assertions which lie at the bottom of the business, should first be shown to be false, and then the conclusion, or appeal, or whatever it may be called, would fall to the ground as a matter of course? But this method did not seem good to our author. He lets the assertions alone, and begins with telling us how anxious the Directors have been to secure the funds against perversion or monopoly-what means have been used to effect this object-who the men are that constitute the General Society-the number of members-in how many States they reside-why there are so few Presbyterians-where the Society originated-what originally constituted membership-when and why a change in obtaining membership was made. He goes on to tell us how much money was raised in N. England during the first ten years-how much in Massachusetts-how many members have been elected since the change in the constitution--how many in N. England-how few in Massachusetts--how many in the States of N. York, N. Jersey and Pennsylvania. And then asks, "Does this look like local partiality? Or is there any party ambition or purposes discoverable in this?" He then gives some important information to the Reviewer and his friends, and in order that they may not overlook it, underscores his words. He goes on to console Presbyterians with the hope that they will soon have a controlling influence in the A. E. Society. He then tells us the measures of the Directors are revised by the Society, and that the Board is elected only for one year. He then takes another view of the subject, and shows us another check imposed on the Board by means of the Branch Societies. Again, that the whole is so nicely organized, and the parts balanced by mutual checks, that it is "not unlike what the structure of our National Government exhibits." And further, goes on commenting on the constitution of the Society two more pages. And finally, from the review of the constitution and principles of the Parent and Branch Societies draws his conclusion in these words" it seems to me quite impossible, that any partial or party appropriations of monies, should be made by the Directors of the Parent Society," &c. (p. 585.)

After he has persuaded himself, that funds to any amount are perfectly safe in the hands of his friends, and their successors, he admits every thing that the Reviewer had asserted respecting the monies refunded, and surplus funds going into

the treasury of the Parent Society. Now what has become of the assertions proposed to be examined? What has he said to invalidate the averments? After leading us to expect that some error would be pointed out, he has not condescended to give us one instance.

The object of the Reviewer in the article under consideration, was to show the stupendous power and even independence which the General Society, by means of loans returned, surplus and permanent funds and scholarships, might attain, if the scheme proceeded. And our author having spoken, in the commencement of his Strictures on this article, of assertions and averments, and led his readers to imagine some erroneous statement had been made, gives ús a long dissertation on the constitution, with a view to show that the Directors must obey the will of a majority of the Society. This argument, as far as it has force, is applicable to the third objection, and not to that under consideration.

We say, the Society itself may become a party engine, and the Directors be the agents to execute the party purposes of a majority of the General Society.

Let it be noted, that the author of the Stricture does not deny or attempt to disprove the assertions of the Reviwer, respecting the power and independence of the Society. Indeed he could not. For as early as May 1827, soon after the connexion with the Presbyterian Branch was formed, the Directors, having spoken of the establishment of scholarships and increase of funds during the preceding year, exult in the prospect before them. "It has," say they, "not only saved the Society from great embarrassment and from more serious evils, but has placed it upon a basis where with the common blessing of God, it will stand for ages to come, increasing in resources and influence." XI. Report, P. 14.

So confident are we that the merits of the question have not been fairly and fully met by our author, that we request the reader who doubts, to look at the review from the middle of p. 360 to the same part of p. 361. Let it be remembered too, that the power and independence of the Society are the grounds on which we apprehend danger. If the Society were not thus powerful and independent, the checks of which the author speaks would be amply sufficient. We ask no other security than he has given us, from a Society,

which is annually dependent for its support on the liberality of the public. But not so in regard to a Society, which has means to go on, if every individual, except its members, should raise a voice against it. The security arising from the mode of electing Directors, on which our author relies with so much confidence, we shall notice hereafter.

But it seems that after the requiem sung to our "fears" the author himself has some apprehensions lest the Branch Societies will not be fully satisfied. "If," says he, "for the sake of convenience, however, the General Society should adopt a plan, which would allow the monies returned within the limits of each Branch Society, to be paid into the treasury of such Society, this measure would remove even the semblance of the difficulty which the Reviewer suggests. The Directors, I have no doubt, will be disposed to adopt this, or any other arrangement which may promote the interests of the Society." p. 585.

We are gratified with this concession. It is worth all the attention we have given to the subject. And although we would not wish to press too far those who are disposed to be accommodating, we would suggest another arrangement, viz. that the monies refunded, as well as the surplus funds, be kept in the treasuries of the Branch Societies, until their own Directors dispose of them at their own discretion. It is possible the Branch Societies at no distant day, may think their own Directors competent to decide, if they have no beneficiaries within their limits, whether they should send their surplus funds to the East or to the West, to the North or to the South.

We now proceed to notice the security which our author thinks he finds in the mode of choosing Directors and Officers of the Society, and in the revision which the Society, at its annual meetings, exercises over all the acts of the Board.

We have given offence by saying that according to the mode of doing business at the annual meetings, the Direc tors might, if they pleased exert an influence in choosing new members and in the election of a new Board. Our author rebukes us for such an intimation, and that we might not again fall into a similar mistake, says "I repeat it, in order that neither the Reviewer nor his friends may overlook it; The Directors neither nominate nor choose any of the elected members of the Society." (p. 582.)

Let the reader now turn to page 363, of our former article, he will there find these words, "Suppose that at any time, a majority of the acting members of the Society, is in favor of the measures adopted by the Directors, the Directors can, through their friends, have new voting members chosen favorable to the same course, &c." Do we here say that the Directors as such, either nominate or choose new members? Surely not. We say, that, from the nature of the case, they can, if so disposed, exert an influence in this business. Is this objection met by saying, and underscoring, that the Directors have no official right of appointing the new members? Our author, therefore, is mistaken when he says (p. 586,) that our objection to the influence of the Directors," is built on misapprehension of the Constitution and Rules of the A. E. Society." Our objection is, in the first place, that the A. E. Society has a power of dange rous extent; in the second place, that the Directors, of necessity as the organs of the Society, hold and exercise this power; and that their accountability to the Society is no adequate security, because, besides other reasons elsewhere urged, they have the main direction of the Society itself, and can, if so disposed, influence the election of new members as well as the decision of other matters. We would appeal to the Minutes of the twelfth annual meeting held in city of New-York, May 8, 1828, to prove that in point of fact, the Directors have this influence.

The published Minute is as follows, viz. "The Rev. Dr. Porter of Andover, the Rev. Dr. Spring and Arthur Tappen Esq. of New-York were appointed a committee to nominate new members for admission into this Society." XII. Annual Report, p. 3. We have no fault to find with the worthy gentleman appointed on this nominating committee. We would rejoice if our country and the church had ten thousand such men. Nor do we find fault with the nomination made. Our simple object is, to account for our former error, in supposing there was nothing in the Constitution or mode of conducting the election of new members, to prevent the Directors, if they were so disposed, having some influence in the selection of voting members, who are to review the proceedings of the former Board, and to choose a new one.

In looking at the Minutes of the previous Annual meeting held in Boston, May 28, 1827, it will be seen that all the

gentlemen on the nominating committee, were Directors. XI. Report, p. 4. And from the Minutes of the meeting at which these nominations were made, it appears that the gentlemen on the nominating committee were re-elected Directors for the following year. We have not said and we do not now say that the nomination of new members is an official act of the Directors: but we do say the Directors have de facto an influence in nominating and choosing new members, who are to choose new Directors and to review the proceedings of those whose term of office has expired. Now what security have we that the Society will exercise a vigilant control over the proceedings of the Board of Directors? The checks as described by our author appeared admirable, rendering it almost impossible that the Directors can do amiss, without a speedy retribution; but now we see that the mode of conducting elections gives them a good opportunity to escape. Let us not be understood as suggesting, that there was any improper management in the transaction referred to. Positively we do not. We only mean to justify our former positions, and to show that we are not the only persons who write about important concerns without correct information.

But independent of such examples, which may be said. to be casual, we maintain on general principles, that the Directors of all voluntary associations have, almost invariably, an influence in directing all the measures of the Societies to which they belong. They know the interests of the Society, whose concerns they manage, and it is natural, and in most cases proper, that members of the Society who are less acquainted with the details of the business, should pay great respect to the opinions and wishes of those actively engaged in the management of the concern. This is the fact in all voluntary Societies, of which we have any knowledge. And when there is no temptation to abuse, as is the case in other associations, no evils result, but many advantages.

But supposing the General Society can, and does exercise a vigilant control over the proceedings of the Directors, what is there to prevent a small majority of the Society, happening to be be present at a single annual meeting, from creating, at a single ballot, voting members sufficient to maintain the ascendency ever afterwards? All that our author says about the probability, that members of the Presbyterian church