incapable of Self-Motion. This will ferve to put the Question right, which is not Whether he can give Self-Motion; but Whether he can give Thought, to a folid, as well as an unfolid Subftance : But is there any Contradiction in that? I anfwer:

4. That here again is an unfair State of the Cafe; Solidity is a reductitious, not a first Property of Body; or, however, is not that first Property we make use of as a Medium, to prove the Inconfiftency by; but when we trace it up, and find every Solid Subftance Phyfically extended, and divifible, and paffive; then we clearly conceive that fuch a folid Subftance is incapable of Thought. The only Evafion here, that I can imagin, is this; That it does not follow, because God has created one extended divifible Subftance of a Paffive Nature; therefore he has created all the Kind of those Substances of the like Nature. Yes, fay I, it does follow; because the Connexion is founded in the Reafon of the Thing, which holds univerfally, as well as our Obfervation in Fact, which concludes no farther than it extends: For I have proved it both forward, and backward, from the Cause to the Effect, and from the Effect to the Caufe; which, together, make the most compleat Demonstrative Evidence.

From

From all which I conclude, according to what I obferv'd concerning the Regular Exercise of the Divine Power upon his Creatures, that to what Subftance foever, for I abfolutely deny it to none, Omnipotence has give the Faculty of Thought; he has either never given to that Substance, or actually taken away from it Phyfical Extenfion; and let the Objector take which he pleases, he comes up to all I aim at, which is the Truth of this Propofition, Every Thinking Being is Immaterial.

What I have faid I take to be a Foundation for a full Answer, to all that Mr. L. has objected, upon this Head, to the late great Bishop of Worcester; which I shou'd not presume to do, had the World enjoy'd the Bishop longer, to have had his own more perfect Anfwer; or had not Mr. L. more avowedly and laboriously maintain'd the Objection I propofe to answer, than any other Writer I know of; fo that by taking the Objection from him, I have fet in its beft Light; and fo far as I have anfwer'd him, I may presume to have filenc'd the Objection.

And having now proved at large, the Incapacity of Matter, either to produce, or fustain the Property of Thought; and alfo shewn the Weaknefs, and Infufficiency of all the best Attempts that have been made, to

fuper

fuperinduce this Property to any Material Subftance; I pafs by a whole Train of other, both Modern and Ancient Objections, as being of lefs Moment than those already mention'd, and fuch as must stand and fall with them.

SECT. IX.

That it is not GOD the Supreme Spirit, that Thinks in Human Nature.

is not then, we find, our Body, or any Part of it, or any Thing belonging to it that thinks within us: But what if it be God himself, who contains all poffible Ideas in his own Eternal Mind, that makes ufe of our Bodies, but as fo many different Inftruments, variously to display his own Intellectual, Incommunicable Faculty; and so he himself properly thinks in those, we fuppofe Cogitative Substances?

There are but very few, if any, amongst the Oppofers of the Doctrin of a Human Spirit, who plainly and exprefly hold this; for there are but few of that Sect, that are willing to build upon the Suppofition of an Immaterial God; And

yet

yet, I think, almost all of them affert and maintain what, in the Result and Confe

If we will

Anima Mundi, p.105.

quence, amounts to thus much. believe Mr. Blount, The general Opinion of the most Inquifitive amongst the Heathens was what Bernier fays the Inhabitants of Indoftan believe, of the Souls Eternal Condition, that it wou'd mix with the Soul of the World again: Like Water taken out of the Ocean in a Bottle, and fwims therein for a while; till, by fome Accident or other, being broke, it returns back to the Sea from whence it was taken. He might as well have faid the Inhabitants of Indoftan, are the General, and the most Inquifitive Part of Mankind. However, this is propos'd as an Opinion fit to be receiv'd; and if, as fome are apt to believe, the Soul of the World be that Author's God; it is the fame Opinion we are now confidering. And Second for others who of late have afferted the Soul to be barely Life, and Life to be a Ray of the Divinity; thefe do say the very fame thing.

Thoughts, paf

fim.

That I may not feem to trifle with the Reader, in bestowing much Pains upon fo trifling an Objection; I fhall only offer thefe two infeparable Qualities of Human Thought, which no Man, that knows what we mean by the Word GOD, can fix

upon

upon him. 1. That they are finite, and limited : 2. That they are morally Peccable.

1. That the Faculty of Thought in Man is finite and limited, I prefume I need not prove; he must be of a very narrow Capacity that denys it. We are conscious that it is the inevitable Condition of our Nature, not only fo long as we are ty'd down to Sense, but fo long as we think; how far foever our Intellectual Capacity may be enlarg'd, and extended in another State, perhaps to know adequately, and fully to comprehend many Objects: Yet this we are fure of, that it can never comprehend all Objects at once; and for this, among other Reasons, that fuch a Capacity cou'd never lye dormant in our Nature, but wou'd be actually exerted, at all times, and upon all Objects; in as much as a Capacity of Comprehending all Objects, can meet with no Obstruction from any. And therefore, tho' it may be fuppos'd (as we fhall endeavour to fhew) that the Laws of Union with Matter, may terminate, and bring to a narrower Compafs, an Understanding finite and limited by Nature; yet as to that First Infinite Mind, how closely foever we fuppofe it united to Matter, it cannot posfibly be fo determin'd in its own Thoughts, as to lose its own Effential Perfection. This wou'd