Religion, than a Beast that perishes, or SER M. than a lifeless Machine.

THE Truth, in Both these controverfies, is; that there is Something in Each part of the Question, which must needs be acknowledged to be True: and yet 'tis equally neceffary that it be always so only acknowledged, and fo only understood, as to be confiftent with what on the Other part of the Queftion must at the fame Time, and for the fame Reasons, of Neceffity be acknowledged too. For otherwife, we do but indeavour to establish One Truth at the Expence of Another ; which, at the conclufion of the Argument, is not indeed confirming Either of them, but destroying Both. Thus, for inftance, the Freedom of Men's Will, whatever be the Nature and the Degree of that Freedom, muft upon no account be any thing in any wife inconfiftent with any of the Perfections of God; because the Attributes of the Divine Nature are Necessary in themselves, abfolutely and unalterably, and antecedent to the Production of all created Beings. And on the other fide, no Attribute of the Divine Nature,

fuch

XIII.

it

SER M. fuch as Foreknowledge in particular, can XIII. poffibly be fuch as to take away the Liberty of the Will of Man; because then it would confequently deftroy fome of the Other equally neceffary Perfections of God, fuch as Juftice and Goodness, which cannot poffibly be deftroyed. Since therefore neither the Foreknowledge of God, nor the Liberty of Man, can without a plain contradiction be denied ; follows unavoidably, that the Foreknowledge of God must be of fuch a Nature, as is not inconfiftent with the Liberty of Man. That is to fay; it cannot be a Knowledge of the fame fort or Species, as is the Knowledge of neceffary and determined Events, arifing from a View of the whole Chain or Series of Neceffary Caufes producing thofe Events: but it must be a Knowledge quite of another Nature; a Power, difficult indeed for Us to frame a clear conception of, but yet not impoffible to have a Notion of in general. For as a Man who has no influence over Another perfon's Actions, can yet often perceive beforehand what That Other will do; and a wifer and more ex

perienced

perienced Man, will ftill with greater SER M. probability foresee what Another, whofe XIII. Difpofition he is perfectly is perfectly acquainted with, will in certain Circumstances do; and an Angel, with ftill much less degrees of Errour, may have a farther Prospect into Men's future Actions: fo 'tis very reasonable to apprehend, that God, without influencing Men's Wills by his Power, yet by his Forefight cannot but have as much Certainer a Knowledge of future Free Events, than either Men or Angels can poffible have, as the Perfection of His nature is greater than that of Theirs.

IN like manner, in that Other queftion, which is the Subject-matter of my Text: Whatever Power Men be fuppofed to have in the Ufe of their natural Faculties, 'tis evident it cannot be fuch as in any wife to diminish the Senfe they ought to have of their continual Dependance upon God; because those very Pow ers and natural Faculties, are themselves entirely the Gift of God, and not any thing at all of our own procuring, as of our felves. So that those who have been VOL. II. charged

U

SERM charged with afcribing the most to the XIII. Power of Men's own Wills, did not per

haps (as their Adverfaries conceived) intend to derogate any thing from Men's true Dependance upon God: For it cannot be imagined that any reasonable Men fhould contend, (neither did their Argument require it,) that any One should in any Action, or in any Degree, be Independent on his Maker. On the other fide; whatever be fuppofed to be the Power and Efficacy of the Grace of God, even where it has the most effectual Influence; yet it must upon no account be understood to be fuch as to over-rule the Liberty of Men's Will and Choice, and render their Actions necessary; because This would be to remove the whole Foundation of Religion, by entirely deftroying the Morality of Men's ActiOs, and taking away the very Nature of Virtue and Vice. Since therefore neither the Influence of the Divine Grace, nor the proper Power of Men in the use of their natural Faculties, can without an evident contradiction be denied; it follows unavoidably, that the

Grace

Grace of God must of neceffity always be SER M. understood to have the nature of a moral XIII.

Affiftance only, which does perfectly a-
gree with Men's Free ufe of their Facul-
ties; and that it is not in the nature of a
phyfical compulfion, which is altogether
inconfiftent with Men's doing any thing
themselves. The Apostle perfectly ex-
preffes this whole Notion, in the Words
of the Text: Work out your own Salva-
tion with Fear and Trembling; for it is
God that worketh in you both to will and
to do, of his good pleasure. He does not
fay, Work out your own Salvation your-
felves, as having no Need of the Grace
of God: Neither does he fay on the con-
trary, The Grace of God worketh All in
you, and therefore ye need not to do any thing
yourselves: But, afcribing to each part
its proper Office, he fays, Work ye out
your own Salvation, because the Grace
of God (the Motives and Affistances
of the Gospel) gives you Power fo to
so
do.

THE principal Argument alledged by
Thofe, who think the Influence of the
Divine Grace to be fo efficacious as to ne-
U 2
ceffitate