existence; for since in their existence there can be no last occurrence, there can be no last but one, nor any event which will bear an ordinal relation to the termination of their existence: but it would not follow from hence that their existence must be in statu quo; because permanency of being cannot preclude the succession of events, and therefore it cannot preclude successive duration.

It may indeed be truly said of all finite existence, that the absence of a first event precludes the possibility of a second, and so on ad infinitum; but the same assertion cannot be true in relation to the Deity; for although he could not have had a beginning, yet the history of his conduct, and the existence of his own works prove, that he has been the subject of past existence, that he is now the subject of present existence, and also that he must be the subject of future existence, and that without end.

The error alluded to above, arises from not distinguishing between the eternal necessity and stability of the Divine existence, and the successive events of the Divine conduct. Action implies existence, and successive acts imply successive existence. By confounding indefinite with inaugmentable quantities, the mind is betrayed into the most egregious blunders. The quantity of the past existence of the Deity is indefinite and immeasurable, because it is unoriginated; but it is not for that reason infinite in quantity and therefore inaugmentable; for although its present aggregation is immeasurable, it must admit of augmentation world without end. One of the best conceptions which we are able to form of the eternity of the Divine existence, is that which is suggested to us by the Psalmist, and is conveyed to us in the following words: "Thou hast been our dwelling-place in all generations;" and therefore the Deity must have existed along with all those successive generations. "From everlasting to everlasting thou art God." No words could possibly convey a more clear and decided conception of progressive existence than that which is suggested by this devout aspiration: From everlasting to everlasting.

Those persons who advocate the notion of the nunc stans, pretend to say that the difference between time and eternity is that which lies between successive and unsuccessive existence. I would ask such persons whether they really

mean by successive existence any thing else than continued existence? For if they do, they ought to define their meaning. For my own part I employ those terms as being synonymous, and I am not aware that the terms are ever employed in any dissimilar acceptation. I mean by successive existence, nothing more than the continuance of being, and I therefore attribute it alike to finite and to infinite existence. Do the objectors suppose that after the termination of the present life, and in a state of immortal existence, we shall not then be the subjects of successive duration, or in other words, of continued existence? We are accustomed to apply the epithet eternity to the immortal existence of created beings; but we are all very well aware that no duration, either of time or eternity, can have any positive existence; and we must be equally assured, if we will but suffer our reason to decide, that the only distinction between time and eternity, in relation to created beings, is that of terminable and interminable existence.

But even if the point of unsuccessive existence in the Deity, were fully ceded to the advocates of an inaugmentable knowledge, they would still have a formidable difficulty to get over, before they could fairly establish their doctrine. They must not only prove the fact of unsuccessive existence in the Deity, but they must prove that every other being exists alike in the past, the present, and the future, and that every object of the Divine knowledge is like himself the subject of an unoriginated and interminable existence. Before the Deity could have a present knowledge of my future actions, I myself must have an actual and present existence in the future. If all eternity, as they are pleased to say, is now present to him, then of course, all eternity must have a present existence. Thus it appears that the doctrine of the nunc stans must be equally applied to all existence, created and uncreated, and to all occurrences past, present, and to come; and therefore, the following alternative must await the abettors of this theory, and upon one of the horns of this formidable dilemma they must eventually be transfixed: either they must deny a continuance of existence to the Deity, and render him more evanescent than an insect, a vapour, a shadow, or an empty sound, or else they must believe that

ail existence, both past, present, and to come, possess an unoriginated, unchangeable, and everlasting being.

Now let me ask my reader, whether he is able to produce any single passage of scripture that can be made to express, or even to imply, any thing like the notion of unsuccessive existence? If he will only take the pains to examine the sacred volume, he will, I think, be shortly convinced, that there are numerous passages of holy writ, which no sophistry, however ingenious, would be able to pervert to such a purpose, and that those passages of the sacred Scriptures which have been supposed to favour such a notion contains in reality no such meaning.

The Psalmist in his devout meditations on the eternity of God has said, "For a thousand years in thy sight, are but as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night." Ps. xc. 4. Here it is easy to perceive that the Psalmist is contrasting the brevity of human life with the eternity of God: but if the notion of unsuccessive existence were true, there would be more continuance of being in a single day than in the whole eternity of the Divine existence.

When the apostle Peter encouraged the believers in his day, and armed them against the sceptical insinuations of the wicked, who said, "Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of creation;" he said unto them, "But beloved, be not ignorant of this one thing, that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." 2 Pet. iii. 8. Many persons have eagerly laid hold on this portion of holy writ, supposing it to be favourable to the notion of unsuccessive existence in the Divine Being. But if this very scripture were clearly understood, and considered in its relative bearing on the context, it would be found to be as hostile to such a notion of the Divine existence as any words which could be possibly put together. The enemies of the Gospel had insinuated that there was no probability of a general judgment of the human race, because that event had been foretold so often and had been so long expected, and had not yet actually transpired. But the apostle told them that they had quite mistaken the cause of the delay, and that God was not slack concerning his

promises, but was long suffering, and not willing that they should perish. At the same time, the apostle informed them that the delay which had been practised, would not invalidate the prediction of a general judgment, and that the denunciations of the Divine wrath upon incorrigible offenders would be executed with as much certainty and fidelity at the end of a thousand years, as though they had been executed on the day of their promulgation. But if the notion of unsuccessive existence were correct, then there could not be with the Deity either a thousand years or a single day for one indivisible and unsuccessive point of duration would be the unalterable and inaugmentable limits of his being. In such a case, the whole of the Divine existence would not include any divisible portion of duration, and the whole history of his conduct would embrace but one unsuccessive and undivided page.

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The great apostle of the Gentiles exhorted the Hebrew Christians in the following words: "Remember them which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God, whose faith follow, considering the end of their conversation, Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever." Heb. xiii. 7, 8. And here I will only ask my reader, whether this notable passage of Scripture could have been written merely for the purpose of inculcating the notion of an unsuccessive existence in the person of the Redeemer of mankind? or whether the object of the apostle is not evidently that of shewing, that the great end of the christian ministry is preaching Jesus Christ as the Saviour, and preaching the stability and permanency of his salvation from generation to generation, until there shall be time no longer?

The following scripture has been quoted for the purpose of supporting the notion of unsuccessive existence; but how unadapted it is to such a purpose we shall endeavour hereafter to shew. The apostle speaks of the "Faith of Abraham, before God, who quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things which be not as though they were." Rom. iv. 17. Now if this scripture had affirmed in plain and unequivocal words, that God actually maketh things to be and not to be at the same time, it would indeed have been a fortunate testimony for the doctrine of an inaugmentable knowledge in the Deity; but since it only says,

that in the predictions which were delivered by the prophets of ancient times, the Deity speaks of future events as though they had actually transpired, the theory of unsuccessive existence falls at once to the ground; for although the Deity, in all absolute prophecy, speaks of future events as though they had actually transpired; yet he does not by such predictions give a present existence to those future predicted events, neither does he affirm in those predictions that such events have actually transpired: but being the objects of an absolute, efficient, and infallible determination, they now become the objects of certainty, and therefore may be spoken of and acted upon with as much confidence by human beings, as things may be spoken of and acted upon which have already taken place.

Having adduced the foregoing arguments and scripture quotations, and having investigated both the one and the other with impartiality and with the utmost care, I come at last to a full and decided conviction, that the notion of unsuccessive existence, like that of an inaugmentable knowledge, which it is intended to support, has no foundation or countenance, either in the notices of our senses, or in the deductions of our unsophisticated reason, or in the unperverted testimony of the word of God.

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