which had occurred in the Rhenish Province since then; '1 and that the Separatist Movement was a quarrel among Germans in which France had no desire to take part.2 Officially, the French Government clung to this position from beginning to end of the affair; but it soon ceased to be tenable in the eyes of the world. Throughout the Rhineland the course of events bore out the conclusion which was reached, in regard to the Palatinate in particular, by an authoritative and impartial first-hand witness, Mr. Consul Clive,3 that this Government could never have come into existence without French support and would immediately be driven out if French support were withdrawn'. The Separatists were, in fact, driven out of the Belgian Zone as soon as the Belgian authorities ceased to support them. They never attempted to obtain a footing in the British Zone, where the local representatives of the Occupying Power did not leave it doubtful that they intended to fulfil the purpose for which they were there by preventing the illegal bearing and use of arms and enabling the lawful civil authorities to maintain order; and in the French Zone itself, as soon as French support was withdrawn, Mr. Clive's prophecy came true. The Separatists collapsed in a moment-even in the Palatinate, where the pressure exerted on their behalf by the representatives of France had been most pronounced. These facts proved conclusively that the Separatist Movement was not, as the French officially claimed that it was, a spontaneous development in the internal political life of Germany, and that it could not be accounted for by the mere existence of the Inter-Allied military occupation or even by the effects of the struggle in the Ruhr. It was the product of French policy, and could never have occurred if Frenchmen in high places had not willed it.

Thus the relations of the French Government with the Rhineland Separatists in the years 1923-4 painfully resembled the relations of contemporary Near Eastern Governments with the chettes and komitajys under their respective patronage. Through these unworthy agents, for whose acts they disclaimed responsibility, representatives of the French Government sought to procure results which they desired to see accomplished but were unwilling openly to bring about by their own action. As was the case in similar situations in the Near East, it was particularly difficult to ascertain

1 M. Poincaré's note of the 6th November, 1923 (White Book, No. 6).
2 French note of the 21st February, 1924 (White Book, No. 19).
3 See p. 313, below.

exactly to what extent the principals were responsible for the crimes committed by the unavowed executants of their policy, or, again, to what extent that policy, as promoted by the lower ranks of the French official hierarchy on the spot, was initiated and approved by the heads of the Government in Paris. In the end, when the bitter feelings aroused by this affair have long died away, it is possible that the exact facts may be established by patient historical research. In the present state of knowledge, it is only just to France to say that the discredit of the story does not reflect exclusively upon her. Germans, Englishmen, or Italians, looking back dispassionately over their own national records during the ten years preceding the summer of 1924, might well hesitate to cast the first stone at their French neighbours. The relations between the French Government and the Separatists were one among several specially striking examples of the unhappy condition into which Europe had fallen— a condition which the great majority of educated Europeans would have dismissed as incredible if it had been foretold to them at any moment before the outbreak of the War of 1914.

The Separatists' first stroke in their new campaign was delivered at Düsseldorf (General Degoutte's head-quarters, in the Sanctions Territory' occupied on the 8th March, 1921) on Sunday the 30th September, 1923. Their intention being known beforehand, the local trade union and party organizations decided that the town should protest passively by the suspension of traffic, by the closing of places of amusement, and by the whole population remaining indoors. The police were concentrated in the public buildings with orders to act strictly on the defensive; but when the Separatists, who arrived on the scene in a Régie special train, marched through the town, armed and in military formation, 1,500 to 2,000 strong, they came into collision with the police, and, after the first shots had been fired (apparently) on the Separatists' side, there was a pitched battle. resulting in about 300 casualties, in which the Separatists had the worst of it before the police were placed under arrest, disarmed, and court martialled by the French military authorities.1 After this, the Separatists reorganized their forces, and on the 21st October a 'Rhineland Republic' was proclaimed at Aachen, in the Belgian Zone. On the Belgian side, it was announced semiofficially that the Belgian troops had received orders not to intervene unless their security were threatened, and on the 28th fresh instruc1 See White Book, Nos. 2 and 7 for the German version, and Nos. 4 and 11 for the French version. 2 See Yellow Book, pp. 1-2.

X

tions to observe strict neutrality were given by the Foreign Minister, M. Jaspar, to the High Commissioner of Belgium in the Occupied Territories. Meanwhile, in the Belgian Press,1 some doubt was cast upon the genuineness of the neutrality which the Belgian military authorities had been observing up to date; and after the 31st October, when the British Minister at Brussels delivered a note announcing the British Government's opposition to the separation of the Rhineland from Germany, the Belgian Government called for a report from the military authorities on the spot regarding the attitude of their officers and men during the Separatists' operations. The finding seems to have been that while the official attitude of the Belgian army had been correct, certain individual members of the Belgian forces had intervened on the Separatists' behalf. These irregularities were checked by the Belgian Government's action, and on the 2nd November the Belgian High Commissioner compelled the Separatists to evacuate the Rathaus at Aachen, after which, the Separatist Movement virtually collapsed as far as the Belgian Zone was concerned.2

Simultaneously with the proclamation of the Rhineland Republic' in the Belgian Zone, the Separatists (by the methods and with the assistance that have been indicated above) seized the public buildings and attempted to take over the administration 3 in those parts of the French Zone which belonged to the two German Länder of Prussia and Hessen-Darmstadt. The Putsch was carried out at

1 Particularly in Flemish and Socialist organs.

2 It was afterwards reported (in The Times, 2nd January, 1924) that the seizure of public buildings and proclamation of the Rhineland Republic at Aachen on the 21st October was brought about by certain 'Belgian Ñationalists' (presumably officers in the Belgian Army of Occupation) in order to forestall the French and thus prevent the latter from effecting the establishment of a Rhineland Republic under French patronage, which would have hemmed Belgium in between France on one side and a French client state on the other. This premature Putsch in the Belgian Zone forced the French (according to this story) to precipitate events in their own Zone. Meanwhile, the Belgian Government, which had not been a party to this Belgian intrigue with the Separatists and which disapproved of that policy, took the action which has been described in the text, with the result that the 'Separatist Movement' in the Belgian Zone was brought to an end in the first days of November. Pending the verification of this report, it may be pointed out that it does not conflict with the known facts which are stated in the text; and that, if the French plans were upset, that would explain the crudeness of the methods by which the Separatists were assisted into the saddle by the French authorities in the French Zone in the course of the next few days. 3 See Yellow Book, pp. 2-3, for the Separatists' proclamations. The part belonging to Hessen-Darmstadt consisted of the southern half of the Mainz Bridgehead and a small triangle on the left bank of the Rhine which included Mainz, Bingen, and Worms. Everything to the north-west

6

6

Coblenz (the seat of the Rhineland High Commission) on the 21st-26th October, at Bonn on the 21st-25th, at Wiesbaden and Trier on the 22nd, at Mainz on the 23rd; and while large armed bands, transported in special trains by the Franco-Belgian Régie, executed these operations in the larger cities, the country towns and villages were raided by smaller parties in motor-lorries. There were indications that (as was commonly observed in contemporary occurrences of the same kind in the Near East) the terrorism was more naked in the countryside1 than in the towns, where the Separatists were to some extent restrained by the presence of foreign witnesses, and where the French authorities on their side were concerned to keep up appearances though Herr Matthes, the Separatist leader, in his proclamation of the Rhineland Republic' at Coblenz on the 25th October,2 ventured to declare that the members of the Separatist Government' had been received by the President of the Inter-Allied High Commission in his capacity as French High Commissioner, and had been informed by him that they were recognized as the de facto Government wherever their authority was effective'. A further proclamation was published on the 29th October 3 in Der Rheinländer, the official organ of the Provisional Government', in which the names of the members were given and it was announced that they had delegated full powers to Herr Matthes and Dr. Dorten. This pretentious beginning, however, was followed by no permanent results, since the Separatists were so incapable of helping themselves that it proved impossible for their foreign patrons to help them effectively. The leaders had neither experience nor authority, and the movement found no support whatever either among the lawful officials (in spite of the pressure which was brought to bear on them in the hope of inducing them to carry on their work under the new régime) or among the population. Herren Matthes and Dorten further discredited themselves by quarrelling with one another, with the result that Dr. Dorten carried out a new Putsch, this time against his colleague, on the 27th November. On the 29th January, a French military court at Wiesbaden found itself compelled to sentence one of Dr. Dorten's collaborators, Herr Hocquel,' President of the FrancoRhenish League', together with several other Separatists, for having of this (except the little Birkenfeld enclave belonging to Oldenburg) was Prussian territory.

1 For conditions in the Moselle valley see The Times, 24th January, and The Manchester Guardian, 30th January, 1924. 3 Ibid., p. 3.

2 Yellow Book, pp. 2–3.

attacked and looted a consignment of Reichsbank notes.1 On the 31st January, the public buildings at Wiesbaden were quietly evacuated by the Separatists and reoccupied by the lawful officials,2 and by the 11th February the Separatist régime had come to an end in every important place in the Prussian and Hessian portions of the French Zone, including the Kurhaus at Bad-Ems, in which Dr. Dorten's Government' had installed itself.3 This was the end of the attempt to establish a Separatist Government in any portion of the Occupied Territories outside the Bavarian Palatinate; and although the Separatist leaders still tried to play a part by intervening in labour troubles, founding a Rhenish Labour Party '5 and a new 'Republican Defence Force' (Republikanische Notwehr), and publishing an election address at the Reichstag elections of the 4th May, 1924, they confined themselves thenceforward, outside the Palatinate, to the tactics of pacific evolution ',8 until the ultimate withdrawal of French protection, owing to the signature of the London Agreements, left them the choice between flight or impeachment.

4

6

In the Palatinate, where the Separatist Putsch was started about a week later than in other parts of the French Zone, the activities of the Separatists took a much more serious turn than elsewhere owing to the policy pursued by General de Metz, the chief delegate of the Rhineland Commission for this area. They not only produced a greater local harvest of anarchy, injustice, and bloodshed,10 but very nearly created a breach between France and Great Britain.

The Palatinate-unlike the greater part of the Occupied Territory, which had been incorporated since 1815 in Prussia-had since that date belonged to Bavaria.

It thus tended to live a life of its own apart from the remainder of Germany west of the Rhine and also apart from the main body of Bavaria, from which it was separated by Hessen-Darmstadt and 1 Le Temps, 31st January, 1924.

2 The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, 2nd February; Le Temps, 3rd February, 1924.

3 The Times, 12th February; Le Temps, 13th February, 1924.

4 e.g. in the lignite district in the British Zone (The Manchester Guardian, 21st February, 1924).

5 Yellow Book, p. 5.

6 Ibid., p. 6; The Manchester Guardian, 27th June, 1924.

7 Yellow Book, p. 7. No Separatist, of course, secured election.

8 Le Temps, 13th June, 1924, quoting from the Kölnische Zeitung.

9 See Section (vi), below.

10 For general descriptions of local conditions under the Separatist régime see two series of articles in The Times, 15th, 17th, and 22nd January, and The Manchester Guardian, 25th and 26th January.