Common Notions of Men, and cannot be believ'd without extraordinary Prejudice to Mankind. I confefs indeed, that, for the moft part, one cannot argue well against an Opinion from its confequences, fince

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NOTES.

than we can settle the proportion between the Pleasures of feeing and hearing; which yet we know are neither of them infinite. Tho' therefore we cannot precisely determine the Proportion, yet we are certain that we frequently cross all our natural Appetites to maintain our choice, and by means of it bear up against the ftrokes of adverse Fortune, and a flood of natural Evils.

But 5thly, 'Tis objected, that if we had this power of making things agreeable or difagreeable by choice, we need not trouble our felves how our other Appetites were fatisfied, for we might be abfolutely happy in fpite of all the accidents of Fortune.

He that objects this, affuredly did not confider the defcription given by the Author of this Faculty, nor that the having it doth not deftroy our other Appetites, and that when it chooses things contrary to them, it neceffarily creates a great deal of pain, uneafinefs and torment, which abates fo far the pleasure we take in our Elections, that the pleasure we obtain by fuch a choice is little or nothing in refpect of what it might be if we did not choose a mifs. These things are fo plainly and frequently repeated in the Book, that it feems ftrange how any one could imagine that because we have a Faculty to please our felves by choofing, that therefore we may be abfolutely happy in spite of all the Accidents of Fortune.

If by Happiness be meant a state more eligible then nothing, I believe by means of this Faculty we may generally speaking be fo far happy, and that is fufficient to juftify God's putting us into our present Circumftances. But if by Happiness be meant, as ought to be, a ftate wherein we have a full and free exercise of all our Faculties, then in as much as our power of choofing is but one Faculty, tho' fuperior to all the reft, the exercise of it alone can never make us abfolutely and compleatly happy, tho' it may in fuch a degree as is very defireable.

6thly, The Conclufion of the Argument is granted, and it is look'd on as no inconvenience that our Happiness should in fome cafes depend on things without us, and not in our own Power. But the conclufion is quite another thing. The words are, If this Opinion be true, ar 1ir of human Happiness,

for

fince a great many things are true which have confequences hard enough: not to mention how easily we mistake in deducing confequences. But yet when these are acknowledged by the Authors themfelves; and, if believ'd, would prove detrimental

NOTES.

to

for it will not be in the least in our own power, but entirely depend upon external Object.

fink a

The accidents of Fortune, fuch as an Earthquake may Man and all his concerns, and tho' in that extraordinary cafe, as it is put, my choice be not able to prevent my death, yet my Happiness in the general management of Life may be very much in my own power, and not altogether in the power of foreign Accidents. And even in the cafe of an Earthquake a good Man that had fixed his Election to fubmit to fuch a death and circumftances as it fhould pleafe Providence to align him, wou'd not be without fome pleasure, even in fuch an accident, at leaft not fo unhappy as another that had made no fuch Refolution or Election. But if fuch an Election can make him no cafier or do him no good, it were to no purpose to make it. He can have no profpect or defign in making it, if the Good or Evil refulting from the Agreement or Difagreement of what happens to his natural Appetites be the only Confiderations that can determine his will. It is plain that in fuch a cafe he must be miferable, if outward things happen crofs to his Appetites; whereas if he can make them agreeable or difagreeable in any meafure by his own choice, he is ftill mafter of his Happiness, and the confideration that he can make them fo is a good reafon for choofing. So far is he from choofing without Reason, as is falfly objected.

But 7thly, 'Tis urg'd, that if the will were not moved but by the Reprefentation of antecedent Good and Evil in the things that happen, it would not indeed be in our power to be happy, fuppofing there were no God, and that all things were govern'd by Matter and Motion. But God has fo order'd it, that to be virtuous is fufficient to make a Man happy. If therefore the Soul follows Reafon and the Orders God has given her, fhe is fure to be happy, altho' fhe cannot find enough to make her fo in this Life.

To which I anfwer, ift, That this is giving up the Happinefs of this Life, and acknowledging that God has not provided any Natural means to make us happy here, which is a Con

feffion

to Morality, they bring no fmall prejudice against an Opininon which is attended with them, and recommend us to fome other as more probable, tho it be not fupported by any stronger Reasons.

the Will

XX. 'Tis to be obferved alfo, that among the All thofe foregoing Authors I reckon thofe who declare that who dethe Will is determin'd by the last Judgment of the clare that Understanding †, which has taken with a great is paffive many Philofophers; and, in fhort, all who main- in its Opetain that the Will is passive in Elections. For these rations must be esteem'd to have the fame Sentiments of must be of Liberty Opinion

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the fame

with the

former, and preffed with the fame confequences.

NOTES.

feffion that one who is zealous to defend the Wisdom and Goodness of God will not eafily grant.

2dly, I have no other Notion cf Virtue than that of an Election within the limits prefcribed by God and Nature; I think the definition of it is Habitus cum ratione electivus in mediocritate confiftens; if then to be virtuous is enough to make us happy, it is plain that our Happiness confits in our Election, which is the very thing I plead for: but if our Election make the things elected neither better nor worse, neither more nor lefs agreeable, it is inconceivable how our Happiness should confift at all in Virtue. If the meaning be that God will reward us hereafter, that is to confefs we are miferable for the prefent, but fhall be happy fome other time. I own indeed that Hope is a great cause of Pleasure, but except we choose the croffing our natural Appetites for the prefent out of profpect to the future, it will no ways render our prefent fuffering tolerable. Nor will fuch a profpect, how clearly foever offer'd by our Understanding, yield us this Pleafure, except the will confent. For then it would do fo to all to whom the offer is made; whereas we fee one perfeveres by means of it, and another in much more advantageous Circumftances yields to the prefont Temptation, and knowingly lofes the Reward.

Against this Notion fee Sect. 5. Subfect. 2. par. 13.

Liberty with the former, which way foever they explain their Opinion; as may appear from hence, that most of them exprefly deny that Indifference belongs to the Nature of the Will; their Opinion therefore is attended with the fame confequences as the former. (45) SUBSECT.

NOTES.

(45) As Mr. Locke has particularly labour'd the point before us, and feems to defend by turns the feveral Principles which our Author attacks here and in the following Section, we shall examine a little into his Method of treating the Subject. Having first of all defin'd Liberty to be A power in any Agent to do or forbear any particular Action, according to the Determination or Thought of the Mind, whereby either of them is preferr'd to the other." He takes a great deal of pains to prove that fuch Liberty does not belong to the Will: which is very certain, granting his fenfe of Liberty to be the only one, fince by his Definition it is evidently fubfequent to the choice or preference of the Mind, and only relates to the execution of fuch choice by an inferior faculty t. But then, beside this Idea of Liberty, which is nothing to the prefent Question, there is another previous and equally proper one, which regards the very determination, preference or direction of the Mind itself; and may be called its Power of determining to do or forbear any particular Action, or of preferring one to another; and if Freedom can with any propriety of Speech be attributed to one of thefe Powers ** as he has conftantly attributed it, why may it not with equal propriety be applied to the other? He proceeds therefore to ftate the Queftion concerning the latter, which he would not have put, whether the Will be free? but whether the Mind or Man be free to will? both which I think amount to the fame thing with common Understandings, fince in the first place we only ask, Whether this Will be properly an active power of the Mind (i, e. as oppofed by Mr. Locke's paffive Power) and in the fecond, Whether the Mind be active or indifferent in exerting this Power call'd Will? and both which will be equally improper Questions with regard to his former fenfe of the Word Free, i. e. as only applicable to the Actions fubfequent on Volition; However, he goes on in the fecond

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SUBSE C T. II.

An Opinion is propofed in general, afferting a Freedom from Neceffity as well as Compulfion.

1.

HIS Opinion determines almost the fame This a

TH

grees with

or Agreeableness of Objects to the Appetites, nor the former is there much difference in what relates to the di

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in most cafes, ef

ftinction pecially

in those relating to the Appetites, to Good, Pleafant, Profitable and Honeft; but makes this to be the difference between a Man and Brute, viz. that the one is determin'd by its bodily Appetite, the other by himself.

NOTES.

fecond place to enquire, whether in general a Man be free To Will or not to Will, when any Action is once propofed to his Thoughts, as presently to be done'. In which respect he determines that a Man is not at liberty, because he cannot forbear Willing or preferring the one to the other; [a] which tho' it be scarce confiftent with his other Notion of Sufpenfion, whereby a Man either avoids a particular determination in the cafe, and continues in the fame ftate he is in [not by virtue of a prefent Determination of his Will, bu: of fome precedent one] or elfe wills fomething different from either the existence or non-existence of the Action propofed, [b.] and tho' it should comprehend, as he fays it does, moft cafes in Life, yet fill it is not of the leaft Importance. For what does it fignifie to me that I must neceffarily take one fide or the other, right or wrong, fo long as I can choofe either of them indifferently? If I can will or choose either of the two, here's full room for the exercife of Liberty; and whether I can or no, ought to have been Mr. Locke's next Question. The Anfwer to which feems pretty