But Man may

choole a

XV. From hence it appears that a Faculty of pleafing itself by Election cannot be determin'd to mifs fince Good by Objects, in the fame manner as the Sight his Good is to Light, or Tafte to Savours, (fince Goodness is not always an abfolute Quality in things, like Wifdom Light and the Objects of Senfe) nor by the Undernor can be Standing, fince many things must be chofen in which adequate the Understanding can perceive no manner of

nefs and

neither are

to his

Power.

'Tis bet

ter to be

deceiv'd

to be al

Good, except that they are capable of being chofen, and when chofen please, because they exercise the Faculty. And tho3 the Objects of Election are not Infinite, yet in a finite number there are infinite refpects in which Good or Evil may be produced: There's need then of infinite Wisdom and Goodness to direct the Choice, left it deviate into Evil. Since therefore a Creature endow'd with Wisdom is finite, it is impoffible but that it fhou'd have a natural Power of fometimes choofing wrong.

XVI. Fifthly, If the Will was confined to the Choice of thofe things only which the Understandfo netimes ing declares to be good, or was reftrain'd from with Plea- choofing till the Goodness of the Objects were apfure, than parent, we must of neceffity hesitate in many things, and be anxious and folicitous in all. For fince things are connected together by a long chain of Confequences, it is impoffible for us to form a right Judgment of the abfolute Goodness of them, without a foreknowledge of thefe Confequences, we muft therefore have been oblig'd to use all poffible Difquifition

ways folicitous.

NOTES.

itfelf: Nay, without this Idea, to be loaded with Favours would prove even an Uneafinefs to a generous Mind. This Notion will be farther explain'd and vindicated in the following Subfection; for the Truth of it we muft appeal to the conftant Experience of the ingenuous part of Mankind.

Difquifition before every Election, and fufpend the Choice where any Sufpicion of Error or Ground of Doubt fhou'd appear: but fuch a Difquifition and continual Solicitude would be a greater Bar to Happiness than many Errors and natural Inconveniencies. For if the Will can produce Good to itfelf by choofing, the Errors and Inconveniencies to which it is expos'd by a bad Choice, may be compenfated by the Pleafure which arifes from the Senfe of Liberty. But if we were oblig'd to all poffible Enquiry, more inconvenience would be felt from that Obligation, than from fome Errors in Elections; nor would all of them be by this means avoided; for after all poffible Examination, a finite Understanding may be deceiv'd. Evil Elections are to be avoided on account of the Uneafinefs confequent upon them, if therefore fuch a Difquifition as is neceffary to discover the Good, and a Sufpenfion of the Elective Faculty till that Good be difcover'd, would bring greater Uneafiness than some wrong Elections, a Man will be more happy with a Power of doing amifs, than if he were oblig'd to wait for the determination of the Understanding in every Cafe. For it is better that fome Perfons fhoulu fometimes do amifs, and fuffer Uneafinefs from the Confcience of having done fo, than that all Men fhould in every Cafe be always afraid, uncertain, and folicitous, nay generally ceafe from all manner of Action.

XVII. Such is the Nature of our Will that it 'Tis betcan please itself in Election, and by its own Power ter to be make the things chofen agreeable, tho' in them- in danger felves difagreeable to the Appetites. And tho' this cannot be done at all times, and in every Object, to cele ning, than yet it is better to run the hazard, than to be de- from Elecprived of fo ufeful a Faculty, or to be reftrain'd tion. from Election till an imperfect Understanding, such

as

as that of Man neceffarily is, were clearly convinced of that Impoffibility. It is therefore convenient for us to derive our peculiar and chief Happiness from the Will itfelf; for if it depended on the Understanding it would come with Difficulty, Pains and Anxiety, and we could feldom enjoy it pure and unmix'd. 'Tis better therefore for us to be able to please ourselves without a long Speculation of Antecedents and Confequences, tho with a danger of Sinning, than to ceafe from Election, and be reftrain'd from the Exercife of our Faculties, till a whole train of these were perfectly apparent, which if it could be at all, yet would not be without Pain and Anxiety, as any one will find that tries. (67.)

SUBSECT.

NOTES.

(67) All that Bayle objects to this [.] is taken from the Nature of Good Angels, and Glorified Souls, who, according to him, are no less happy in themselves, nor perform a lefs acceptable Service to the Deity for the want of it; and why therefore might not we? To what was obferv'd about the Inconclufiveness of all fuch Arguments as are drawn from Beings of a different Order in Note H. we fhall here add, first, that it is more than we are oblig'd to grant, that either Angels or Saints in Heaven are abfolutely devoid of Liberty. They may have more clear Impreffions of Good and Evil on their Minds, more enlarged Understandings, fewer and lefs Temptations, &c. without being less free [d.]; nay they must be in one sense more free, the more they are fo qualified [e] This way of reasoning therefore proceeds upon a falfe, or at least uncertain Hypothefis.

Secondly, Tho' it fhould be granted that thefe glorious Beings, fuppofing them all neceffary, might have as ample Know

ledge,

[.] See bis Anfwer to the Queries of a Provincia', and Crit. Di&t. Article Marchionites, Remark F. &c.

[d.] See A. Bp. Dawes's 5th Serm. p. 73, 74. and the latter end of Note T.

[e] See the beginning of Note 72.

SUBSE C T. III.

Why God does not interpofe his Omnipotence, and occafionally reftrain the Will from depraved Elections.

IS evident from what has been faid, that it More and

vils would

of Free

I. have created Free Agents, for without these the arife from Syftem of Nature would have been imperfect: nor thence, could their Actions have been determin'd to Good than from the abuse by any natural Propenfity or Limitation, in the fame manner as the Senses are limited by Objects: Will. But yet it is certain that they depend upon God for their Actions, and if he fhould fufpend his Influence, they would not act at all. Since therefore he could fo eafily hinder the abuse of Liberty, why does he suffer it? Why does he not reftrain ElecVol. II. D d tions

NOTES:

ledge, as ardent Love of the Divine Perfections, and confe-
quently be as happy in the Enjoyment of God and themselves,
as if they were all free; tho' they might have no occafion to
fee or experience Vice, in order to their being fully acquainted
wi
with the Excellence of Virtue, and made fenfible of the Infinite
Wisdom, Power, and Goodness of the Deity, shewn in the
Government and Suppreffion of the former, and in the Pro-
duction and Improvement of the latter: Tho', I fay, thefe ex-
alted Beings could be fuppofed to have a thorough Intuition of
all the Attributes of God without any fuch manifestation of
them in his Works; (against which Notion fee D'Oyly's First
Differtation, C. 8. and Conclufim, p. 123.) yet it does not seem
poffible for fuch imperfect Creatures as we are, to attain unto
this excellent Knowledge, and enjoy the hippy Effects of it on
any other Terms than the prefent. We could not sure have

had

It would be as much

Violence

of Free Will, as on of the

the Moti

Sun.

tions when they tend to Vice and Abfurdity? We grant that this Objection cannot be fatisfactorily anfwer'd otherwife than by fhewing that more and greater Evils would befal the Universe from fuch an Interpofition, than from the abufe of Free-Will. In order to which it is to be confider'd,

II. In the first place, That this cannot be effected without Violence done to Nature: "Tis allow'd to prevent that Elections ought to be free, and that thinking the Action Beings cannot otherwife be happy: God himself in creating them has determin'd, as it were by a Law, that they fhould be free. For by giving them a Nature endow'd with Choice, he allow'd them to make use of it. They cannot therefore be hinder'd without Violence done to the Laws of the Creation. I grant that God can dispense with the Laws of Nature; but who will require or allow this to be done frequently? The bounds of this World, and the number of thinking Beings are unknown to us, but we believe that the Syftem of Nature will endure for ever. Now as all things depend upon the Will of God, we cannot have any

NOTES.

other

had fo lively an Idea of the Mercy of God, if there had never been any proper Objects of it. We could not have been fo thoroughly confcious of our Dependency or Danger; nor had fo grateful a fenfe of our conftant Support, our frequent Deliverances, nor confequently have arrived to fo great a degree either of Virtue or Happiness in this Life or the next, by any other Method; as will be further fhewn in Notes 80 and 83. Either then thefe Happy Beings are fif perfectly free, which Freedom conflitutes the greatelt part of their Happiness; and let any Man try to prove the contrary; or at least they once were fo, in order to their greater Perfection, and are now only alter'd by being tranflated into another State, and put out of farther Tryal; and confequently they belong to our Author's third Expedient, which will be examin'd in Subfect. 5.