God, they did not deny; but the justice of it, they called in question. In this chapter God vindicates his character from such aspersions, and after a disclosure of his conduct, he appeals to the reason of mankind for the justice and equity of his proceedings. He then inquires for the ground of their conclusion, that his ways were unequal, or that he had any pleasure in the punishment of the wicked. "Have I any pleasure at all, that the wicked should die ?" This certainly did not appear from his conduct. He then in a more explicit and solemn manner asserts, that this is not the reason why sinners die. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live." In these words the following things may be

observed.

1. This passage contradicts that opinion, which supposes, that the punishment of the wicked is a proof that God delights in misery. How strongly do these words oppose the sentiment of those who believe the fact, that God does, and will punish the wicked, and from hence, infer that God is unrighteous, who taketh vengeance? This was the complaint of sinners in the days of Ezekiel, and it has not altogether ceased from the lips of sinners in this day.

II. Another error guarded against in the text is, that which supposes, that because God does not take pleasure in the death of the wicked, he therefore will not die, or be finally miserable. "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked.", Which words render it certain, that the

wicked do die, and that God has no pleasure in the death of the wicked. How could the Lord God say, that he has no pleasure in the death of the wicked, if the wicked did not die? But before we proceed any further on this subject, it is necessary to make some remarks on the death mentioned in the text.

1. I would observe, that the death here mentioned is not a temporal death, or the death of the body. For the Lord declares, "that if a man do that which is lawful and right, he shall live, he shall not die." But temporal death is the common lot of all men, both of the righteous and wicked. If a man do that which is lawful and right, it will not secure him from death. The wise man and the fool die alike in this sense; which shows that the death intended in the text is not the death of the body.

2. The death mentioned in the text is not that kind of death, which is common to all sinners, a death in trespasses and sins. This is a death, under which all men lie, who are not regenerated and quickened by the Spirit of God. But the death in the text is the final result of spiritual death, or of sin; a death, which in the new testament is called the second death, which consists in being "cast into the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone." The text therefore has immediate reference to the punishment of the impenitent in the eternal world. For if it mean neither the death of the body, nor the depravity of the heart, which is called death in the scriptures, it can be no other, but the death of the soul-a death which a soul only can die. And in this death, God says in the

text, he has no pleasure; that is misery in itself considered is an object in which God has no complacency, and therefore nothing like this can be the cause, or reason why the wicked die, or suffer punishment in the eternal world. All evil is contrary to the divine nature; that is, there is nothing in God like pain— like sin. Nothing in him can ever exist, which can reconcile him to misery or sin, for their own sakes. Natural evil is really as contrary to the nature of God as moral; yet it is a fact, that both exist in the universe. None who believe the existence of a God of infinite perfection, can doubt but he hates sin; and yet who can question its existence ? Can we prove that sin does not exist, because God has no pleasure in it; or because he is infinitely opposed to it? He, who would deny the existence of sin, must not only deny the scriptures, but all distinction between right and wrong, and contradict the opinions and feelings of mankind in all ages of the world. And indeed every man, let his speculations be what they may, feels a difference between love and hatred, and is conscious of a difference between that temper which seeks the good of others, and that which opposes their happiness and prosperity. To pretend to reason against the existence of sin, is to set up empty speculation both against revelation, and the universal sense and feelings of mankind. And should there be any, who think it impossible that there is any such thing as sin, because it is contrary to the nature of God, who is infinitely holy and able to prevent it, such would find as much difficulty in vindicating the goodness of God in implanting, universally

in mankind natural notions of good and evil, of sin and holiness. To account for these impressions on the human mind, (were there no distinction between right and wrong) would be as difficult, as to account for the existence of that which is contrary to the divine nature. And what has now been said of moral evil is equally applicable to natural evil, or misery. This, being contrary to the divine nature, does not prevent its existence. Every man knows, by experience, that there is such a thing as pain, as misery; yet God delights not in it. And it is a fact, which none can question, that God hath, in the course of his providence, brought many and great evils upon mankind, as punishments for their sins. He drowned the old world; burnt Sodom and Gomorrah. He has sent famine and pestilence, which have swept away mankind by thousands, but all this will not prove, that God delights in the misery of his creatures. Would a reasonable man conclude, that the judge who pronounces sentence of death upon a criminal, or that he who executes this sentence, takes delight in the misery of mankind? Would not a judge in any human court feel himself injured, should such an inference be drawn from his condemning a criminal to the pillory or gallows? On the other hand, it would be very unreasonable for a subject to conclude, that under the administration of a just and benevolent prince, he might transgress with impunity, upon the presumption, that if his prince did not delight in his misery, he never would punish him according to his desert. But the delight which a good prince has in the happiness of his sub

jects, instead of protecting, endangers offenders. His delight in happiness, and aversion to misery are in no degree inconsistent with his inflicting punishment, even capital punishment on proper objects. And if a human prince may, consistently with his love of happiness and hatred of misery, punish the guilty; so may the great Ruler of the universe punish sinners, yet have no delight in their death. Punishments, in certain circumstances, are the genuine effects and natural expressions of love to the body, over which the prince presides. Love to the publick happiness, will induce a ruler to be a terror to evil doers.

They who conclude that God will not punish sinners in another world, because he delights not in their death, might conclude upon the same principle, that he never punishes them in this world; that there are no such things as pain and misery in this world. For if there be such things; such sensations as these, they are the effects of sin; they are punishments which God has annexed to disobedience. For if it be contrary to the divine nature, to make sinners miserable in a great degree in a future state, it is equally contrary to his nature to punish them at all. A change of worlds alters not the nature of things, nor reconciles inconsistencies. If then any degree of punishment, under the divine government be consistent with his infinite happiness and benevolence, then the eternal ⚫ punishment of sinners who deserve it, is also consistent with his benevolence. And if God can, consistently with his love of happiness and hatred of misery in itself, punish the guilty one day, or one hour, there can