Lord Curzon once more raised the question of the outstanding points at issue between the two countries, and suggested, as he had done on the 5th December, that it would be preferable to follow the precedent of 1904 by settling these differences first before attempting to find a definitive formula for the Pact of Guarantee. In reply, M. de St. Aulaire pointed out the danger that French public opinion might then be confirmed in the impression that the Pact was being made a subject of bargaining (an impression which had already been created by the publication of Mr. Lloyd George's memorandum of the 4th January); and he argued with some force that the situation in 1904 was not a true parallel, since the local conflicts of interest between the two Powers, to which Lord Curzon had alluded, were now far less serious than they had been at the earlier date, whereas the problem of their relations with Germany, which in 1904 had been a common interest strong enough to overcome their differences in other quarters, was now precisely the matter on which they disagreed with unfortunate effects upon their relations in other fields. He therefore pleaded that this central problem, as the principal source of friction between the two countries, should be solved by the conclusion of the Pact, if possible, before the meeting of the forthcoming conference at Genoa.1 Lord Curzon, however, to whom this order of proceeding did not commend itself, declared a settlement within that time to be out of the question, and therewith the conversation came to an end.

Thereafter the negotiations languished. It is true that M. Poincaré returned to the charge on the 29th January with a reasoned memorandum 2 which was communicated to Lord Curzon on the 1st February by M. de St. Aulaire; and on the 17th February Lord Curzon completed a commentary on this in a memorandum of his own; 3 but although both these documents were masterly, and in this and other respects characteristic of their distinguished authors, the very ability of the written arguments accentuated the inherent incompatibility between the theses of the two Governments, and the chances of agreement were probably therefore not diminished by the fact that Lord Curzon's memorandum, which had been composed for the benefit of his colleagues in the British Cabinet, was not communicated to the French Prime Minister. In this document, in which the British Foreign Secretary once more minutely examined

1 For the Genoa Conference see Survey, 1920-3, pp. 25-34.
2 Yellow Book, No. 25; Blue Book, No. 41.

3 Blue Book, No. 44.

and rejected the French demands, the following passages were perhaps especially significant :

I am clear in my own mind that in so far as British public opinion will endorse our guarantee, it will be in the belief that it can only become operative in the event of a German army actually crossing the French frontier and invading French soil. If we envisage British action at an earlier stage, I foresee serious and even dangerous disputes as to what constitutes an act of aggression, and at what stage mobilization or concentration or advance develops into attack...

At first sight this clause [Article 4 of the French draft] seems to embody a quite innocent proposition. But it must be read in the light both of its history and of its real significance. It is the heir, or rather the substitute, of the proposal put forward by the French Ambassador in his first conversation with me last year, that the Anglo-French Agreement should apply in some undefined way to the frontiers of Poland and other Eastern European States which are regarded by the French as the outer frontier of their country. That proposal was unhesitatingly rejected both by myself at that time and by the Prime Minister in his conversations with M. Briand at Cannes...

The new obligation is not confined to the maintenance of the Treaty of Versailles, but to all the treaties of peace of which France and Great Britain are signatories. In other words, if there is trouble on the Bulgarian frontier or at Budapest, or, it may be, later at Constantinople, the two Powers, not waiting for any one else, are 'to examine in common the measures necessary to ensure speedily a peaceful and equitable settlement'. Of course, this might mean that they would jointly refer the case to the League of Nations. But, if so, the provision is unnecessary. On the other hand, it could be taken to mean, and is probably intended by the French to mean, that the settlement of the future European disputes is a matter primarily for Great Britain and France, and that the rest of the world is to look on until our two Governments have made up their minds what they will do. This might prove a very powerful and effective form of European hegemony. But I do not think either that we want it or that the rest of Europe would welcome it..

A military alliance of this description between Great Britain and France could only result in rival and, it might be, hostile combinations between other Powers (conceivably even between Germany and Russia), and it is inconsistent with the theory upon which it has hitherto been assumed that the post-war polity of Europe is to be based.

Meanwhile, two further conversations between M. de St. Aulaire and Lord Curzon on the 9th and the 17th February 1 had left on the French Ambassador's mind the impression that the British Government was in no hurry to carry the negotiations to a conclusion, while the British public appeared to take no further interest in the project. On the 4th March M. de St. Aulaire was instructed by M. Poincaré 2 2 Ibid., No. 30.

1 Yellow Book, Nos. 26 and 27.

to ask for a reply to his memorandum of the 29th January; but, in the next conversation at the Foreign Office on the 18th March,1 the Foreign Secretary intimated that the Pact would stand little chance of acceptance by Parliament unless and until the outstanding differences between the two countries had been removed. In May, M. de St. Aulaire, under further pressure from M. Poincaré, reopened the question again; but this time Lord Curzon was ill and his place was being taken by Lord Balfour, who informed M. de St. Aulaire that he was only superficially acquainted with what had recently taken place in connexion with this question', but that he would inform himself upon the matter and communicate with him again. Further enlightenment, however, did not dispose Lord Balfour more favourably towards the French project than it had disposed Lord Curzon, and the negotiations finally lapsed in July 1922.2

A year later, the question of the Pact was tentatively reopened by Lord Curzon himself in the course of the abortive negotiations between the British, French, Belgian, and German Governments over the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr; and the rebuff which M. Poincaré administered to these advances is recorded in that connexion.3 The miscarriage of these British overtures in 1923, though unfortunate, is hardly surprising when it is considered how sharply the previous negotiations had brought out the underlying differences between the French and British points of view. In the meantime, the problem which had proved too difficult for French and British statesmen to solve in isolation had been approached from another angle in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance evolved by the League of Nations.

(iii) The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance.4

Security can be sought either by devising safeguards or else by attempting to remove or diminish the anticipated danger; and, in the particular problem of providing military security for states against the danger of foreign invasion, the solution may lie either in a one-sided reduction of armaments, or in a system of defensive 1 Yellow Book, No. 31; Blue Book, No. 45.

2 Yellow Book, Nos. 32-9; Blue Book, Nos. 46-50.

3 See below, p. 332.

See the pamphlet entitled The League of Nations and Reduction of Armaments (Geneva, 1923, Information Section, League of Nations Secretariat) and also the French Yellow Book, Documents relatifs aux négociations concernant les garanties de sécurité contre une agression de l'Allemagne (10 janvier, 1919-7 décembre, 1923), No. 44.

1

alliances, or in a general reduction of armaments, or in some combination of these measures. One-sided reductions of armaments were imposed on the defeated parties in the four European Peace Treaties following the War of 1914, and the next impulse of certain of the victorious nations was to explore the second possibility of defensive alliances. The negotiation of the Franco-Polish and Polish-Rumanian treaties in 1921 and the construction of the 'Little Entente' have been recorded in the preceding volume; and the negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact, which really broke down over the unwillingness of Great Britain to be drawn into a continental system of alliances embracing Europe as a whole, have been described in the preceding section of this Part.2 In the meantime, the obligation to approach the problem from the side of disarmament had been laid upon all Members of the League of Nations by certain articles in the Covenant; and this line of approach was combined with the other into a single avenue in the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance. This combination was conceived by Lord Robert Cecil, and, as will be seen, he brought his idea forward in July 1922— that is, at the psychological moment when the negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact were in articulo mortis. His services, however, were not limited to the origination of the scheme. His ability as a practical statesman and his freedom from egotism were displayed still more conspicuously in the open-mindedness and resourcefulness with which he adapted his proposals to the actual conditions of international politics at the time. In this he was assisted by Colonel Réquin, the French representative on the Temporary Mixed Commission of the League 3 and the principal critic of Lord Robert's proposals in their original form. Colonel Réquin shared with Senator Lebrun (a French ex-Minister of State) and with Colonel Fabry (afterwards French Minister for the Colonies) the credit for discerning that the security which France had not succeeded in obtaining in the form of an Anglo-French Pact might be sought along a path which at first sight seemed remote from the field of the abortive Anglo-French negotiations. The Temporary Mixed Commission as a whole shared with its distinguished French and British members the credit for co-ordinating their respective proposals into a harmonious and logically coherent document. Owing to circumstances which will appear, the Treaty of Mutual Assistance was not destined

1 Survey, 1920–3, Part III (ii) 3 (ƒ), and (iii) 2.

2

pp. 2-16, above.

3 For the genesis of the Commission see below, p. 18.

C

to pass beyond the draft stage, but this fact does not detract from its historical importance, for the combination of ideas which it embodied marked a permanent advance, and the subsequent Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes proceeded from this starting-point.

Before discussing the evolution of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, it is necessary to review the provisions of the Covenant in regard to the reduction of armaments, and to describe the organizations created by the League in order to carry these provisions into effect. In Article 1, § 2, and Articles 8 and 9, the Covenant envisaged a general reduction of armaments, extending to the ex-victors and ex-neutrals in the War, and designed, not to differentiate against particular defeated states (like the military, naval, and air clauses in the four European Peace Treaties) or against recalcitrant tribesmen (like the Convention signed on the 10th September, 1919, at St. Germain-en-Laye) but to provide a common solution for a world problem. Article 8 contemplated the control of the private manufacture of munitions and implements of war, the exchange of full and frank information by Members of the League regarding armaments, and the formulation of plans for the reduction of armaments by the Council for the consideration of the several Governments, while Article 9 provided for the constitution of a Permanent Commission to advise the Council on the execution of Articles 12 and 8 and on military, naval, and air questions generally. This Commission was constituted on the 17th May, 1920, from technical delegations (composed in each case of a naval, military, and air representative) of each of the countries represented on the Council. On a recommendation from the Assembly during its First Session in the autumn of 1920, the Council further appointed, on the 25th February, 1921, a Temporary Mixed Commission, consisting of six persons of recognized competence in political, social, and economic matters; six members of the Permanent Advisory Commission for Naval, Military, and Air Questions, selected by this Commission; four members of the Provisional Economic and Financial Committee; and six members of the Governing Body of the International Labour Office-three employers' representatives

1 For the execution of these clauses see Survey, 1920-3, pp. 104-13, and the Survey for 1925.

2 Article 1 provided, among other things, that future applicants for membership in the League should accept such regulations as might be prescribed by the League in regard to armaments.