by them, but becaufe we fuppofe them to be comprehended in the very firft Act of his Will of creating things, and to be pleafing or difpleafing to him fo far as they are agreeable or oppofite to that Election. Nor does this deftroy the Liberty of God, that he must neceffarily will thefe while he does will them: For every thing, while it is, neceffarily is; but this Neceffity is confequent upon, and not antecedent to the Divine Will. The Divine Election therefore is not determined by the Goodness of things, but the Goodnefs and Fitnefs of them arifes from that Election, and that is beft for them which is moft agreeable to that Choice of the Deity whereby he will'd them to be what they are. From hence, I think, it appears fufficiently that God is fuch an Agent as delights in things merely because they are chofen.

a

Power is

yet this

XVIII. Yet it is to be remark'd, that this felf- A Being determining Power is not of fuch a Nature as to endow d imply infinite Perfection; for it may be confiftent with this with an imperfect understanding, and other Ap more perpetites, as we have fhewn before: 'Tis not there- fect than fore peculiar to God, or incommunicable; there one that is no reason therefore for us to doubt whether wants it: Creature may partake of it; if God were pleafed does not to communicate it, there feems to be no contra- imply indiction in the thing for a Creature to be capable finite Per of it. Now that Being which has this gift be- fection, ftow'd upon it, will manifeftly be more noble it is comthan the reft, and a more perfect refemblance of municathe Deity fince therefore God has created the ble. lefs perfect Beings, we may, without any abfurdity, believe that he has not omitted the more perfect. Let us fee then whether there be any Tokens of this Power among the Divine Works SUBSECT

2

For the poffibiliy of Juch a Power, and of its being commuhicated, fee Dr. Clarke's Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God, p. 82 and 85. 7th Edit. For the Perfection of it, fee Note 82 and 4. 2. of this Chapter:

therefore

SUBSECT. V.

That Man partakes of the Principle of pleasing bimfelf by Election.

Some rea- I.

fons are

offer d to

Tappears, I think, from what has been faid, that there is fuch a Principle as this in Nafhew this, ture, and that it is alfo communicable. We are now to enquire whether Nature has conferr'd it upon us: If we confult our own Minds, we may poffibly entertain a doubt whether we are always paffive in our voluntary Acts: namely, whether the Goodness of Objects determines our Elections according to the Degrees of it, which are, or are believed to be in them; or to fpeak more plain ly, whether we always choose things because they pleate us or feem convenient; or whether they fometimes appear indifferent in themselves, or inconvenient before the Choice, and acquire their Goodness from it, and are for this reafon only agreeable because they are chofen. We have feen that there is in Nature fuch a Power as this, which can produce a Convenience or Goodness in things by willing them; but whether we partake of it or no is the doubt. Now that we do partake of it may I think be evinced from the following Reafons. First, If we be confcious of an inherent Liberty. Secondly, If we experience in ourselves thofe Signs and Properties which have been declared to attend this Principle. Thirdly, If the Caufes which are fuppofed to, determine the Will be evidently infufficient, or arife from Election inftead of producing it.

II. As to the firft; We experience in ourfelves Firt, Exa Principle of this kind, i. e. a free one, to fuch a perience. degree of certainty, that if our Minds be confulted we can hardly doubt of it; and from hence it is that all Men of all Nations, while they follow'd the Guidance of Nature, and attended to the Perceptions of their own Minds, have conftantly afferted their Liberty, at least in fome particular Actions: Nor has any one, unless he were forc'd to it, and as it were circumvented by Philofophical Subtilties, ever deny'd either that he was free, or that he could please himself in choofing one or other out of many Objects prefented to him, tho' that which was preferr'd were no ways preferable to others in respect of any intrinfic worth.

ter of

matters of

III. In this therefore, as in many other Cafes, the The vulVulgar feem to be much wifer, and to reafon more gar often juftly than Philofophers. For the Vulgar generally judge betfollow the natural Sense of the Mind; and tho' they be dull enough in forming long Deductions, Fact than yet in fuch things as are the immediate Objects of Philofoof Senfe and Experience, they are often more ac- phers. cute than Philofophers themselves. For thefe being either puff'd up with the Vanity of appearing wife above the Vulgar, or impos'd upon by their own Subtilty, often frame Monsters of their own, and deny things that are the most manifeft: while they are striving to purfue Truth thro' Coverts impervious and inacceffible to human Wit, they leave her behind their Backs, and are blind in full Light. Hence fome have deny'd Mation, and others Reft, others Space, others all Senfe in Brutes, others the being of a God, and others all manner of Truth and on the fame account, fome have deny'd Liberty, viz. because they were not able to unravel the Difficulties in which they themfelves had involv'd it by their Subtilties. The ignorant

and unlearned do much better in flighting all fuch Arguments, and judging of things ingenuously according to the dictate of their Senfes and Experience; and if their Judgments be taken, we have clearly gain'd the Caufe: for all thefe declare that they are confcious of this free Principle within them, which yet cannot, as we have fhewn, be well explain'd otherwife than we have done: The Senfe of our unprejudic'd Mind agrees with thefe, nor is the common Teftimony of Mankind to be efteem'd of little importance in a matter of Fact. (54) IV. Secondly,

may

NOTES.

:

(54) The Subftance of what Leibnitz objects against this Argument [k] amounts to thus much, viz. That it is no proof of the non-existence of a thing because the Vulgar don't perceive it; they are no Judges of any thing but what is perceiv'd by the Senses; they believe the Air to be nothing when it is not mov'd; they know nothing of the fubtle Fluid which caufes Gravity, or of the magnetic Matter, much less of immaterial Subftances and therefore the feveral Caufes of Action, the fecret Springs, the Reafons and Inclinations, be all unknown to them, and yet we abfolutely determin'd (as he believes we always are) either by the conftitution of our own Bodes, or of thofe about us, or by a thousand little things which, upon due attention and reflection, we might be able to discover. We reply, that tho' in many Cafes our not percei ving a thing be no Argument that it does not really exit, yet in fome Cafes, in this particularly, it is: To feel no Pain, to be confcious of no Idea, is to have none; and in like manner to perceive no motive or reafon of Action, is the fame as not to act upon any, or to perceive that we act without one. If any one (whether Philofopher or Peafant) be thinking upon a Subject, he must, at that inftant, know the Subject that he is thinking on, or however, that he does think on fomething: 'tis likewife felf-evident, that every reasonable Man, when he refolves upon fome View, or follows an Inclination, must be conscious of that View, or at least be fenfible that his Refolution was form'd upon fome View or other, In these Cafes therefore, and in all the modifications of Thought, not to be, and not to be perceiv'd, is the very fame thing.

[k] Remarques, p. 477.

But

we pir take of this

Power, becaufe we

IV. Secondly, If we experience in ourfelves the 'Tis pro: Signs and Properties which belong to this Power, ved that it cannot be queftioned but we have the Power itfelf: Now thefe are a Self-confcioufnefs that we are the true Cause of our Actions; an Ability to act and please ourselves in contradicting our natural Appetites, our Senfes and Reafon. If it be evident from Experience that we can do thefe things, Y 4

NOTES.

it

But befide the abfurdity of being influenc'd by a Motive which we know nothing of; befide the Impoffibility of reconciling thefe imperceptible Movers with any kind of Liberty, (for which fee Note 45.) we reply, fecondly, that our Author does not conclude against the Existence of a thing because the Vulgar do not perceive and take notice of it, but on the contrary argues, that there must be fuch a thing as a Liberty of Indifference, because they do continually perceive and acknowledge it; because they clearly perceive and experience it in themselves, or at leaft imgaine that they do fo; nay, because they have as great Evidence of fuch a felf determining Power, as they have of any thing, even of their own Exilence. and confequently they must either be deceiv'd in every thing, or not deceiv'd in this [1] The prefent Argument is therefore built on matter of Fact, and will be conclufive here, tho' our Ignorance be never fo great in other Cafes. Our affurance of a Truth which we do clearly perceive, is not the lefs for there being a great many other Truths which we do not perceive: and tho' our not perceiving a thing were no Argument that it does not exist, yet our actual perception of it is a Demonftration that it does. It is not, therefore, because we do not confider the Caufes that communicate Motion to the Soul, or are not able to delineate the precife manner of that Communication, that we affert the Soul to be felf-motive (as the Author of the late Differtation on Liberty and Neceffity argues, p. 15.) But we affert that it is felfmotive, because we feel it to be fo, and have as great Evidence of it as we could expect or conceive ourselves to have, were it really fo. And that Author unreasonably begs the Question, in fuppofing that there are fuch Caufes and Communicators in Cafe where he has, where he can have, no Evidence at all of them. But this Differtation is fully confuted by Mr. Jackson, to whofe Answer I refer the Reader.

[Z] See Note 59.

a

difcover the Marks

and Properties of it in our

felves.