the disinterested ambition of any engineer. The genius of that useful corps should not be cramped by an illiberal and short-sighted parsimony, their feelings disgusted from the service, and their conceptions rendered useless. Our engineers should be numerous and instructed, organized on the most efficient footing, and maintained on the most liberal system; for every good engineer who retires, is a real loss to the country.'

It is not perhaps doing justice to colonel Tone to quote him thus disjointedly, but if these extracts excite a curiosity to read the entire pamphlet one end will be gained. His concluding remarks are these:

"The result of all these observations and of this whole work is, that to have a good army on a system adapted to our government and circumstances, we should form and entertain a great number of good officers, and then we may safely reduce the number of our soldiers; that to avoid the necessity of creating and instructing new corps, we should rather diminish the force than the number of our brigades and battalions, and organize them so as to incorporate readily in their ranks any reinforcements which circumstances may require, such as the probable means of the enemy, the nature of those means, and the mode of attack which he may adopt. Those brigades, supported and flanked by the militia, whose courage they would confirm by their own steadiness, would prove sufficient for our defence on every important point. The militia would serve as excellent light troops to guard them, and watch and harass the enemy. How far it might be proper to add to each brigade a small detachment of light dragoons and riflemen, and

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one or two field pieces, are military questions, which the experience of the brave officers, employed in the last war and acquainted with the topography of the country, can best resolve.

"Our present establishment is clearly insufficient for these pur poses, and if further reduced, will become absolutely useless. It comprises only nine full battalions and about 300 officers of infantry. In time of war, we shall need a division of the army at NewOrleans, supported by the militia of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky and Tennessee. The militia, well organized, may perhaps suffice for the defence of Florida, Georgia and Carolina, but the Chesapeake will require a strong division of the army to cover our national establishments, the seat of government, and the rich shores of the bay. (Maryland should be attached to this division.) In our northern department, Ohio, Indiana and Michigan, (to which the Illinois and Missouri territories should be attached,) require a division of the army to garrison our Indian frontier to the Yellow Stone river, and in time of war, heading the militia of those states, pour upon Upper Canada. Another will be required on the Hudson, on the Delaware, in New England, covering Boston and Rhode Island, and another on the northern frontier of New York and Vermont. It it evident that 40 battalions and 1000 officers will scarcely be sufficient for this service, even if the militia be so improved as to give some reliance on its service and co-operation. It is not necessary that we should therefore maintain that number, small as it is, in time of peace, but we should always have the means of completing it immediately on the approach of

war.

For that purpose we might maintain twenty battalions, reduced to half the number of privates, a force little superior to what we maintain at present, but fully officered, and even attach to each of them a certain number of supernumerary officers. As soon as we determine on raising the army to the war establishment, these battalions should be completed, organized in brigades and divisions, and encamped, whilst the supernumerary officers and sub-officers, detached with some chosen soldiers, receive and incorporate the recruits and organize twenty other battalions. If the military depots be amply provided with arms, clothing, equipment, field equipages, &c. it is inconceivable in how short a time this may be done. I have seen corps thus formed with good elements, ready to appear in the field in the course of a few weeks. The number of officers required in such an organization of the army will occasion a trifling augmentation in its expense, but of no moment, when compared with the advantage of having all its cadre ready formed at the moment of war. The economy of time and expense, thus procured, will be understood by all who know the value of foresight and order, and the superior quality of such troops, by all military men. In fact, new corps will otherwise be no better at first than the militia, and cannot support it.