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upon himself or others by a depraved or foolish Choice.

But, in order to make this whole Matter concerning Moral Evils more fully understood, we muft confider in the

1st Place, What the nature of Elections is.
2dly, That our Happiness chiefly depends upon

Elections.

3dly, What kind of Elections may be faid to be made amifs, or foolishly.

4thly, How we came to fall into depraved or wicked Elections.

5thly, How fuch Elections can be reconciled with the Power and Goodness of God.

That it is I.

not easy to underftand or

SECT. I.

Concerning the Nature of Elections.

SUBSE C T. I.

A View of their Opinion who admit of Freedom from Compulfion only, but not from Neceffity.

I

F there be any thing obfcure and difficult in Philofophy, we are fure to find it in that Part which treats of Elections and Liberty. There is no point about which the Learned are lefs congive a true reprefen

fiftent

nions con

fiftent with themselves, or more divided from each tation of other. Nor is it an eafy Matter to understand them, the Opior to give a certain and true reprefentation of their cerning Opinions. I think they may be diftinguifh'd into Liberty. two Sorts, both admitting of a Liberty; One of Some acthem from external Compulfion, and not from internal Neceffity; but the other from both.

know

ledge a Liberty from Com

pulfion only, others from Neceflity alfo.

the former

II. As far as I can understand the Opinion of The Au the former, it is this: Firft, they obferve that thors of there are certain Appetites implanted in us by Na- Opinion ture, which are not to be esteem'd ufelefs, but con- fuppofe tributing toward our Prefervation, as was fhewn be- Appetites fore; and that fome things are naturally agreea- ed in us implaintble, fome contrary to thefe Appetites: that the by Nature former, when prefent, please and imprefs a delight- what is aful Senfe of themselves; the latter difpleafe and greeble to create uneafinefs. These therefore are called in- called commodious, troublesome and Evil; and those good; commodious, convenient and Good.

these is

the con

are agree

III. Secondly, That Nature has given us Rea- trary, Evil. Things fon, a Mind or Intellect, whereby to diftinguish Conveniencies from Inconveniencies, Good from Evil. able to the And fince this may be confidered by the Mind in Appetites a threefold Refpect, hence alfo arife three kinds of in a three Good and Evil; namely, Pleafant, Profitable and fpect. Honeft.

fold re

Hence 3

good.

IV. For if Good be confidered as prefent with kinds of regard only to the Appetite which is delighted That with the Enjoyment of it, and acquiefces in it, which is 'tis called Pleafant.

actually

is called

V. But if it be not agreeable to the Appetite of agreeable itself, but only connected with fomething elfe which Pleafant. is of itself agreeable, or produces Pleasure, and That on that account only be defirable, then 'tis called which is Profitable. For tho' the Appetite cannot come at with fome the thing

Q3

connected

which is of itself a

greeable,is

called Pro

fitable. That which is judged by the Un

the immediate Enjoyment of it, yet the Mind makes ufe of it in order to procure those things which it can enjoy, and from thence it is esteem'd convenient, i. e. Good.

VI. But fince that which is agreeable to one Appetite, may be repugnant or lefs agreeable to others; and that which pleafes now, may have derftand fome things connected with it, which may be difing to be pleafing afterwards, there is need of enquiry and all things deliberation, in order to procure an abfolute Good, confider'd, i. e. one which, all Appetites and Times confider'd, will afford as great, as certain and durable Jutely a Pleasure or Delight as poffible. For this End good, and therefore was the Mind or Understanding given us,

the best,

is abfo

called Honeft.

Inftances

Medicines

that we might be able to determine what appears fitteft to be done upon a view of all fuch things as create pleasure or uneafinefs for the prefent or the future. And what is thus judg'd by the Underftanding to be the beft, if there be no Error in the Cafe, must be look'd upon as Honeft. For that is Honeft which is agreeable to a rational Agent; but it is agreeable to a rational Agent, and Reafon itself directs, that, all things confider'd, we fhould prefer that which brings the greater, the more certain. and more durable Advantages.

VII. The Defenders of this Opinion reckon these in Health, kinds of Good to be Moral fo far as they respect and fuch Man, because they fall under the Government of things as Reafon. But fince all things cannot be always had are agree together, a comparifon must be made between able to the them, and that embraced which appears to be the Appetite. beft. Now the kinds may be compared together,

Rational

as well as the particulars of each kind. For instance, Health is a thing pleasant in itself, and defirable above all things that relate to the Body, but for the preservation of it Medicines must be sometimes taken, which of themselves are far from being agreeable to the Appetite, but as they are means to

an

an End which in itself is delightful, they are faid to be profitable, and on that account fit to be chofen. Now the Goods of the Mind are greater, more certain and more durable than thofe of the Body; if therefore they cannot be had without the lofs of Health, or even Life, right Reason dictates, that Health, or even Life be defpifed in regard to thefe. For this appears to be the most convenient, all things confider'd, and on that account is honest and as Goods of a different kind may be compared together, fo may alfo particulars of the fame kind, as any one will find that confiders it.

VIII. As to Liberty, the Men of this Sect will He that have it to confift in this, that among all thofe can act as Goods an Agent can embrace that which pleases his own him beft, and exert thofe Actions which his own Judgment directs, is Reason approves: For, according to thefe Men, free accorhe that can follow his own Judgment in Matters is ding to free. For Example, he that is found in Body, and thefe Men. has his Faculties and Limbs entire, if all external Impediments be removed, is at Liberty to walk : for he can if he will, and nothing but his will is wanting to exert that Action.

min'd to

IX. But as to the Actions of the Will itself, But we are namely, to will, or to fufpend the Act of Volition, deterthey think that it is determin'd to thefe, not by it choose eifelf, for that is impoffible, but from without. If ther from you ask from whence? They anfwer, from the the goodPleasure or Uneafinefs perceiv'd by the Understand- nets or ing or the Senfes, but rather, as they imagine, ablenefs of di fagreefrom the present or urgent Uneafinefs: fince there- objects fore thefe are produced in us ab extra, not from perceiv'd the Will itself, and are not in its power, but arife by the Infrom the very things; 'tis manifeft, according to thefe Sentes; Men, that we are not free (at leaft from Neceffity) and thereQ4

to

tellect or

fore not

free as to

the Acts of the Will, but only of the inferior Faculties, which are fubje&t to its determination.

to will or not will, that is with regard to the immediate Acts of the Will: Some of them therefore exprefly deny that Liberty belongs to Man with regard to thefe Acts, or that an Election can be faid to be free, or Man himself in that respect : They will have it therefore, that Liberty belongs to us properly with refpect to the inferior Faculties which are fubject to the Government of the Will, and discharge their Functions when the Man himself has willed: that is, a Man is free to walk who can walk if he pleases; but not to will; for he receives the Will to walk from elsewhere: neverthelefs, he that can do what he wills, according to them, is free, even tho' he be neceffarily determin'd to will. (42.)

NOTES.

X. If

(42.) The moft remarkable Defenders of this Opinion, among the Moderns, feem to be Hobbs, Locke, (if he be confiftent with himself) Leibnitz, Bayle, Norris, the Authors of the Philofophical Enquiry concerning human Liberty, and of Cato's Letters. But in order to have a more diftin&t Notion of the different Schemes of Authors all profeffing to treat of Human Liberty, Free-will, &c. Let us in the firft Place recite the feveral Powers or Modifications of the Mind, and obferve to which of them Liberty is or may be apply'd. ---- These are commonly diftinguish'd into Perception, Judgment, Volition and Action. The two former are generally necessary, at least always passive; For I cannot help feeing a light when my Eyes are open, nor avoid judging that two and two make four, whenever I think of that Propofition; tho' I may hinder that Perception by shutting my Eyes, as well as prevent that Judgment by refusing to think of the Propofition. The Will then may properly enough be faid to influence or impede these †, but this does not make them lefs paffive in themselves; nay, the more it does influence them, the more evidently they are fo. The third will appear to be the exercise of a Self-moving Principle. and as fuch cannot properly be moved or influenced by any thing elfe. The laft is the Exercife of the inferior Powers, the actual Production of Thought

See Note 45. + See Note 59%

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