Psychologia

with his Remembrance, than he with my Fact. For I am confcious that if once a full period is put to my Life, and the Scene of it ever become a perfect Blank, this Life can no more be restor'd to my Body, or the Scene of it really appear again, because it is rais'd an Human Body, than if it were rais'd the Body of a Beaft, and enliven'd; in which there might be all the Particles of my Body, and yet not I my felf; and thus it is in the former cafe; there is nothing more of me, befides the Particles of my Body, the rest is all the Workmanship of God. Now I appeal to any Man, that does but understand what he properly means by himself, whether this is not the true State of the Cafe.

Eftibius fomewhere expreffes a great veneration for Lucretius, infomuch that he thinks an Immaterial Substance too wild a Notion for him to have entertain'd. Lucretius, we know, declares for Man being wholly Mortal; but then he declares it with a little better Confiftency than his Admirer: It was indeed too wild, as well as too religious a Notion, for him, that the fame Man, once wholly dead, cou'd poffibly revive. No, he plainly faw, and boldly maintain'd the Confequence; and therefore, taking Advantage, as is fuppos'd of the Stoic's sola, which is the very

fame

fame Notion Eftibius has grafted on the Christian Religion, he has these remarkable Lines.

Nec, fi materian noftram conlegerit ætas,
Poft obitum, rurfumque redegerit,
ut fita nunc eft:
Atque iterum Nobis fuerint data
Lumina vita,
Pertineat quicquam tamen ad nos id quoque
factum,

Interrupta femel cum fit retinentia Nostri.
Et nunc nil ad nos, de nobis attinet, ante
Qui fuimus; nec jam de illis nos afficit angor,
Quos de materia noftra nova proferat tas.

English'd by Mr. Creech,

De rerum

Natura Lib. 3.

Nay, grant the Scatter'd Ashes of our Urn
Be joyn'd again, and Life and Senfe return ;
Yet how can that concern Us, when 'tis done,
Since all the Memory of past Life is
Now we ne'er joy, nor grieve, to think what

gone ?

Were heretofore, nor what thofe things will

be,

Which fram'd from Us, the following Age fball fee.

Now if the fame Perfon that reads Second Thoughts, thou'd read Lucretius too, as

E e

'tis

'tis not improbable he may, and is convinc'd by the former, I am very apt to think he will clap together Eftibius's Principle, and Lucretius's Confequence; for a Man is not fetled till Principles and Confequences agree, and his Notions lie quiet, and consistently in his Mind; but we fee Lucretius is not willing, and I am confident Eflibius is not able to part these two.

And now I need not dwell upon the horrid Confequences, that attend this Notion, when made Chriftian. It makes God create, in the future State, finners as fuch; who receive their polluted Souls immediately from his pure Hands; and having once taken away their Being, according to this Doctrine, he creates them on purpofe to be miserable. And therefore once more I call upon Eftibius, either to quit the Premiffes, or ftand by the Conclufion; and I hope he will deal fairly, in this important Controversy, with himself and the World; for it is a Subject, upon which fo long as he is free to publish his Thoughts, he cannot expect to keep fecret his Defign.

THE EN D.

CONTENTS

OF THE

FIRST PART.

SEC

CT. I. Some Terms intended to be us'd explain'd. p. 1. viz. Subftance, p. 2. Attribute, ibid. Property, ibid. Mode, p. 3. H. Soul, ibid. Idea, ibid.

SECT. II. What fort of Proof is to be expected, and infifted upon, p. 4. ift, Not Senfible, p. 5. 2dly, Not Mathematical, or Geometrical, ibid. 3dly, Not fuch as will leave no Hefitation or Scruple with moft Readers, ibid. And yet may be valid and conclufive. p. 6. 4thly, The Proof upon this Subject must proceed inthe Analytic Method, with the validity of that Method, ibid. 5thly, Tho' it does not lead to a full comprehenfion of the Caufe, yet it fully concludes for the Existence of it, p. 7. Laftly, The Neceffity of recurring to a Principle for the Solution of fome Phænominon, in what Cafe a good Establishment of that Principle.

SECT. III. Of Immaterial Subftance in general. ft, Subftance prov'd to be as felf-evident as any other fimple Idea, and a real Principle notwithstanding Mr. L's deriding it, p. 8. Acknow

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ledg'd

ledg'd by Spinoza, p. 9. How we may be faid to
know fomething of Substance, ibid. That a Dif
ference in Accidents inferrs a Difference in their
Subftances, p. 10. 2dly, Immaterial Subfiance,
the Exiftence of it prov'd from thefe Two Princi-

ples, 1ft, That fomething was from Eternity, P.

11. 2dly, That Motion was communicated to

Matter, p. 12. Finite Immaterial Subftance no

impoffibility, p. 13.

SECT. IV. Of Extenfion and Cogitation, as

the Attributes of Body and Mind, and how far

their different Ideas argue different Subftances,

P. 14. No connexion between Thought and Ex-

tenfion, p. 15. Granted by Spinoza, ibid. What

fort of difference of Attributes does not, ibid. and

what does prove different Subftances, p. 16. No

third Thing, Subftance or Attribute, to connect