149

SECTION V.

Of the Fundamental Rules of Morality relating to External Actions.

SECT. V.

THE first law of morality, relating to the mind and its affec- PART II. tions, requires the love of mankind as the greatest good to which CHAP. II. human nature is competent: If it fhould appear that mankind are not agreed in the defcription of external actions that flow from this principle, nor in the choice of favours to be expected from the beneficent, it may be asked, by what rule is the friend of mankind to conduct himself? What is the harm from which he is to abstain, and what the good office which he is to perform to his fellow creature?

To this question we may answer, in general, that, notwithstanding the varieties of manners, in different ages and nations, and the different interpretation of favours or offences, which, in the file of declamation, may be made to appear fo formidable and fo perplexing, in the choice of virtuous actions; yet, that mankind in reality do not fo far mistake the pernicious for the

ufeful,

PART II. ufeful, nor the deftructive for what tends to their preservation, CHAP. II. as that the beneficent needs to be at a loss, in determininig what SECT. V. is in him a natural effect of benevolence or of good will to his fellow creatures. In every particular fociety, thefe points are fettled; and few have occafion to transfer their beneficence from one scene to another, in which the constituents of a benefit are differently conceived or differently understood.

Notwithstanding the diversity of opinions which men may be fuppofed to entertain, with respect to the morality of particular actions, yet, in every age and nation, in every rank and condition of men, there is a rule of propriety, which, though it may be different in different inftances, is to each the canon of estimation, and the principle from which they are to judge. Admitting fuch differences, then, as they affect particular articles of propriety, this may be laid down as a law of external action for mankind;-That, in matters physically indifferent or of fmall moment, men are to obferve the rules established in their own country or in their own condition; as they fpeak its language and wear its drefs: That, in judging of behaviour, in other countries, or in other fituations, they are not to estimate proprieties of conduct by the standard of their own manners or cuftoms; but, to allow every nation the free and diftinctive use of its own.

This rule applies chiefly, if not wholly, to matters of propriety, decency, and common civility; with respect to which, it is obvious, that as the object is to do what is inoffenfive, what is agreeable or obliging, it is proper that the person, acting in matters physically indifferent or of small moment, should confult the opinions of those he would oblige rather than his own.

SECT. V.

CHAP. II.

Even, in matters not altogether phyfically indifferent, and in PART. II. respect to which unequal degrees of conveniency or inconveniency may be apprehended in the practice of different nations; it would be an error in point of propriety if any one fhould deviate from the manners of his own country, under pretence that he meant to fubftitute what he thought an improvement. He might, in the fame manner, apprehend, that the language of his own country were inferior to that of a neighbour, or the fafhion of its dress less convenient; but, any extreme or fingular affectation of thus deviating from what is common in fuch matters, under the notion of exhibiting somewhat fuperior, is ever ftigmatized, or is confidered as the mark of a fool or a coxcomb.

Where nations, or different ranks and conditions of men, vary from one another in fuch immaterial forms and obfervances, they are faid to differ in point of manners; and, as they are feverally to be judged of by the standard of their own custom or practice, none has a right to apply that standard, in estimating the manners of others. This rule may be applied, not only to matters purely arbitrary, like the forms of falute, or the titles of addrefs, but even to all those matters, to which men though not originally indifferent, are in effect by cuftom or habit, reconcileable, or attached. Though to others from an oppofite custom and habit, fuch examples may appear awkward or abfurd, it is not to be expected of perfons in any particular age, nation or rank, that they fhould have any apprehenfion in fuch matters different from that of their own nation, condition, or age.

Men of all ages and nations however have been generally dif

pofed

PART II.
СНАР. ІІ.
SECT. V.

pofed to trefpafs on this rule, and to judge of other men by the
standard of their own manners and cuftoms. This error is equal-
ly the concomitant of ignorance and of national pride, and few
are qualified to distinguish what is effential in the character of
nations from what is an article of variable inftitution or custom,
and though fuppofed erroneous, yet confiftent with the noblest
qualities of the mind. Homer fung of great men, who performed
for themfelves the functions of butcher and cook, and who served
up
the mess on which their guests and themselves were to feed:
He is therefore said by a late celebrated wit, to have fung of coarse
or inelegant heroes*: But the manners of men are variable in dif-
ferent ages; and the fame virtues and vices, the fame elevation
or meanness, may be exhibited under this or any other variety of
manners. The moral of Homer has accordingly been equally ad-
mired by those who could hire butlers and cooks to serve them, as
by others who themselves dressed and served up their own provi-
fions. In this matter the Roman critic appears to have differed
from the French one.

Trojani belli fcriptorem, maxime Lolli,

Dum tu declamas Romæ, Prænefte relegi;

Qui quid fit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non,
Plenius ac melius Chryfippo et Crantore dicit.

This latitude of judgement, however, relating to the variety of manners, which may be admitted, as confiftent with equal or fuperior degrees of merit in different nations, hath limits beyond which it cannot be fafely carried. Should we suppose a nation to reject what is evidently falutary, and to prefer a cuftom which

3

* "D'avoir chanté des heros groffiers." This expreffion is to be found fomewhere in Voltaire's Works.

which is pernicious; this, no doubt, would come under the de- PART II. nomination of abfurdity and folly, rather than a mere variety of CHAP. II. SECT. V. manners: It would furnish other nations with a fubject of just ridicule or cenfure, and justify the individual, when better informed, in counteracting the practice of his own age or country. The virtuous citizen in fuch inftances ftrives to preferve his country, although the practice in fashion should tend to its ruin.

Virtue is fo far from being valuable, merely on account of its external effects, that the greatest and most beneficial effect it can produce is the communication and propagation of virtue itfelf; "You will ferve your country more," fays Epictetus, by raifing "the fouls, than by enlarging the habitations of your fellow citizens." And this is the greatest benefit which any man can receive from his virtuous neighbour, that he become, like him, wife, courageous, temperate, beneficent, and juft.

Fashion sometimes leads to effeminacy, fervility, prodigality, and debauchery. Where nations differ from one another in thefe refpects, they are justly said to exhibit, not a difference of manners merely, but certain degrees of corruption and depravity. If they fhould be ignorant or infenfible of the pernicious tendency of what they do, even this ignorance or infenfibility is a heavy article in the charge of corruption or vice to which they are exposed, and it must be admitted, that the fingularity of an individual, which in any instance of mere arbitrary manners were an error and a blemish, would in fuch inftances as thefe be a merit and a just topic of praise. Among the faithless faithful only be, is made the distinction of an angel of light *.

It must no doubt therefore be established as a rule of action, VOL. II. that

U

*See Paradife Loft.