found the American General, Maxwell, at the head of the Jerfey brigade, and reinforced by all the militia which in a few hours could be collected, well posted at that place. Whether it proceeded from Maxwell's good countenance and pofition, or from whatever other caufe, fo it was, that the army halted; and continued on the fame ground until night, without advancing. The Americans, however, though inferior in ftrength, did not permit them by any means to hold their poft in quiet; and a very confiderable and continual firing, without coming at any time to close action, was kept up during the day. The report in the British line was, that they only waited for the coming up of the waggons and neceffaries which were in the rear.

Whatever the caufe was, the defign of attacking Springfield' was given up, and the army returned to Elizabeth Town in the night. They were purfued by the enemy, as foon as day rofe, all the way to that place; and they were now grown fo eager and confident as boldly to attack the 22d regiment, which was pofted at fome fmall distance in the front of the line. That reigment being ordered to fall back on their approach, was purfued with great rapidity by the enemy, who confidered it as the rear-guard of a retiring army, whofe van, they fuppofed, was then pafling over to Staten Island. The reception they met, and the appearances they difcovered, foon convinced them of their error, and they retired with precipitation.

It is not eafy to account for the inaction in the firft inftance at

Springfield, any more than for the fubfequent retreat. Undoubtedly, fo much refolution on the part of the Americans, was not expected; and it appears from subsequent circumftances, that although no direct attack had been made, the afternoon of that day was bufy and warm. It was faid, that intelligence had been received, of Wathington's having detached a brigade from Morris-town for the fupport of Maxwell; that the appearances at his head quarters indicated a determination of making that fupport effectual; that Maxwell had already been reinforced by fome neighbouring regiments; and that the country was every where in motion. The expedition itfelf had probably its origin from fome of thofe delufive reprefentations, which had fo often led to mischievous or unreputable purfuits, concerning either the favourable difpofition of the country to the royal caufe, or the fuppofed weak and contemptible ftate of the American forces."

It was reported at New York, that the Heffian General Knyphaufen was ftrongly of opinion, and eagerly difpofed, to attack the poft at Springfield; but that he had been over-ruled by another commander; and this report received fo much credit, that it was made the foundation of fome illnatured pafquinades upon the subject. However these things might be, the Jerfey militia and brigade, with whatever other corps were concerned on the occafion, received public acknowledgments and high praife from Washington, for their behaviour in that day's fervice.

The arrival of Sir Henry Clinton,

ton, which happened immediately after, made no change in the fituation of the royal forces, who ftill maintained their poft at Elizabeth Town. That commander, on the contrary, determined to improve on the original defign, and to afford them an opportunity of acting with effect. For this purpofe, troops were embarked at New York, and fuch movements took place among the fhipping, and fuch preparations were made, as indicated an immediate expedition up the North River, This produced the defired effect in alarming Washington; who being exceedingly apprehenfive for the fafety of Weft Point, and other strong holds in the Highlands, immediately marched with the greater part of his army, to fecure thofe, to him, invaluable pofts. June 23d.

This point being gained, the forces at Elizabeth Town again advanced on their former track towards Springfield. Whatever the original defign might have been, the general's views feemed now to have been extended, to the getting poffeffion, during the abfence of Washington with his main force, of the ftrong country of Moriffania, which had fo often afforded a fecure retreat, and an inexpugnable camp, to that commander. At any rate, if it was not found convenient to retain pofts at fuch a diftance, the deftruction of his ftores, magazines, and defences in the mountains, would have been .no inconfiderable object.

On the part of the Americans, General Greene, with Stark's and the Jersey brigades, fupported by the neighbouring militia, were VOL. XXIV.

left to guard thofe difficult hills and defiles, which conftitute the ftrength of the country. Springfield lay at their feet; and led directly to fome of the principal paffes. The royal troops advanced with rapidity to this place; where they found the bridge, which led to the village, occupied by a small party of about 170 men, under the conduct of a Col. Angel. That officer, turning all the advantages afforded by his fituation (which were many) to the beft account, defended his poft with great gallantry. With that handful of men, he obftinately maintained the bridge, against a prodigious fuperiority of force, and the moft fpirited attacks, for a quarter of an hour. Finding himself at length overpowered, and no relief appearing, he ftill found means to carry off the remainder of his detachment, and even to fave the wounded; nearly one fourth of his whole number being by that time killed or difabled. The British troops fuffered more in this trifling affair than could have been expected.

Greene lay, at that time, at Short Hills, about a mile above Springfield. But his troops were fo divided in guarding their refpective pofts, and the attack fo unexpected and sudden, that he could not make any detachment in time and fufficient for the fupport of Angel, without hazard. ing the fecurity of the much more important poft which he himfelf occupied. Whether it proceeded from indignation and refentment, at the refiftance and lofs which the troops unexpectedly met at the bridge, or from whatever other cause it was, Spring[B]

field

field experienced the fame fate with the Connecticut farms; the whole village, excepting four houfes, was reduced to afhes.

This conflagration clofed the enterprize. The ftrength of Greene's fituation, the difficulties of the approach, an ignorance, probably, of the state of his immediate force (which, at that time, amounted only to about a thoufand men), and, perhaps, the bold defence made at the bridge, all concurred, in preventing the British officers from attempting the pafs at Short Hills. It is likewife probable, that the day was confidered as being too far advanced, to admit of their profiting properly of any advantage which they might obtain; and that it was deemed too great a hazard, to involve the army during the night in the faftnetles of a dangerous country; and furrounded on every fide by enemies, whofe force, pofition, and distance, were all equally unknown. The troops were befides without cover or receffaries; and the keeping of a communication open with Elizabeth Town, might have been not lefs impracticable than dangerous.

Under fome or all of thefe impretions, the royal army made a fecond retreat from Springfield, and returned on that evening to Elizabeth Town; they being purfued with great spirit, and redoubled animofity, by the country militia, who were highly enraged at the conflagration which they had juft beheld; but a firong and well conducted rear-guard, rendered their efforts in a great meafure ineffective. The royal forces paffed over on the fame night to Staten Island; while Washington

continued to be amused for some days longer, with the appearances of an expedition up the North River, which probably had not been at all intended.

Thus ended the fhort campaign in the Jerfies. These ineffective attempts, by a force which would once have been deemed capable of sweeping the whole continent before it, fufficiently manifefted, that the practical habits of fervice and danger, without any thing near abfolute perfection in difcipline, will place all troops nearly upon an equality. It was now evident, that the British forces had an enemy little lefs respectable in the field than themselves to encounter; and that any difference which yet remained in their favour would be daily leffened. In a word, it was now obvious, that all that fuperiority in arms, which produced fuch effects at the beginning of the conteft, was, in a great measure, at an end; and that the events of the war must in the future depend upon fortune, and upon the abilities of the refpective commanders.

Such were the unwelcome truths, which if not now first discovered, were at least now fully established. Washington fhewed no small degree of exultation in his public orders, upon the great improve ment in difcipline of the troops and militia, with the happy effects which it had produced, and the greater which he ftill hoped. But he did not augur greater benefits from the perfection or courage of the troops, than from that unequalled ardour, which, he said, at prefent animated all orders of the people.

The matter of fact was, that

the

the lofs of Charles-Town produced a directly contrary effect to that which might have been naturally expected. For instead of depreffing and finking the minds of the people, to feek for fecurity by any means, and to fue for peace upon any terms, the lofs being now come home to every man's feelings, and the danger to his door, they were at once awakened to a vigour of exertion, fcarcely to be expected in their circumftances; and which had hardly appeared in the fame degree, fince the first, or at most, the fecond year of the conteft. For in the intermediate time, the firft heat of paffion being over, men who were not actively concerned, were fond of recurring to their wonted eafe, and foon refumed their usual habits of life; and the din of war being faintly heard at a diftance, they were contented to contribute to its fupport by opening their purfes, without much tormenting their minds in the contemplation of an odious fubject. And as the bitterness of contention was allayed, and the traces of paft grievance or injury faded on the memory, fo the fpirit of enterprize had proportionally flackened; particularly in thofe colonies where it was not kept alive by immediate hoftility.

Many concurring caufes and circumftances ferved to increase and fupport that fpirit which now appeared among the Americans. The very lofs of Charles - Town became a ground of hope, and an incitement to vigour, from the wide feparation which it had caufed of the British forces, and the confequent incapacity of their divided armies to fupport each

other. But the expectation of a ftrong naval and military force from France, by the aid of which, they hoped to retaliate on New. York for the lofs of CharlesTown, and even to clear the continent entirely of the British forces, could not but have had a much greater effect.

In the mean time, their principal leaders, as well as the Congrefs, omitted no means to encourage and to profit of the rifing fpirit, and to cherish in the people the moft fanguine hopes. Letters were written by a committee of that body, which were ftrengthened and enforced by thofe from the commander in chief, General Reed, and fome other popular commanders, to the different executive governments, to the people at large, and to particular colonies, ftimulating them by every motive to the speedy furnishing their refpective quotas. The ditgrace of appearing contemptible in the eyes of their great ally, and the mifchief and ruin which muft be the confequence, of their being incapable to benefit of his intentions in their favour, were ftrongly urged. And the people were pathonately called upon, not to fuffer the curfe of another campaign to reft upon America! The eyes of all Europe were upon them; and their future independence, fortune, and happiness, as they faid, depended upon their prefent exertion.

Thefe remonftrances produced a confiderable effect upon the different governments, and feemed to operate no lefs upon individuals. Many arts were used to keep up the fpirit. Large fubferiptions were made by private

[B12

perfons