Errata in 'Survey of International Affairs, 1920–3' Page 240, lines 23 and 24: For Esthonia and Latvia had declared their independence during November, 1918, read Esthonia and Latvia had declared their independence on the 24th February and 18th November, 1918, respectively Page 244, line 19: For Riga read Reval Page 339, line 8: For Lausanne Treaty read Treaty of Neuilly Page 359, line 10: For Article 11 of the Covenant read Article 15 of the Covenant Page 397, line 23: For Mr. C. R. Hofmeyr read Mr. G. R. Hofmeyr PART I WORLD AFFAIRS A. SECURITY AND DISARMAMENT (i) Introductory Note. In the following sections an attempt is made to trace the history of the Security and Disarmament Problem during the six years ending in the Fifth Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations (September 1924). The transformation which the problem underwent during this short period was remarkable. In 1919 it was governed by the efforts of Marshal Foch to obtain the Rhine frontier for France; by 1924 it had become involved in the constitutional relations between the self-governing members of the British Commonwealth; but this change was not the most important. The turningpoint in the history of the problem was the recognition that it could not be solved by purely private agreements between two or more countries, however powerful and however pacifically minded, but that it was a question of international concern which could only be handled successfully within the framework of some international organization. It also became apparent that a solution of it could only be found if its two aspects-Security and Disarmament—were taken into consideration concurrently. At this point the problem was transferred, by tacit consent, from the domain of the Supreme Council to the domain of the League of Nations, where Lord Robert Cecil took the initiative in attempting to fashion a precise diplomatic instrument out of the desires and experiences which had taken substance in the community of nations during the past few years. The production of the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance-for which Lord Robert Cecil shared the credit with Colonel Réquin and the other members of the Temporary Mixed Commission of the League— was perhaps the decisive practical step, since this document embodied the essential provisions for a general pact of security and disarmament in their essential relation with one another. Great temples, however, are built by many hands. Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot B extended Lord Robert Cecil's plan by adding the element of arbitration; and, on the triple basis of Arbitration, Security, and Disarmament, the Geneva Protocol of 1924 was constructed by the labours of M. Beneš, M. Politis, and other skilled artificers. This was a great step in advance; yet, at the time of writing, it was already apparent that the Protocol would not be the final structure, but was destined, like the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, to mark one stage-important but not definitive-in the gradual solution of the problem. (ii) Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact.1 The problem of securing France against future attacks by Germany had weighed upon the minds of the French people ever since the termination of the Franco-German War of 1870-1, and with the outbreak of the War of 1914 and the renewed invasion of French soil by German armies it began also to engage the attention of France's Allies. In 1870-1 three things had happened: France single-handed had been proved to be no match for the united forces of the German states; the victorious German states had formed a permanent union in a new German Reich; and the Reich, by compelling France, in the Treaty of Frankfurt, to cede Alsace and parts of Lorraine, had shifted the Franco-German frontier to a line which suited Germany on strategic as well as political grounds. From 1914 onwards, therefore, the problem presented itself under the three aspects of a possible revision of frontiers, a possible dissolution of the German Reich into its constituent states, and a possible arrangement for assuring to France the permanent support of some or all of her present Allies against any future German aggression. These possibilities were discussed between certain of the Allies while the War was still in progress, and two of them were partially settled immediately after its termination. As a result of the retrocession to France of her lost provinces, the Franco-German frontier was set back to the line of 1815-70, while on the other hand the unity of the German Reich survived defeat and revolution. It remained to be seen, however, whether French opinion would remain content with a settlement on these lines, and whether, if France made up her mind to demand more at Germany's expense, her Allies could 1 British Blue Book: Papers respecting Negotiations for an Anglo-French Pact (Cmd. 2169 of 1924); and French Yellow Book: Documents relatifs aux négociations concernant les garanties de sécurité contre une agression de l'Allemagne (10 janvier, 1919-7 décembre, 1923). persuade her to relinquish such aspirations by offering her alternative guarantees. During 1919 (when the dominating personality on the French side was Marshal Foch, although his extreme view did not in the end prevail in the French counsels) France was under the overwhelming influence of two factors-the recent German invasion of her soil and the disappearance of her continental military Ally, Russia—and her formula for securing herself against the repetition of the one and compensating herself for the other was a military frontier along the Rhine. In Marshal Foch's opinion, the Rhine was so admirable a military barrier from the technical point of view that France could hold it till the tardy reinforcements of her new overseas Allies, with their peace-time voluntary service, could be brought upon the scene. 'Ce fleuve règle tout. Quand on est maître du Rhin, on est maître de tout le pays. Quand on n'est pas sur le Rhin, on a tout perdu.' Of such capital importance did the military line of the Rhine appear to Marshal Foch, and so eager was he to secure the maintenance of that line under the political, as well as the military, conditions which he prescribed, that he preferred to hold it under these conditions, even if that meant holding it with French forces alone and sacrificing the military, diplomatic, and moral support of the British Commonwealth and the United States. This view of Foch's was avowed on the 2nd September, 1919, by M. Tardieu, and he rightly plumed himself on the fact that M. Clemenceau's Government had chosen to accept a reduction of the Marshal's conditions rather than sacrifice Allied solidarity. 1 The settlement which had in fact been accepted by the Supreme Council and embodied in the Versailles Treaty provided that the territory left to Germany on the left bank of the Rhine after the cession of the Reichsland, Eupen and Malmédy, together with a zone fifty kilometres broad along the right bank of the river, should be demilitarized in perpetuity,3 and that the territory on the left bank, together with three bridgeheads on the right bank, should remain for fifteen years under the military occupation of the Allies, which had been established under the Armistice. It also provided, how 1 French Yellow Book, No. 13, p. 54. (See also Nos. 1, 5, and 9 for earlier statements of Marshal Foch's view.) 2 Ibid., No. 16. 3 Versailles Treaty, Arts. 42 and 43. 4 Thus the areas of demilitarization and occupation did not entirely coincide, since the three bridgeheads beyond the Rhine did not constitute a continuous zone. (Versailles Treaty, Art. 428.) |