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and general view of military transactions. Human | the vengeance of England, if she prevails, it is fully affairs, indeed, are so often conducted by accident, that men, and nations sometimes blunder into success. But he is not a wise man, who, in his previous reckoning, takes the good fortune of blunders into his account. And it is the illumination of the man of enlarged and general views, combined with the faculty of applying, by practical experience, the results of general thought to the peculiarities of the instant case, that the issue of any exploit can be ensured, as far as human power and sagacity are competent to ensure.

as much reserved against the spirit of insurrection in Paris, and fully as necessary as against the vengeance of England. And if their brethren are cut to pieces on the shores of England, their efforts will not be very vigorous against the heroic destroyers on the banks of the Rhine. Let it however be distinctly understood that the sole object of England is to drive them within their ancient limits; and there to leave them to their own disposal. Then the question immediately occurs to every one of them, what are we fighting for? And it will occur with peculiar force, On these grounds we do not hesitate to throw out as soon as the vanity, for the gratification of which a few thoughts which have occurred to us on the they fight at present, is repressed by a discomfiture means of conquering the French, should they be in England. With regard to the assistance too exbrought face to face with us on our own shores. They pected from the inhabitants of the new territories of are delivered as thoughts, not as maxims. It is the France, it is not sufficient to deliver them from the duty of every man, by his head, and by his hand, to tyranny of Frenchmen, if you deliver them over to contribute his share to the defence of the inestimable something, almost equally detested. It is now time blessings, which, if we do not defend them with a to speak out. If you propose to give up these terriresolution to live or die along with them, will ine- tories to the wretched governments which formerly vitably be wrested from us. And if the professional harrassed and oppressed them, do not look for the men will only attend to what is wisely told them, and co-operation of the people. But secure to them inmature the whole by the skill which is the fruit of dependence from native as well as from foreign their experience, the era of British greatness, of the tyrants; let the conquering energy of Great Britain unrivalled glory, and undisputed preponderance of be pledged to grant them the choice of a free governour native country, is only about to commence. Forment, and they will fly to your standards. The should we conquer Bonaparte on British ground, we Dutch refused to join you; and so they ought; beconquer not only for the defence of Britain, but for cause with equal folly and injustice you pretended to the degradation of France. The destruction of a impose upon them a government, which they acFrench army landed on the British shores is such a counted not less detestable than that from which you blow to France as she has not sustained since the day wished to deliver them. But on the terms, which we of Agincourt. She dwindles immediately into a have now proposed, the Dutch, Flemings, Germans, power of the second order. The enchantment which Swiss, Italians, will eagerly join you, to shake off, at present surrounds her is instantly broken. Her the degrading yoke under which they at present revolutionary spirit and enterprize goes. Already her groan; and the territorial limits of monarchical revolutionary means are exhausted. And Britain may France may be prescribed to her under whatever follow up the fortunate atchievement by any enterprize government republican, directorial, consular, regal, which it pleases. We hope, we are sure, it will not or imperial she may chuse to exist. attempt a conquest of France; we hope, we are sure, the nation will not permit a renewal of the nefarious attempt to impose a government upon France. But it may, and it ought to follow up its glorious success, by sending its victorious army to the banks of the Rhine, and by chasing the French from their ill-gotten possessions, with the abhorrence and execration following them of all the miserable people over whom their cruel sceptre has been extended. Then is Great Britain placed on an eminence indeed conspicuous. Then, if she uses her preponderance with wisdom and moderation, is she set up the object of the admi- || ration and love of the whole earth.

We speak with confidence, when we say, that upon the destruction of a French army in Britain, the re-conquest of the new dominions of France will be an easy enterprize. The natives will rise to a man, if any thing resembling encouragement is held out to them. For if ever human beings were oppressed to the last pitch of endurance, they have been, by the lying, gasconading tyrants, who have overrun their country. As for the hundred thousand men, said to be reserved on the west coast of France, after the departure of the army of England, as a defence against

VOL. II.

A more effectual plan for her own reduction could not have been devised by France, than the invasion of England, provided it does not succeed. The military energies of Great Britain are called forth to a degree in which they hardly ever have been before, and at a vast expense. Being called forth, being in action, and having mastered the first great affair, shall they not be employed in something worthy of them? Never before was Great Britain in a condition to strike so important a blow upon the continent; because she never had on foot so great a force. Being; placed in perfect security by the destruction of the invading army of France, it will certainly be in her power to make some great and salutary changes upon, the continent. For such objects as these shall not every British nerve be strung? The preservation of our own invaluable privileges ought to inspire every a man in the island with the resolution to fight behind every hedge, and to die in the last ditch. To be preserved from the oppression of a vain, insulting, rapa.; cious, and merciless enemy, ought to rouse the most sluggish to exertion. Not only to defend ourselves, but to have an opportunity put into our hands of res toring the balance of Europe, and of placing our

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selves in a state of unparalleled dignity among nations, gentlemen, but incapable, by their ignorance and ught to call forth all the intellect, and all the courage, frivolity, of the higher functions of their profession; and all the perseverance which is in the nation.in short, better fitted" to caper nimbly in a lady's We shall owe it to the goodness of an overruling chamber to the lascivious pleasing of a lute," than to providence, caring for the peace, the happiness, and spend sleepless nights and days in combining by prothe improvement of mankind, to have put it into the found meditation the means of defeating the enterHeart of the disturber of Europe to rush headlong prizes of an adventurous and powerful enemy. upon his destruction. It is for the interest of the Some other instances of promotion have been menhuman race that a revolutionary army should be tioned, which bear too much the marks of interest, landed on the shores of England; the greater, the and favour. We hope report is false. But the eyes better; we shall more easily conquer them here than of the nation are at this moment earnestly bent on its any where else; and afterwards we shall have the less rulers. If there are any individuals whom selfish remaining to do. Did it not appear presumptuous to motives shall appear to govern at a crisis like the preinterfere with the mysterious and awful decisions of sent, they will not escape the vengeance of an indigthe Great Disposer, whose designs in the affairs of nant country. Let us, however, augur nothing but nations appear still more inscrutable than in those of good either in conduct or the event. individuals, we would offer up to him our modest, but earnest request, that the Gallican chief, and a hundred thousand of his followers, might quickly be embarked upon the ocean, and committed to the chance of the winds and the waves, and the hands of British sailors and soldiers. This is the event, which, in our opinion it is at the present moment most our interest to implore. By this shall we obtain the greatest advantage over our enemy. Here, of all places in the world, shall we fight him with best hopes of success. And here of all places in the world will a defeat be most fatal to him.

Some of the measures of defence lately proposed we hear of with the highest approbation. The scheme of stationing flat-bottomed boats, mounted with heavy ordinance, on all the shoals, and before the harbours on the east coast of England, is admirable, and must have a powerful effect in annoying a landing enemy. An additional guard-ship, it is said, is to be posted at the mouth of every harbour, from the Frith of Forth to the Thames. Among an army of men in open boats, even this may do awful execution. Another proposal to be made, it is said, by the secretary at war, is to train the people at large, from the age of 14 to that of 45, to the use of arms. If this plan is executed with wisdom, its effects will be most important. The great difficulty will be in providing the requisite number of teachers. The people may be trained in their own houses; and called out on particular days, without greatly interfering with the industry of the country. The security then granted to our island, when every man within it is fitted, and disposed to start forward in its defence, is complete, and our whole disposeable force is ready to be sent to the continent, to complete our schemes, as soon as ever we have subdued the foe at home.

There are some other parts of the conduct of government which seem to us to deserve reprehension. It has been asserted in the public papers, and never contradicted, that out of 32 officers on the staff, 28 have been chosen from the guards. That there are good officers in the guards no man doubts. But we will state what we do know; that it is the opinion of the country at large, that the officers of the guards as a body, instead of being at the head of their profession, are rather at the bottom of it. It is understood that they are men corrupted by the dissipation of London, very honourable, and very agreeable

Suppose the enemy landed, and the moment of action arrived; it is our opinion that with all possible, expedition the matter should be brought to the decision of the bayonet. It is this in general which at last determines the fate of the day. And with this instrument Britons have a decided advantage. Their firm intrepidity is much more to be depended upon than the impetuosity of the French, inspired by flattery, and brandy. Their bodily strength is here, an important advantage. Britons are much better fed, and much stronger men than the French; and, it is scarcely saying too much, that every Briton, at an average, in real corporeal force, is a match for two Frenchmen. This tells prodigiously in the charge with the bayonet. But in firing, the puniest Frenchman in the ranks is a match for the stoutest Englishman; or rather, as he is generally more nimble, and, handy, he can fire quicker, and is thus an overmatch. It is surely foolish then to lose our time in the unfavourable mode of battle, when we can bring the matter to that in which we have great superiority.

Another point, which we have no doubt is attended to by our military men, but to which they will not be the worse for having their attention increased by the repeated calls of their country, is the nature of the force with which they will have to meet the enemy. Every man they lead on will have courage equal and superior to that of the enemy. But a great part of them will be inexperienced; and inexperience prevents the unity of exertions, and destroys the confidence that is necessary in the co-operation of numbers. Numbers only serve to augment the confusion of inexperienced troops. The nature of the enemy too is to be taken into account, active and enterprizing, remarkable for their skill in throwing their opponents into disorder, and for the audacity of their movements.

Suppose 100,000 Britons assembled to oppose. 50,000 French. No man knows any thing of military affairs, who is not acquainted with the extreme diffi culty of preserving regularity and integrity in the movements of such a body of men as this. With inexperienced troops it is impossible. This the French found at the beginning of the late war, and changed, in consequence, their mode of fighting. Those who have attended to their proceedings know that they engage in columns, and have been successful chiefly, from the multiplicity of their attacks, and the rapidity

of their movements. Even at this moment, it is the opinion of the most skilful military men, that were they to give battle in regular order, they would be beaten by a less numerous army of Austrians, commanded by an able general. By breaking, however, the army into separate bodies, the movements of each body is much more easily managed. And it belongs to the intelligence of the officers to make these bodies co-operate, though acting separately, to the attainment of the same object.

cumstances of the case, your objections against the plan of raising the army of reserve by ballot, in my opinion, belong to that class. Yet as you allow, that this measure, however bad, cruel, and unjust it appears to you, would be justified by necessity, but deny the existence of that necessity, the point at issue between us, must naturally hinge upon the truth or fallacy of the grounds on which you found your assertion, that no such necessity exists.

Common sense, then, seems to dictate, that something of the same kind should be done with the English army. The 100,000 men stated above, should be divided into five or six bodies, according to the strength of the enemy, and the nature of the ground. Instead of moving on in an entire and ungovernable mass, the greater part of which could have no share in the combat, and would only augment the confusion and disorder, they ought to attack the French successively and without intermission. Great care, at the same time, ought to be taken, not to deprive those who are to make the attack of the confidence ever resulting from the idea of the propinquity and co-operation of another corps. Great use too might be made of the troops waiting for action, in taking up the attention of the enemy, and harrassing him by threatened attacks on different points. But the chief object would be to have them ever ready to cover the retreat of such of their own troops as might be repulsed. Many precautions, at the same time would be necessary, to pre-nuities but rapine and plunder. So much for arguments vent one corps in its retreat from drawing on another. A chief part of the discipline given to the troops ought to be to familiarize them to the idea and to the practice of falling back, of being received by their friends, of forming again in the rear, and returning with new courage to the charge.

The extreme temerity with which the French expose themselves, we have no doubt, will be taken full advantage of by the activity and enterprize of our commanders. How often would that temerity, by which they gained such advantages, have ruined them in the last war, had not the slow movements of the Austrians, and the pedantic strictness with which they adhere to their tactics, prevented them from profiting by such opportunities!

And here, Sir, I must be permitted to express my astonishment at the strange manner in which you support your assertion. You deny the existence of the necessity, which, in your judgment, would justify the measure you disapprove, because an experiment has not yet been made, which was never tried before in this country, but which, in your belief, is so evidently infallible, that you stake your life on the success. Convinced as I am of the certain failure of that experiment, I most sincerely congratulate you on the rapid progress of the bill in question now passed into Law, which must prevent the plan you proposed from being put to the test. My conviction arises not only "from what we know of human nature," but also from experience. An inducement, which is to act as a charm on the human mind, must hold forth some speedy enjoyment. Place any number of years between the stimulus and the action, and the spell is dissolved. The Corsican "Anti-Christ of Providence" orders these things better; he holds out to his satellites no an drawn from "what we know of human nature;" my following remark rests on unquestionable experience. I am intimately acquainted with a foreign service, where every private soldier, after having served his country a certain number of years, enjoys an annuity for life, which, taking into account the vast difference in the prices of all necessaries of life, is fully equivalent to the annuity you propose. Now, sir, take my word of honour for it, that notwithstanding the charm of an annuity for life, which appears to you irrę sistible, the recruiting service is beset with as many difficulties there, as it is in this country, and it costs as much trouble to fill up vacancies, as it does here.

But, sir, let us suppose for a moment, your plan for raising the army of reserve to be feasible, let us suppose fifty thousand recruits sprung up as mush

On the Objections, in our last, to the mode of raising rooms under the genial influence of an annuity for the Army of Reserve.

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life, how do you mean to bring your fifty thousand annuitants into actual service?" By filling up with

MR. EDITOR, Permit me to communicate to you a few observa-them the old regiments." Making all reasonable allowfions, which on an attentive perusal of your strictures on the intended mode of raising the army of reserve by ballot, have presented themselves to my mind. Although I am decidedly of opinion, that the present crisis calls not for argument, but exertion, and that from the known character of our inveterate foe, the proposed means of defence, instead of being dragged through the ordeal of opprobrious censure, should be carried into effect with the utmost expedition, yet I also conceive, that objections against a public measure of such extreme importance should not pass unnoticed, if they rest on no solid foundation.

I am free to confess, that considering all the cir

ance for the heat of composition in pursuing a fa-
vourite argument, I am at a loss to conceive how it
happened, that on writing down this strange concep-
tion, you were not forcibly struck by the grievous in-
convenience, which must necessarily arise from the
jealousy excited by the distinction granted according
to your plan to raw recruits over old disciplined troops,
in the shade of whose arms they are to be trained for
action. I have witnessed the most baneful effects of
a similar jealousy subsisting among troops brigaded for
actual service, and that on slighter grounds than the
above distinction.
H. N.

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We have inserted the preceding letter of objections | titled to assert, that recruiting for the regular service to our observations on the mode of raising the army would be ineffectual to answer the present emergency, of reserve, because we think them as strong as any because not a single experiment had been made to objections which we have yet heard to those observa-shew what could thus be done. Our objector is pleations, and because we think it not improbable that some others of our readers may have fallen into the same errors with this gentleman.

sed to make us say, that we disapprove of the ballot, because a particular experiment proposed by us has not been tried. This is fair and sensible at one and the same time. After mentioning our opinion, that it was possible, by means which might be devised, to raise men voluntarily for the present service, we said that even the expedient of large bounties, we were persuaded, would be sufficient. We stated a mode of giving a bounty, which we thought would have peculiar good effects, to wit, by an annuity for life after five years service. Against this the thunders of the gentleman's rhetoric are turned. His objections are two. The first is, that it would not be an induce

Our objections to the mode of raising the army of reserve were that it was partial, and by consequence unjust, that this partiality fell with a most gailing weight upon certain individuals, and that by consequence the injustice rose in many cases to cruelty. To these observations the objector advances not a syllable in reply. He has not the candour to admit their justice in words. But he in fact confesses them to be unanswerable, when, with all the warmth which he manifests, he passes them without attempting an answer. If a measure be partial, unjust, and in its operationment sufficient to bring men to enlist. He says he cruel, we should think a wise man would be of opi- knows from human nature, that the prospect of enjoy.nion that the proof of its necessity ought to be very ing free for life, 121. a year at the end of five years, clearly made out, before it should be attempted to be would have little or no effect upon the mind of a poor put in execution. We should think he would allow man. We, who know a good deal about our countrytoo, that the duty of proving its necessity lay with men, and with what diligence many of them labour, those who proposed it; and that those whom it af- and save to lay up a provision for their old age; with fected were well entitled to object against it, till this what zeal, too, friendly societies, which deprive them proof were afforded them. We denied that this proof of a portion of their present enjoyment, for the sake had been afforded by the promoters of the bill. Our of future subsistence, are formed, know that such a objector does not presume to say that it was. He is notion of human nature does not apply to Britons. only angry at us for disapproving of it on account of He says he knows a service abroad, where, though anthe want of this proof. His first duty, in such a case,nuities are granted, recruiting is difficult. We too was to have supplied the proof which we complained was wanting. This he has not attempted.

know something of that service; and we know that the objector ought to have stated some of the many miseries and hardships which attend that service, and more than counterbalance all the annuity.

We went a little further than to say that proof was wanting of the pretended necessity. We stated our opinion that the necessity did not exist; that means might be devised so to animate the recruiting service,nience arising from the inequality of advantages. as to procure a regular force, of equal value with the army of reserve, in a time as short as would be necessary for embodying that ariny. Does our objector offer a shadow of reason to shew that such means were not to be found? Not the slightest. And we can assure him, and we have conversed with not a few, that we have not met with an individual who doubts that such means might have been found.

The gentleman's second objection is the inconvegranted to the soldiers. In all the heat of composition, we felt this to be a difficulty when we threw out the idea; nor did we propose it as a scheme to be adopted, but as a hint, to shew those whose business it is to mature schemes, that means were not exhausted, but that still many plans would present themselves to an inquiring and fertile mind, to obtain the force which we wanted, in the best of manners, by volun

the charges. We knew too, and the objector ought to have remembered, that the present is a great emergency, and that we did not propose this as a good plan, but only as a better than that of the ballot. We know further, that the difficulty complained of existed in the bill as it stood. The army of reserve was raised for only 5 years, and not to serve out of the kingdom. The objection of our correspondent is equally strong against this. Does he not know, besides, that even inequality of pay is already admitted in the army? Does he not know how much higher the pay of the guards is than that of the rest of the soldiers? Can there be any motive for rewarding the guards in this manner, greater than for rewarding those who should come forward to their country in the present emergency?

We were not satisfied with stating our opinion, that|tary enlisting, and a fair and equal impost to defray it was possible to raise recruits for the regular service, to answer the exigence of the case, we proceeded to state some of the means, which, it appeared to us upon a slight view, would be effectual for raising them The whole of the objections of the author of the letter are against these means. He says that the means which we mentioned, as fitted speedily to procure recruits for the regular service, are foolish. They may be so. But he is a sorry reasoner, who, like our letter-writer, shall, without any more proof, conclude that recruits could not be procured, and that the mode of raising a force by ballot was inevitable. Pray, although the means which we pointed out should be bad, are there no other means which might be good? Or is our objection invalidated till this be established? Why did not the gentleman proceed to prove that there were no other means, after stating his objections to ours.

We said that the proposers of the bill were not en

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POLITICS.

Historical Review of Political Occurrences. The events of chief importance in the first part of this month are the preparations for hostilities between France and England. Parliament has been principally engaged in passing the bill for raising the army of reserve, which has been at last enacted into a law with-dividual voluntarily to act in a desultory warfare in out any material alterations from the original state in which it was proposed. The measures of finance too brought forward by the minister to provide supplies for the present emergency, have been in progress through the two houses, but the most important of them, the tax on income, is not yet passed, as is the case with some others.

dreds, and through them to the superintendants of parishes.

The first head of their resolutions refers to the dri

ving of the country within 15 miles of the coast. Under the second head it is proposed to every in

A project of enrolling sea fencibles, for the defence of the coasts, has been devised. It is to comprise all fishermen, and other persons occupied in the ports, and on the coast, who from their occupations are not liable to be impressed. The coast is divided into certain districts, and put under the command of post captains and commanders, with a proportionate number of lieutenants. Eighty-eight post captains are nominated, and their districts of command assigned.

Regulations have been issued with respect to the providing of supplies for the army, and the removal of property, in case of invasion, with regard to the formation of corps of guides, and of pioneers, and of all voluntary co-operation on the part of the people. A letter, too, from the commander in chief has been distributed to the general officers having the command of districts, requiring their efforts in assisting his majesty's lieutenants to carry these regulations into execution. One particular, the formation of voluntary companies of the inhabitants, his royal highness recommends strongly. They should be formed of no greater numbers of men than are known to each other, should act under the direction of a man known to every individual in the country. Such companies, he says, knowing accurately the country, might do important service in harrassing the enemy, firing upon his advanced posts, and cutting off his foraging parties, without exposing themselves to any greater danger than their own bravery might prompt them to encounter. Notice, besides, has been given by the secretary at war, of an additional measure of defence, to be proposed to parliament, which is understood to refer to the training a great portion of the people to the use of arms.

Recourse has been had to the unusual measure of impressing landsmen for the sea-service. Orders have been issued to the patrole parties of all the police officers, and many persons, under the denomination of idle and disorderly, have been sent on board the ten

ders.

At a meeting, held at Canterbury on the 2d, of the deputy-lieutenants and magistrates of the county of Kent, attended by the commanding officer of the district, and a great proportion of the noblemen and gentlemen of the county, the following system of operations was adopted :-The county to be formed into divisions, each under a deputy-lieutenant; each hundred to be placed under a competent inspector; and each parish under a superintendant, with such agents as they may chuse; all orders to be conveyed through the hentenants of division to the inspectors of hun

aid of the regular force; to class themselves for this purpose, into bodies of from 25 to 35 men, to select one from among themselves as lieutenant or leader, recommended by the Lord-lieutenant, and approved by the King;-to receive pay, officers and privates, if mounted as yeomanry; if on foot as volunteer infantry.

The third head refers to pioneers. The unarmed inhabitants are called upon to form themselves into companies of not less than 25, and not more than 75, to come provided; if possible, with pickaxes, spades or shovels, bill-hooks, and felling axes; have leaders chosen from among themselves; and to be paid according to the rate of labour in the county; the officers at somewhat a higher rate.

to

The fifth head contains the regulations for obtaining the use of waggons, &c.

And the 6th,,th, and 8th heads contain forms of papers, to be sent respectively to millers, bakers, and the masters of the barges and boats, to obtain. their co-operation for the service of the army.

Numerous bodies of volunteers are formed in every part of the country. No fewer than 23,000 are said to be embodied in Scotland alone; 8,000 additional marines have been voted; and the magistrates of London have voted and published resolutions recommending that volunteer armed associations of all men between the ages of 18 and 45 be raised, and regularly trained in every ward, and that all the house-holders and inhabitants above the age of 45 be enrolled in a corps to serve as constables, to co-operate with the volunteer corps.

We

In France, Bonaparte has set out upon his parading expedition through the northern parts of France, and her newly acquired dominions; and every where receives the most prostitute adulation. With regard. to the real state of preparation for invading this country, we are very imperfectly informed. hear of numerous voluntary proposals to erect flatbottomed boats, the half of which will not be carried into execution. The papers are filled with gasconading speeches of the facility of conquering England,. and of the zeal of all classes of men to accomplish this object. But we hear nothing of the numerous and bitter complaints against the government, and. the ruinous schemes of the Consul, which are uttered in the dark. Even the French papers however are ashamed to conceal altogether the aversion of the people to submit to the forced levies for recruiting. the army, and that they even cut off their fingers to escape the service.

The most forcible hostile measure which has yet been attempted on our part is the blockade of the Elbe, so long as its navigation is in the power of the French. An active warfare is carried on by our cruizers against the shipping of France, and every day prizes are sent in. One of the most remarkable occurrences which has yet taken place is the capture

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