Such an

thefe Appetites. Yet this Agent is oblig'd to have fome regard to the Appetites, and not to disturb them unneceffarily, nor reftrain them from a due enjoyment of their proper Objects. He that does this will bring upon himself uneafinefs, and a needlefs conteft. Tho' therefore it be not at all proper that fuch a Power should be abfolutely determin'd by the natural Appetites, yet it is fit that they fhould perfuade it, and that fome regard be had to them in its Determinations.. And this may be reckon'd its third Limitation.

XVI. Ninthly, An Agent poffefs'd of fuch a Principle as this would be Self-active, and capable Agent as of being determin'd in its Operations by itself alone. Now there is sometimes an abfolute neceffity for it to be determined; for when arly thing is propofed

this is

Selfactive.

NOTES.

to

able, muft add to the Pleasure arifing from it; when determin'd to a contrary one (both which kinds of Objects he always fuppofes) muft deduct from the Pain; when to an indifferent one, it must make that pofitively agreeable, by conferring fo much abfolute and folid Happiness.

But ftill this exercife of the Will, and of confequence the Pleafure attending it, mult in all finite Creatures be effentially and neceffari'y finite, as well as the exercife of all their other Powers: and tho' it has no bounds as to the nun ber and kind of its Objects, yet it must be limited as to its own Nature and the degree of its exercife. This appears to me easily conceivable, and Matter of experience. We find ourselves generally able to turn our Thoughts to any Object indifferently, but does any Perfon from hence imagine that he can fix his thoughts upon any particular Object, with an unlimited Intenfenefs, or think infinitely? granting the Words Intensenefs to be applicable here in any tolerable fenfe: which will perhaps, upon Examination, appear very doubtful. However, it is evidently no good confequence to infer, that because I can will or chaofe a thing abfolutely and freely, therefore I can will it in infinitum. May I not as juftly be faid to perceive or un derftand a thing in infinitum, becaufe I perceive or understand it at all? See Note N.

to be done immediately, it must neceffarily either act or fufpend its action, one of them muft neceffarily be; but when either of them is done, the Power is determin'd by that very act; and no less force is requifite to fufpend than to exert the act, as common Sense and Experience may inform any. one †. A determination then about a thing once propos'd to be done, is unavoidable; and fince it can neither be determin'd by any Good or Evil pre-exiftent in the Objects, nor by the natural Powers or Appetites, nor by their Objects; ic muft of neceffity either continue undetermined, or else determine itself. But tho' it be naturally free from any determination, yet the Nature of the thing requires that it fhould be determin'd on every particular occafion; and since there is nothing external to do this, it remains that it determine itself. We fhall call this Determination an Election; for as it is naturally indifferent to many things, it will please itself in electing one before another.

Is deter

are not

chofen be

XVII. Nor is it a proper Queftion to afk, What determines it to an Election? For if any fuch thing min'd by were fuppos'd, it would not be indifferent, i. e. 'tis himself, contrary to the Nature of this Agent that there and things fhould be any thing at all to determine it. In relation to a paffive Power ++, which has a natural caufe they and neceffary connection with the Object, the please him presence of which determines it to an act, we may but please reasonably enquire what that Good is which may caufe they determine it to exert any particular action; but it are cho is not fo in an active Power, the very Nature of fen. which is to make an Object agreeable to itself, i. e. good, by its own proper act. For here the Goodnefs of the Object does not precede the act of Election, fo as to excite it, but Election makes the

See Note 48. tt See Locke, Ch. 21. Sect, 2:

Goodness

him be

Yet he is

not deter min'd by

Chance.

Is the true

ons.

Goodness in the Object; that is, the thing is agreeable because chofen, and not chofen because agreeable: We cannot therefore juftly enquire after any other cause of Election than the Power itself.

XVIII: If these things be true, you'll fay, this Agent will be determin'd by Chance, and not by Reason; but in reality here's no room for Chance, if by Chance be understood that which happens befide the Intention of the Agent; for this very Election is the Intention of the Agent, and it is impoffible that a Man fhould intend befide his Intention. As for Reason, he that prefers a less Good to a greater, must be judg'd to act unreasonably; but he that makes that a greater Good by choofing it, which before his choice had either no Good at all in it, or a lefs, he certainly chooses with reafon. You may urge that Contingency at least is to be admitted; if by this you mean that this Agent does fome things which are not at all neceffary, I readily own a Contingency, for that is the very Liberty I would establish,

XIX. Tenthly, 'Tis evident that fuch an Agent Caufe of as this, if it be allow'd that there is fuch an one, his Actiis the true Cause of his Actions, and that whatever he does may juftly be imputed to him. A Power which is not Master of itself, but determin'd to act by fome other, is in reality not the efficient Caufe of its actions, but only the inftrumental or occaftonal, (if we may use the term of fome Philofophers) for it may be faid that the thing is done in ft, or by it, rather than that it does the thing itfelf. No Perfon therefore imputes to himself, or efteems himself the Caufe of thofe actions to which he believes himself to be neceffarily determin'd: If then any inconvenience arife from them, he will look upon it as a Misfortune, but not as a Crime; and whatever it be, he will refer it to the Determiner. Nor will he be angry with himself, un

lefs

lefs he be confcious that it was in his power not to have done them: but he cannot be conscious of this (except thro' ignorance and error) who is determin'd by another. For no others ought to be look'd upon as true Caufes, but fuch as are free. Those that operate neceffarily, are to be conceiv'd as paffive, and we must recur to fome other which imposes that neceffity on them, till we arrive at one that is free, where we may ftop. Since then the Agent endow'd with this Power, is determin'd by himself and no other, and is free in his Operations, we must acquiefce in him as a real Cause, and he ought to be esteem'd the Author of whatever he does, either well or ill. (O.)

NOTES.

XX.

(0.) Against this 'tis objected that the quite contrary foli lows. For to fall on a good action by a Motion abfolutely indifferent and not in confequence of fome antecedent Good or Evil Qualities in the Agent is to fall on it blindly, by mere Chance, and fo Fortune not the Agent is to be thanked or blamed. He rather is to be blamed or praised that owes his good or ill Actions to his antecedent good or ill Qualities.

To which I anfwer, that this is to deny and difpute against the Conclufion, without answering one word of the Premises, which are fo plain and evident that I can't reckon the Argument other than a Demonftration; whereas that which is oppofed to it is against the common Senfe of Mankind.

For thofe good or bad Qualities that oblige him to do a good or bad Action are either from himself, that is his choice, or proceed from outward Agents that produced them in him if from his own Choice, then it agrees with the Author's Opinion; but if from fome outward Agent, then it is plain the good or Evil is to be imputed to that Agent only. Quod eft caufa Caufa eft etiam Caufa Caufati.

I can't better explain this than by an Example. Suppose I am in diftrefs, and there is one Man that by the Commands of his Prince, by his own Interest, and Politic Confiderations is obliged to relieve me, and is in fuch Circumstances that he cannot poffibly avoid doing it; the other is under no manner of Obligation, may do it or let it alone, yet feeing my Misfortune

nefs.

Is capable XX. Eleventhly, 'Tis manifeft that fuch an Aof Happi- gent as this is capable of Happiness. For that Perfon must be happy who can always please himfelf, but this Agent can evidently do fo. For fince things are fuppos'd to please him, not by any neceffity of Nature, but by mere Election, and there is nothing which can compel him to choose this rather than another; 'tis plain that the Agent endow'd with this Power may always choose fuch things as it can enjoy, and refufe, i. e. not defire, or not choose thole things which are impoffible to be had. And from hence it appears of how great Importance it is, whether that whereby things become agreeable to the Appetites, be eftablished by Nature, or effected by the Agent himfelf. For if Good and Evil proceed from Nature and

NOTES.

fortune he choofes and pleafes himself in doing me a good Office. Let any one of Senfe judge to which of these I owe the greatest Obligation, or if the World wou'd with Patience. hear me excufe my Ingratitude by saying, Sir there was no Obligation on you to help me, you might have done it, or let it alone, therefore it was mere Chance, that determin'd you. Would not the Reply be naturally, the lefs Obligation was on him that relieved you, the greater your Obligation is to him for his kindness. If it be faid that the Relief proceeded from Compaffion and good Nature, which were antecedently in the Benefactor, and therefore it was valuable: fuppofe the Perfon that did this Office had always before been remarkable for cruelty and ill nature, ought the obliged Perfon to value the Kindness lefs for that? Quite contrary; it was rather a greater Favour to him that it was fingular. But fuppofe it proceeded from a general Compaffion and good Nature, that had nothing of Choice in them, fo that the Perfon cou'd not help doing it, ought I not to thank him for it, and give him the Praises due to the Action? I ought to praise and commend him for his useful Qualities, as I do the Sun: but if I were fure that there was nothing of choice in them, I had no more reason to thank him than the Tyrant whofe impofthume was cured by the Wound dẹfigned to kill him, had reason to thank the Affilant.