from this Indifference they declare, that we have an Opportunity of rejecting or embracing any thing. For tho' we can choose nothing but under the Appearance of Good, i. e. unless it be in fome manner connected with the Chief Good, as a Medium or Appendant; yet this does not determine the Choice, because every Object may be varied, and represented by the Understanding under very different Appearances. III. Secondly,

NOTES.

granting the very thing we contend for, viz. that the Pleasure attending the exercife of the Will is often the fole reason of Volition. Befides, that Motive is one of the Mind's own making; and to be able to produce the Motive for Action, is the fame thing, with regard to Liberty, as to be able to act without one. If by trying our Liberty be meant an Experiment to affure us that we have really fuch a Power; we answer, that there can be no reason for trying it in this fense, because we are fufficiently confcious of it before any fuch Trial.

6

The Mind (fays the Author of the Effay on Consciousness, p. 208) before ever it exerts its Will or Power of choofing, is confcious, and knows within itself, that it hath a Power of Choice or Preference, and this is a neceffary Condition of willing at all, infomuch that the very first time I had occa'fion to exert my Will, or make use of my elective Power, I could not poffibly exercise it, or do any voluntary Act, without knowing and being confcious to myself [before hand] that I have fuch a Faculty or Power in myfelf. A thing that feems at first fight very strange and wonderful; to know I have a power of acting before ever I have acted, or had any 'trial or experience of it: But a little Reflection will quickly. fatisfie any one that in the nature of the thing it must be so, and cannot poffibly be otherwife; and which is peculiar to this Faculty: For we know nothing of our Powers of Perceiving, Understanding, Remembring, &c. but by experimenting their Acts, it being neceffary firft to perceive or 'think, before we can know that we have a Power of percei'ving or thinking'. The Author proceeds to fhew, that this Fore-consciousness of a power of willing or choofing does most clearly demonftrate that the Mind in all its Volitions begins the Motion, or acteth from itself.

+ Eay on Confcioufnefs, p. 209, 210,

To

Though therefore

the Will follows

ment of

the Understand.

III. Secondly, When therefore any Good is propofed which is not the Chief, the Will can fufpend+ the Action, and command the Understanding to fome Judg. propose fome other thing, or the fame under fome other Appearance: which may be always done, fince every thing except the chief Good is of fuch a Nature, that the understanding may apprehend fome refpect or relation wherein it is incommodious. Notwithstanding therefore that the Will always does follow fome Judgment of the Understanding, which is made about the fubfequent Actions, yet it is not neceffarily determin'd by any, for it can fufpend its Action and order fome other Judgment, which it may follow. Since therefore it can either

ing, yet it is not neceffarily

deter

min'd by

it.

NOTES.

exert

To argue ftill that fome minute imperceptible Causes, fome Farticular Circumftances in our own Bodies, or thofe about us, must determine even these seemingly indifferent Actions, is either running into the former abfurdity of making us act upon Motives which we don't apprehend; or faying, that we act mechanically, i. e. do not act at all: and in the last place, to fay that we are determin'd to choose any of these trifles just as we happen to fix our Thoughts upon it in particular, at the very inftant of Action, is either attributing all to the felf-moving Power of the Mind, which is granting the Queftion; or elfe referring us to the minute and imperceptible Causes above mention'd; or else obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning Word Chance instead of a Phyfical Caufe, which is faying nothing at all. How hard muft Men be prefs'd under an Hypothefis when they fly to fuch evafive fhifts as thefe ! How much eafier and better, would be to give up all fuch blind, unknown, and unaccountable Impulfes, and own what common Sense and Experience dictate, an Independent, Free, Self-moving Principle, the true, the obvious, and only fource of both Vo

lition and Action?

With regard to Mr Locke's Inconfiflencies, I fhall only add one Obfervation more, viz. that he feems to place the Caufe (Motive, or whatever he means by it) of his Determination of

† See Note 48.

the

exert or fufpend its Act, it is not only free from Compulfion, but alfo indifferent in itself, with regard to its Actions, and determines itself without neceffity.

blishes Li

IV. It must be confefs'd, that this opinion efta- This Opiblishes Liberty, and on that account is more agree- nion eftaable to reason, experience, and the common fenfe berty, but of Mankind, yet fome things in it feem to be pre- yet there fum'd upon and not fufficiently explain'd.

are fome

fufficient

V. For in the first place, 'tis faid that the Will things not determines itself, but we are not informed how that lyexplainis poffible, nor what use such a Power would be of, ed in it. were it admitted: nay, it feems rather prejudicial

to be of

then beneficial to Man. For that Goodnefs which Such a it is fuppofed to purfue, is in the things themselves, Liberty as and arifes from their connection with the chief Good; it is not therefore to be form'd, but difco- more prevered by the Understanding. If then the Under- judicethan standing performs its Duty right, it will difcover benefit to what is beft but it is our Advantage to be determined to that which is beft; it had therefore been better for Man if Nature had given him up absolutely to the determination of his own Judgment

NOTES.

and

the Will after the Effect. The Cause of that Determination is,' according to him, Anxiety; this he fometimes makes concomitant, fometimes confequent upon Defire; and Sect. 31. he fays the one is scarce diftinguishable from the other.

But this fame Defire appears to me to be the very Determination of the Will itfelf; what we abfolutely defire we always will, and vice versa, whether it be in our Power to pursue that Will, and produce it into Act, or not; and indeed Defire seems to be no otherwise diftinguishable from Volition, than as the latter is generally attended with the Power of Action, which the former is confider'd without. This I think is all the Diftinction that they are capable of, which yet is only nominal: Nor do his Inftances in §. 30. prove that there is any real Difference between 'em. Thus when I am oblig'd to use perfua

fions

Mankind.

and Understanding, and not allow'd that Judgment to be fufpended by the power of the Will. For by that means he would have obtain'd his End with greater certainty and eafe. I grant, that if a Man were abfolutely determin'd in his Actions to the best, there would be no room for virtue, properly fo call'd; for virtue, as it is commonly understood, requires a free Act, and this Liberty is the very thing that is valuable in virtue; and with good reafon, if a free Choice be the very thing which pleases; (For thus it would be impoffible to attain the end of choofing, i. e. to please ourselves, without Liberty, fince that very thing which pleases in Actions, viz. Liberty, would be wanting.) But yet, if any thing which the Understanding can discover, be the very beft before or independent of our Choice it were proper for us to be neceffarily determin'd to it; for the fruition of it, howfoever obtain'd, would make us happy, and be fo much the more valuable, as it would be certain, and not depend upon Chance, as all the Actions of Free-will are in a manner fuppofed to do: nor need we much regard the Glory arifing from a well made Choice; fince

NOTES.

fions with another, which I wish may not prevail upon him, or fuffer one Pain to prevent a greater, here are two oppofite Wills, or a weak imperfect Volition conquer'd by, and giving way to a ftronger and we might as well fay Defire is oppofite to Defire as to Volition. I will or defire that this Man may not be prevail'd upon, but yet I will or defire more powerfully and effectually to use these perfuafions with him: Or rather, here is but one actual Defire or Will in the Cafe, and the other is only Hypothetical. Thus I fhould will to be cured of the Gout, if the cure would not throw me into greater Pain; but in the prefent circumftances I do not really will it, nor exert any one act which may serve to remove it: nay, in this Cafe, I will or defire to bear the Gout rather than a worse Evil that would attend the removal of it. His Axiom therefore, that

wherever

fince the fruition of the greatest Good would give us Happiness without it; nay fuch Glory would be vain and despicable in competition with the greateft Good, Hence it appears, that Free-will, according to this Hypothefis, cannot be reckon'd any Advantage.

Vol. II.

S

NOTES.

VI. Se

wherever there is pain, there is a defire to be rid of it, is not abfolutely true.

Again, I fhould refufe a painful Remedy or difagreeable Potion, if I could enjoy perfect Health without them; but as I manifeftly cannot, I choose the lefs Evil of the two. Nor can I indeed be properly faid to choose or defire both in the present Circumstances, or to will one and defire the contrary, fince 1 know that only one of them is poffible, which therefore I now certainly will or defire, tho' I fhould as certainly have will'd the contrary had it been equally poffible. Thefe then and the like Inftances are not fufficient to prove any oppofition between Will and Defire, except the latter be only taken for a mere pasfive Appetite; in which fenfe the Words choose, prefer, &c. must then be very improperly apply'd to it. But, in reality, I believe Mr. Locke here fets the Word Defire to fignify what we commonly mean by Will, as he does in Sect. 48. where 'tis call'd the Power of preferring and puts Volition into the place of Action; as feems probable from his defcription of Willing in the 16th, 28th, and 30th Sect. as alfo, C. 23. Sect. 18. where he defines the Will to be a Power of putting Body into Motion by Thought. And the fame Notion, I think, runs thro' all his Letters to Limborch.

Upon a review of this Chapter of Mr. Locke's Effay, and comparing the firft Edition of it with the reft, I find a remarkable Paffage omitted in all the followingones, which may ferve to fhew us upon what Ground he at firft fuppofed the Will to be determin'd from without, and why upon altering part of his Scheme and leaving the reft, he was obliged to take it for granted, and let his former fuppofition ftand without its Reafon. It begins at Sect. 28. "We muft "remember that Volition or Willing, regarding only what is in "our power, is nothing but preferring the doing of any thing to the not doing of it, Action to reft, and contra. Well, but "what is this preferring? It is nothing but the being pleased 68 more with one thing than another. Is then a Man indifferent to be pleafed or not pleafed more with one thing than ano

66

"ther ?