"sustanza, cosi (gli aggiuntivi) non possono star "senza la sustanza, cosi (gli aggiuntivi) non possono "star nell' orazione senza un sustantivo: e standovi, "non vi starebbon a proposito; perchè non "significherebbon niente.” Buonmattei.

H. The opinion of Frischlinus is sufficiently confuted by Vossius(). And notwithstanding R. Johnson's confident assertion, that nobody would say so, I maintain that the adjective is equally and altogether as much the name of a thing, as the noun substantive. And so say I of ALL words whatever. For that is not a word which is not the name of a thing. Every word, being a sound significant, must be a sign; and, if a sign, the name, of a thing. But a noun substantive is the name of a thing....and nothing more. And, indeed, so says Vossius.... "Nec rectiús substantivum definitur....quod aliquid per se significat.....Nam omnis vox ex instituto significans, aliquid significat per se.”

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De Analog. lib. 1, cap. 6. I mean not to withdraw any portion of the respect which I have always declared for R. Johnson, B. Jonson, or Buonmattei. But it does not follow that I should be compelled jurare in verba upon every thing they have advanced. They were grammarians, not philosophers. Were I to compose in Latin, I certainly should not venture to use an uncommon supine or a compared participial, without first consulting R. Johnson: but for the philosophy of language I cannot consider him as an authority. How strangely does he here impose (0) De Analogia, lib. 1, cap. 6,

upon himself with his example of good man: concluding, because good does not signify the same thing which man signifies, that therefore good signifies nothing, i. e. is not the name of any thing. So, if he had reversed his instance and chosen this ....human goodness:....he must, by the same kind of reasoning, have concluded that goodness was, but that human was not, the name of a thing. Still more absurd will this appear, if, instead of human, we employ Wallis's adjective and say....man's goodness: for then (if Wallis is right in regard to the genitive) this reasoning will prove that....man's....is not the name of a thing.

But to return to R. Johnson's instance of good

man.

"The substantive man (he says) represents all "that is essential to the nature of the thing; but "the adjective good represents only an accidental "quality." Which, when well considered, amounts to no more than this: That the substantive man represents all that is signified by the term man; but that the adjective good does not represent any idea that is signified by the term man. And this is very true. But whoever will reflect a moment, will see that each of these words, both good and man, represents equally all that is essential to the nature of the thing of which good and man is respectively the sign. Good indeed does not represent (i. e. is not the sign of) any idea signified by the term man, nor was it intended: any more than the term man represents (i. e. is the sign of) any idea signified by the term good. But good represents

:

all the ideas signified by the term goodness. And all the difference between a substantive (as goodness) and its corresponding adjective (good) is that, by some small difference of termination, we are enabled when we employ the sign of an idea, to communicate at the same time to the hearer, that such sign is then meant to be added to another sign in such a manner as that the two signs together may answer the purpose of one complex term.. This contrivance is merely an abbreviation in the sorts of words to supply the want of an abbreviation in terms. For instance....a holy man. Here is a difference of termination in one sign....holiness.... to shew us that it is to be joined to another sign.... man: and that these two together are to serve the purpose of one complex term. In this last instance, our language enables us to exchange them both for one complex term, (which we cannot do with good man) and, instead of a holy man, to say a saint.

In some cases our language is so deficient as not to enable us to use either of these methods, when we want to express, a certain collection of ideas together; and we then have recourse sometimes to prepositions, and sometimes to another expedient: if we speak, we do it by joining the terms close in pronunciation: if we write, we do it by using a mark of junction, thus. Which mark is not a word nor a letter, because it is not the sign of a sound; but is itself, what a immediate sign of an idea; with this difference, that it is conveyed to the eye only, not to the ear. Thus sea-weed, ivory-wand, shell-fish, river-god,

word should be, the

weather-board, hail-storm, country-house, familyquarrel, &c.

For these collections of ideas our language does not furnish us either with a complex term, or with any change of termination to sea, ivory, shell, river, weather, hail, country, family, &c. by which to communicate to the hearer our intention of joining those terms to some other term.

That an adjective therefore cannot (as the grammarians express it) "stand by itself, but must be

joined to some other noun;" does not proceed from any difference in the nature of the idea or of the thing of which the adjective is the sign: but from hence, that having added to the sign of an idea that change of termination which, by agreement or common acceptance, signifies that it is to be joined to some other sign, the hearer or reader expects that other sign which the adjective termination announces. For the adjective termination of the sign sufficiently informs him, that the sign, when thus adjectived, is not to be used by itself or to stand alone; but is to be joined to some other term(”).

(P) Though most languages are contented to give a distinguishing termination only to the added sign; in the Persian language the sign which is to receive the addition of another sign to it, has a distinguishing termination to inform the reader when it is to receive an addition. So that in the Persian language there are substantives which cannot stand al ne, but must be joined to some other word in the same sentence. But I hope it is not necessary to travel so far as to Persia, to convince our grammarians of the impropriety of making its inability to stand alone in a sentence, the distinguishing mark of an adjective; if they will be pleased only to recollect, that no substantive, in

Yet we very well know by the adjective alone, as well as by the substantive alone, of what idea or collection of ideas the term mentioned (whether adjective or substantive) is the sign: though we do not know, till it is mentioned, to what other sign the adjective sign is to be added.

It is therefore well called noun adjective: for it is the name of a thing, which may coalesce with another name of a thing.

But if indeed it were true that adjectives were not the names of things; there could be no attribution by adjectives: for you cannot attribute nothing. How much more comprehensive would any term be by the attribution to it of nothing? Adjectives therefore, as well as substantives, must equally denote substances: and substance is attributed to substance by the adjective contrivance of language.

F. Not so. You forget the distinction which Scaliger makes between substance and essence.

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"Substantiæ appellatione abusi sunt pro essentia: "sicuti Græci nomine solas, in prædicamento. Namque etiam convenit rebus extra prædicamenta, ut Deo. At substantia neque extra prædicamenta, neque in omnibus; sed in iis "tantum quæ substant accidentibus."

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It is not therefore necessary that adjectives should denote substances, or else that there would be nothing attributed by their means.

any of its oblique cases, can stand alone any more than the adjective. And this latter circumstance might perhaps incline Wallis to call our genitive, an adjective: for man's cannot stand alone, any more than human.