For the Sake of Argument: Practical Reasoning, Character, and the Ethics of BeliefWhat role does reason play in our lives? What role should it play? And are claims to rationality liberating or oppressive? For the Sake of Argument addresses questions such as these to consider the relationship between thought and character. Eugene Garver brings Aristotle's Rhetoric to bear on practical reasoning to show how the value of such thinking emerges when members of communities deliberate together, persuade each other, and are persuaded by each other. That is to say, when they argue. Garver roots deliberation and persuasion in political friendship instead of a neutral, impersonal framework of justice. Through incisive readings of examples in modern legal and political history, from Brown v. Board of Education to the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, he demonstrates how acts of deliberation and persuasion foster friendship among individuals, leading to common action amid diversity. In an Aristotelian sense, there is a place for pathos and ethos in rational thought. Passion and character have as pivotal a role in practical reasoning as logic and language. |
Contents
Introduction Rhetoric and Practical Reason | 1 |
Truth in Politics Ethical Argument Ethical Knowledgment and Ethical Truth | 13 |
Confronting the Sophist | 44 |
Brown v Board of Education as a Paradigm of Practical Reason | 69 |
The Ethical Criticism of Reasoning | 87 |
Rhetorical Argument and Ethical Authority | 109 |
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Common terms and phrases
action agreement Alasdair MacIntyre appeals argue Aristotelian Aristotle Aristotle's assertion audience authoritative authority become believe Bobbitt Brown Cambridge chapter character Chicago Press civilized claim commitment conclusion constitutional interpretation David Luban decision deliberation deliberative democracy democratic desire Dewey distinction emotional enthymeme epideictic Ernest Gellner ethical argument ethical reasoning ethical surplus ethos eunoia example fact Fourteenth Amendment friendship hermeneutics human idea incommensurable instrumental rationality intellectual virtues irrational John Dewey Jonathan Shay Joseph Vining judge judgment judicial justice knowledge Korman Law Review legitimacy liberal look means ment method moral narrative nature one's opinion Oxford Paul Gewirtz person persuasion philosophy phronesis pluralism political practical rationality practical reason practical wisdom principles problem question rhetoric Richard Rorty Ronald Dworkin Rorty rules shows simply social someone sophistic South African speaker theory things tion tolerance trust trustworthy University of Chicago values York