Secondly, The disposition is changed. The simple perception of an object by no means ensures the approbation of it. Two persons similarly educated, viewing the same object from the same point, may be differently affected. Their perception of it, and the disposition they severally feel respecting it, may, indeed, co-exist; nay, are, perhaps, inseparable. They are, however, distinguishable, and should therefore be considered separately. The same remarks are applicable to spiritual things. It is not sufficient that my understanding is compelled by the overwhelming force of evidence to admit the existence of the Deity, I must love him. It is not sufficient to perceive myself to be a moral delinquent, I must endeavour to escape the consequences. Nor will it suffice for me to be informed of a mediatorI must actually employ him as such, and engage him in my behalf by complying with the terms which he has prescribed. But all these, and much more, clearly re quire a corresponding state of mind; a state which is obviously not natural to man, for then all would exercise it, since each follows his own. Nor is it less clear that the Scriptures attribute the change of it to the Spirit of God; wrought in a manner, it is believed, perfectly analogous to the natural operations of the human mind. For, as it cannot be maintained that the will possesses a self-determining power without admitting an affect produced without a cause; nor that moral liberty consists in indifference, since willing or choosing is the result of preference, every choice must, it would seem, depend upon some previously disposing cause. This I denominate disposition. Should it be asked what is intended by disposition, it is replied, "That persuasion or commands, the hopes of future rewards or the dread of future punishment, are effectual in producing different events, according to the different circumstances in which these powers are supposed to exert their ener gies; and that it is absolutely necessary here, as in other cases, to attend very exactly to these circumstances, in order to judge of the effects which they will have upon the human mind. These circumstances we usually denominate by one word, the disposition of the moral agent, and we have no other method of ascertaining the nature of this disposition than, as in other cases, by repeated observations. In fact, by the term disposition, we can only mean something in the composition of man, the nature of which we are utterly unacquainted with; but which is materially concerned in the production of volitions. We are sure that this unintelligible something really exists, because the same external incitements to virtue and vice have very different effects upon different persons: and to what can we so reasonably ascribe a difference of operation in the same motives, as to some essential difference in the structure of the choosing principle? You may as well deny the existence of that power by which bodies tend to the centre of the earth, as affirm that all minds are constituted precisely alike, when the same exhortations and threatenings evidently produce distinct thoughts and resolutions, with an endless variety."6 And as there is a close analogy between the natural and spiritual world, truth cannot be at variance with itself; the Scriptures therefore, addressing us in the language of common life, use the terms able and unable, can and cannot, not only in a physical, but also in a moral sense, as expressive of disposition or of indisposition. Thus our Lord, "Ye hypocrites, ye can discern the face of the sky, but ye cannot (où dúvaole, ye are not disposed to) discern the signs of the times." The very epithet applied by the gracious Redeemer to the Pharisees and Saducees determines the sense of the word rendered, "can 6 Essay on Human Liberty, by the late J. Milner, D.D., Dean of Carlisle, and Presi dent of Queen's College, not." They could not, only because they were indisposed. "Are ye able (dúvaole, (δύνασθε, disposed) to drink of the cup that I shall drink of?" &c. "They say unto him, we are able, (duváμela, disposed,) and he said unto them, ye shall indeed drink of my cup," &c. The reply of our Lord determines the sense of the word able. "No man can (dúvarat, is disposed to) come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him."9 The nature of the inability expressed by the term can, is indicated by the term draw; and which our Lord expresses in another form, but with the same meaning, "Ye will not come to me, that ye might have life." And in the same sense, to give weight to the argument, must, it would seem, the following passage be understood. "The Spirit of truth, whom the world cannot (ou dúvarai, is not disposed to) receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him." 8 Matt. xx. 22, 23. 9 John vi. 44. "2 1 John v. 40. 21, &c. |