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SECTION II.

Of the Term Right in its moft General Acceptation.

CHAP. III.
SECT. II.

PART II. THIS term is fometimes an adjective, employed to distinguish the quality of an action that is proper or morally good; and, in this fenfe, to afcertain what is right, is to apply the principle of moral law to the particular fubject in question.

In our present inquiry, the term right has a different meaning: It is a substantive, the name of a thing, or relation of a person to a thing, and not the mere quality of an action. It may be reckoned among the subjects which are not susceptible of a formal definition. But, we may recur to the cafes in which it is supposed to exift, and leave the mind to collect its meaning from a confideration of the point, to which it refers in all the cafes enumerated.

Thus, a perfon has a right to the ufe of his faculties and powers; he has a right to enjoy the light of the fun, and the air

SECT. II.

of the atmosphere; he has a right to the use of his property, and PART II. the fruits of his labour. Thefe, are self-evident propofitions, and CHAP. III. the meaning of the term right, which occurs in all of them, may be collected from its uniform fignification in each. Agreeably to this rule, right is the relation of a person to a thing in which no alteration ought to be made, without his own confent.

In this circumlocution, the names of perfon and thing imply, that a right is the appurtenance of a person, or of a being vested with choice and volition, and has reference to the will of fuch perfon respecting the object of his choice. This object may subsist in the perfon himself, in his lot or poffeffion, or in any constituent of his being or state whatever.

It is a part in the focial nature of man, that rights are to dif ferent menmutually objects of confideration and acknowledgement.

The concern of a perfon in his own right, is implied in the principle of self-preservation; his concern in the rights of others is implied in the principle of fociety, or in the sympathy of man with his fellow creatures.

Wrong is the violation of right; and, the fame concern which interests the mind in the prefervation of the one, is a cause of refentment on occafion of the other.

There may be a claim or pretenfion without a right; but a right, whatever be the subject to which it refers, is exclusive, and sufficient to fet afide every fuppofeable claim or pretenfion to the fame fubject.

VOL. II.

A a

Although

PART II.
CHAP. III.
SECT. II.

Although numbers at once may lay claim to a right, there can be no more than one to whom it is due; and the object of dif cuffion, under oppofite claims, is to determine with whom the right shall be found to exist: So that, although the right of any two or more persons may be queftioned, or their pretensions remain undecided, yet every question of right implies, that a just title, wherever it be found, is exclufive of every other claim or pretenfion whatever.

Although, therefore, in the loose application of words, or in common language, we fometimes use the terms right, claim, or pretenfion promifcuously; yet, in propriety of expreffion, it is well known, that there may be a pretenfion or a claim where there is no right, and that a right may remain unclaimed and undecided.

From inattention to the propriety of language, or from a wish to make way for a favourite tenet, by the help of fome ambiguity, it has been faid, that in the state of nature, or prior to convention, all men had equal rights to all things; the meaning must be, that. prior to convention, no right was ascertained; and that as no perfon had any right, fo all men were equal in this respect. How far the pofition is true even in this fense we shall have occafion to confider.

In the mean time, we affume, that the right of one person precludes a fuppofeable right in any other person to the fame fubject: And so far it is proper that the term be understood, before we proceed to confider the different denominations under which rights may be known. As they differ in respect to the sub

jects

jects in which they are constituted, so they differ alfo in refpect PART II. to the origin or fource from which they are derived.

Among the fources of right we shall find, that the law of defence itself may be numbered; and, upon this account, before we proceed to consider the distinction of rights, especially in respect to their origin, it may be proper to ftate the law of defence in its most general terms, as a fource to which among others we may have occafion to recur in treating this part of our fubject.

CHAP. III.
SECT. II.

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SECTION III.

Of the Law of Defence in General.

PART II.
CHAP. III.

ACCORDING to the law of defence a right may be maintained SECT. III. by any means which are effectual and necessary for this purpose.

It were irrational to employ means ineffectual, and it might be cruel in fome instances to employ feverities that might have been spared.

If means are fupposed to be neceffary, it is implied that the end cannot be obtained without them; and to suppose that a defence is allowed, and yet that the neceffary means are prohibited would be to fuppofe, that the law of nature is inconfiftent with itself; proposes the end, and yet forbids the pursuit.

It is true, that in some cases the necessary means may be fo severe, and even so destructive to the party against whom they

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