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sufficient: and going farther seems beyond the utmost reach of our faculties.

But it may be said, that, "after all, these supposed impossibilities and relations are what we are unacquainted with; and we must judge of religion, as of other things, by what we do know, and look upon the rest as nothing: or, however, that the answers here given to what is objected against religion, may equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it; since their stress lies so very much upon our ignorance," But,

First, Though total ignorance in any matter does indeed equally destroy, or rather preclude, all proof concerning it, and objections against it; yet partial ignorance does not. For we may in any degree be convinced, that a person is of such a character, and consequently will pursue such ends; though we are greatly ignorant what is the proper way of acting, in order, the most effectually, to obtain those ends; and in this case, objections against his manner of acting, as seemingly not conducive to obtain them, might be answered by our ignorance; though the proof that such ends were intended, might not at all be invalidated by it. Thus, the proof of religion is a proof of the moral character of God; and, consequently, that his government is moral, and that every one, upon the whole, shall receive according to his deserts: a proof that this is the designed end of his government. But we are not competent judges what is the proper way of acting, in order the most effec

tually to accomplish this end. Therefore our ignorance is an answer to objections against the conduct of Providence, in permitting irregularities, as seeming contradictory to this end. Now, since it is so obvious, that our ignorance may be a satisfactory answer to objections against a thing, and yet not affect the proof of it; till it can be shewn, it is frivolous to assert, that our ignorance invalidates the proof of religion, as it does the objections against it.

Secondly, Suppose unknown impossibilities, and unknown relations, might justly be urged to invalidate the proof of religion, as well as to answer objections against it; and that, in consequence of this, the proof of it were doubtful: Yet still, let the assertion be despised, or let it be ridiculed, it is undeniably true, that moral obligations would remain certain, though it were not certain what would, upon the whole, be the consequences of observing or violating them. For these obligations arise immediately and necessarily from the judgment of our own mind, unless perverted, which we cannot violate without being self-condemned. And they would be certain, too, from considerations of interest. For though it were doubtful what will be the future consequences of virtue and vice; yet it is, however, credible, that they may have those consequences, which religion teaches us they will: and this credibility is a certain † obligation in point of prudence, to abstain from all wickedness, and to

*

Page 9. 10.

† Page 3. and Part II. chap. vi.

live in the conscientious practice of all that is good. But,

Thirdly, The answers above given to the objections against religion cannot equally be made use of to invalidate the proof of it. For, upon the supposition that God exercises a moral government over the world, analogy does most strongly lead us to conclude, that this moral government must be a scheme, or constitution, beyond our comprehension. And a thousand particular analogies shew us, that parts of such a scheme, from their relation to other parts, may conduce to accomplish ends, which we should have thought they had no tendency at all to accomplish; nay, ends, which, before experience, we should have thought such parts were contradictory to, and had a tendency to prevent. And, therefore, all these analogies shew, that the way of arguing, made use of in objecting against religion, is delusive; because they shew it is not at all incredible, that, could we comprehend the whole, we should find the permission of the disorders objected against, to be consistent with justice and goodness; and even to be instances of them. Now this is not applicable to the proof of religion, as it is to the objections against it *; and therefore cannot invalidate that proof, as it does these objections.

Lastly, From the observation now made, it is easy to see, that the answers above given to the objections against Providence, though in a general

* Sermon at the Rolls, p. 312. 2d Edit.

way of speaking, they may be said to be taken from our ignorance; yet are by no means taken merely from that, but from somewhat which analogy shews us concerning it. For analogy shews us positively, that our ignorance in the possibilities of things, and the various relations in nature, renders us incompetent judges, and leads us to false conclusions, in cases similar to this, in which we pretend to judge and to object. So that the things above insisted upon, are not mere suppositions of unknown impossibilities and relations; but they are suggested to our thoughts, and even forced upon the observation of serious men, and rendered credible, too, by the analogy of nature. And, therefore, to take these things into the account, is to judge by experience, and what we do know: and it is not judging so, to take no notice of them.

CONCLUSION.

THE observations of the last chapter lead us to consider this little scene of human life, in which we are so busily engaged, as having a reference, of some sort or other, to a much larger plan of things. Whether we are any way related to the more distant parts of the boundless universe, into which we are brought, is altogether uncertain. But it is evident, that the course of things, which comes within our view, is connected with somewhat past, present, and future, beyond it *. So that we are placed, as one may speak, in the middle of a scheme, not a fixt, but a progressive one, every way incomprehensible; incomprehensible, in a manner equally, with respect to what has been, what now is, and what shall be hereafter. And this scheme cannot but contain in it somewhat as wonderful, and as much beyond our thought and conception †, as any thing in that of religion. For, will any man, in his

Page 154, &c.

+ See Part II. chap. ii.

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