have wherewith to fatisfy it within itself; and might render any State agreeable, barely by willing it. Now

NOTES.

about to folve an Objection, to which he cou'd find no other anfwer, by telling the Objector that it cou'd not be true, becaufe if it were, the position against which he produced it must be falfe.

In fhort, we prove the Freedom and Indifference of the Will by producing many Instances where there is no motive to determine it one way more than the other; Nay, when all vifible Motives are against it. To which the Enemies of Freewill reply, 'tis true, they can't produce or find any reafon; but there is one, tho' imperceptible to the Man that chooses as well as to the reft of the World. Which as it is faid without reafon needs none to confute it.

But they ought to remember that to choose any thing for a reafon not known or obferv'd; is to choose without reafon ; ‘a reafon unknown is no reafon at all, except they'll fay that the will is determin'd as mechanically as matter is by impulfe.

But we carry the Matter yet much farther, and fhew that where there are many and ftrong Motives, great conveniency and agreebleness to our natural Appetites on one fide, and nothing but the exercife of our Liberty on the other, we often prefer that to all these Motives, and are well pleased with ourfelves, when we have done fo.

The Men that might live an eafy and quiet Life engage in bufinefs, toil and labour, and every one is fo well pleased with his Choice, that it is hard to fay amongst so many states, and fuch variety of Conditions which are moft happy: and tho' they fometimes complain when preffed with inconveniences, yet as Horace cbferves, hardly one would change if an Option were given him. If the things themselves please abstractedly from Choice, moft Men being of one Make, and having the fame Paffions, Wants and Appetites, thofe only that had all things fuitable to thofe Appetites cou'd be pleased, and all the World wou'd be confined to one way of living.

But as Happiness arifes from the Choice, it fo happens that in the great variety of Circumstances wherein Men are placed, they generally are pretty equally happy, because they enjoy their Choice. A Mariner is a life that feems intolerable to me, and defiitute of all thofe things that are agreeable to my natural Appetites; fuppofe then I am forced to that kind of Life, must I needs be miferable? No, I will and can make it

my

Now Free-Will has this Effect by accommodating itself to Objects, when the Objects themfelves cannot be chang'd. For the Man will be no less happy who chooses what he knows will come to pafs, than he who brings that to pafs which he chooses; the one may be always done, the other is often impoffible: this therefore, or none, is the Way to arrive at Happinefs. 'Tis hard to comprehend how he can fail of Happiness who has it in his Power to please himself. This feems to Vol. II. B b

NOTES.

have

my choice, not from any Motive which my Understanding affords me, for it reprefents it as difagreeable in every respect. But I will choose it and refolve to follow it, that it may please me, and by the force of that Choice it will at length become agreeable.

If it be faid that the neceffity which is on me to lead that fort of Life determines my Choice; I answer, that quite contrary nothing is more oppofite to choice than force, and we find nothing is apter to make us reject and be displeased with a thing than to fee it forced on us. My being forced therefore on Ship-board would rather raise an averfion than pleasure in me; but as foon as by the power of my Free will I refolve to live that Life, and be pleased with it, I find the pleasure begin and grow upon me. If there be any Wiidom in the World undoubtedly this is the Mafter-piece, to make all things eafy to us by choofing the ftate and condition of Life in which neceffity has placed us.

But my Understanding representing the evil and hardship of a thing with the neceffity of bearing it, will no way contribute to my ease except at the fame time it affure me that I can take away or diminish the natural Evil that accompanies it, if I choose to endure it with Contentment. Without this the Confideration of the neceffity that is upon me would rather encrease the difficulty and uneafinefs I feel, than allay it; as knowing the danger of a diftemper encreases a Man's fear of Death, if at the fame time no remedy be offer'd.

In fhort, the exercise of this Faculty of making things agreeable by Choice is all the remedy Nature affords us under unavoidable fufferings; if we have it not, we have none; and if we have, it takes off the complaint we make against God for putting us in fuch Circumftances where we neceffarily muft undergo fuch Evils.

have been the Opinion of the ancient Stoics, who had the fame thoughts of Liberty with thofe laid down above, but did not explain them diftinctly, nor comprehend the whole Series of the Matter.

However, 'tis very plain that they placed Happinefs in the Ufe and Election of fuch things as are in our own Power, which yet would be impoffible, if we were not able to please ourselves in Election. (60.)

SECT.

NOTES.

(60.) Our Author's mentioning the Stoics here, might probably give Leibnitz his reafon to fufpect him of maintaining all the abfurd Confequences which that Sect are faid to have drawn from the above mentioned Principle. They indeed (if they be not greatly misreprefented) urg'd it fo far as to affert, that nothing external could hurt or incommode us except we pleas'd: That all Good and Evil was entirely in our Power, and of our making, and confequently that all outward things were indifferent and alike to us, antecedent to our own Choice. Which Notions, being contrary to every Day's Experience in Pleafure and Pain, led them on to deny that the latter was properly an Evil, or rather that there was any difference at all between them. This Doctrine is indeed liable to Leibnitz's Objections of confounding all the diflinctions of things, of contradiding the natural Appetites, making Reafon and Understanding ufelefs, and fubverting all the other Faculties of the Mind. Thefe and the like Reflections, I fay, are jufly made upon the Doctrine of the Stoics, as they have generally expreis'd themfelves, and overthrow a total, abfolute Indifference of the Mind to will in all Cafes; but are nothing at all to our Author, who never contended for it; but on the contrary, infifts upon a neceffary, fix'd, and unalterable difference in the Natures of things, according to the prefent Syftem; and has allow'd their full force to both Reafon and the natural Appetites, all over the last Section, as well as in the foregoing Chapters of this Book,

But this has been explain'd in the Notes above. For an ap plication of this Sect. fee §. 5. Subfect. 2. and the Notes to 9. 5. Subfect. 3.

FRO

SECT. III.

Concerning undue Elections.

fhort of what we

amifs

not be en

1. ROM hence it is fufficiently evident what To fall kind of Elections are to be called undue ones: For it appears that God has given us this choo'e is Faculty of choofing, that we may please ourselves M.fery; in the use of it, and be happy in the fruition of we choofe those Objects which we choofe. For it is a Hap therefore piness to obtain the things chofen, and Mifery to when we be fruftrated and fall fhort of them. Whenfoever choose what cantherefore we knowingly make fuch a Choice, as not to be able to enjoy the things chofen, 'tis plain joy'd: that we choose foolishly and unduely for we bring This is upon ourselves unneceffary Mifery, fince we could done ift. have chofen otherwife with equal Pleasure. Who- when fuch things are ever then chooses knowingly what he cannot ob- chofen as tain, or what may produce unneceffary trouble to are impof himself or others, he must be efteem'd to choose fible. unduely. And this may be done, first, If any one choose Impoffibilities. It may feem ftrange that any Perfon fhould choose a thing which is impoffible, knowing it to be fo; but 'tis very probable that this has happen'd fometimes, as was faid before.

When

thofe

II. Secondly, If he choofe fuch things as are Secondly, inconfiftent with each other: he that does this contradicts himself, and evidently cuts off all hopes of Enjoyinent. When we will any thing, we muft chofen take all its neceffary confequences together with it. which are

Bb 2

Sect. i. Subfect. 5. par, 10, 11, 12%

things are

But inconfiftent.

with each other.

This 'ly, If the things

the Elector.

But all things here are of a mix'd kind, and nothing is pure from all degrees of Bitterness: we often therefore will that part in a certain thing which is agreeable to the Appetites, and refuse the reft but this is in vain, fince the agreeable Parts cannot be feparated from the difagreeable ones: we must therefore either choofe or reject the whole. He that does otherwife cannot poffibly fatisfy himfelf, fince he must bear with what he would not : He is therefore voluntarily unhappy by an undue Election.

III. Thirdly, he must be efteem'd to choose unduely, who aims at fuch things as he knows not to chefe be be in his Power. For it is a hazard whether he not in the enjoys thofe things that are not in his Power; and power of it is foolish to commit our Happiness to Chance ; while therefore it is in our Power to choose only fuch things as we are certain of obtaining, we risk Our Happiness, or throw it away when we pursue Uncertainties: Now we owe as much Happiness to ourselves as is in our Power, and ought to ufe our utmoft Endeavours to attain it; but we lofe this by undue Election when we defire those things which we know to be out of our Power.

Fourthly, If any choofe

Choice of

IV. Fourthly, That alfo is an undue Election, which obliges us to feize thefe things that are lawthat which fully occupy'd by the Elections of other Men. To is pre oc- be difappointed of an Election is Mifery, as cupy'd by we faid before; to enjoy it, Happiness. Every the lawful one therefore that is endow'd with a Power of others. choofing, has a right to the enjoyment of the thing chofen, fo far as is neceffary to the Exercife of his own Faculties, and is no impediment to the Good of others. But he must be efteem'd an impediment to the Good of others, who will appropriate to himfelf what is common, or affume more and greater Advantages from the common Stock than

fall