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abundance more falsehoods; and it must be clear teachers, or great, impartial studies, of a self-denying mind, with a great blessing of God, that must deliver us from prejudice, and undeceive us. And therefore all the world seeth, that almost all men are of the religion of their country or their parents, be it never so absurd; though with the Mahometans they believe the nonsense of a very sot, (once reading a quarter of whose Alcoran one would think should cure a man of common reason, of any inclination to his belief.) And among the Japonians, even the eloquent Bonzii believe in Amida and Xaca; to mention the belief of the Chinese, the people of Pegu, Siam, and many other such; yea, the Americans, the Brasilians, Lappians, &c. that correspond with devils would be a sad instance of the unhappiness of men's first apprehensions and education. And what doth the aforesaid instance of Popery come short herein, which tells us how prejudice, and education, and company can make men deny all men's common sense, and believe common, unseen miracles, pretended in the stead?

VIII. Another cause is the mistaking of the nature of the duty of submitting our judgment to our superiors and teachers, especially to the multitude, or the church, or antiquity. No doubt but much reverence and a human belief, is due to the judgment of our teachers credibly made known. But this is another thing quite different, 1. From knowing by evidence. 2. And from believing God; (of which, before and after).

IX. Another cause is base slothfulness, which makes men take up with the judgment of those in most reputation for power, wisdom, or number, to save them the labour of searching after the scientific evidence of things; or the certain evidence of Divine revelations.

X. Another frequent cause is, an appearance of something in the truth, which frighteneth men from it; either for want of a clear, methodical, advantageous representation; or by some difficult objection, or some miscarriage in the utterance, carriage or life of them that seem most zealous for it such little things deceive dark man: and when he is turned from the truth, he thinks that the contrary error may be embraced without fear.

XI. Another great cause of confidence in false conceits, is the bias of some personal interest prevailing with a cor

rupted will, and the mixture of sense and passion in the judgment. For, as interested men hardly believe what seemeth against them, and easily believe that which they would have to be true; so sense and passion (or affections) usually so bear down reason, that they think it their right to possess the throne. Not but that sense is the only discerner of its own sensible object as such, (and reason by sense as it is intelligible): but that is not the matter in hand. But the sensualist forceth his reason to call that best for him, which his sense is most delighted with, and that worst which most offendeth sense. The drunkard will easily judge that his drinking is good for him, and the glutton that his pleasant meats are lawful, and the time-waster that his plays are lawful, and the fornicator, the wrathful revenger, &c., that their lusts and passions are lawful, because they think that they have feeling on their side. It is hard to carry an upright judgment against sense and passion.

XII. Sometimes a strong, deluded imagination, maketh men exceeding confident in error; some by melancholy, and some by a natural weakness of reason, and strength of fantasy; and some by misapprehensions in religion, grow to think that every strong conceit which doth but come in suddenly, at reading, or hearing, or thinking on such a text, or in time of earnest prayer, especially if it deeply affect themselves, is certainly some suggestion or inspiration of God's Spirit. And hence many errors have troubled poor souls and the church of God, which afterwards they have themselves retracted. Hence is the confidence of some ignorant Christians in expounding difficult Scripture prophecies; and the boldness of others in expounding dark providences; and also in foretelling by their own surmises, things to come.

XIII. And not a few run into this mischief in some extremes, by seeing others run into error on the other side. Some are so offended at the credulity of the weak, that they will grow confident against plain certainties themselves. As, because there are many feigned miracles, apparitions, possessions and witchcrafts in the world, divulged by the incredulity of the injudicious; therefore they will more foolishly be confident that there are no such things at all. And because they see some weak persons impute more of their opinions, performances, and affections to God's Spirit,

than they ought; therefore they grow mad against the true operations of the Spirit, and confident that there is no such thing. Some deride praying by the Spirit, and preaching by the Spirit, and living by the Spirit; when as they might as well deride understanding, willing, working, by a reasonable soul; no holy thing being holily done without God's Spirit, any more than any act of life and reason without the soul. And they may, on the same grounds, deride all that live not after the flesh, and that are Christians, (Rom. viii. 5-9. 13,) or that love God, or that seek salvation. Yea, some run so far from spiritual fanaticisms, that they deny the very being of spirits; and many confidently set up a dead image of true religion, in bitter hatred and opposition of all that hath life and serious holiness: so mad are some made, by seeing some feverish persons dote.

XIV. Another cause, is, conversing only with those of our own mind, and side, and interest; and not seeking familiar, loving acquaintance with those that differ from us: whereby men deprive themselves of hearing half that is to be heard, and of knowing much that is to be known. And their proud vice hardeneth them in this way, to say, 'I have read, and I have heard enough of them; I know all that they can say.' And if a man soberly speak to them, their. vices of pride, presumption and passion, will scarce patiently bear him to go on without interruption to the end; but the wizard saith, I know already what you will say, and you are tedious; and do you think that so wise a man as I, hath nothing to do but hear such a fool as you talk?' Thus proud men are ordinarily so full of themselves, that they can scarcely endure to hear, or at least learn any thing from others, nor restrain their violent list to speak, so long as either just information, or human civility requireth.

XV. Another cause, is, malignity and want of Christian love; whereby men are brought, if not to a hatred, yet to a proud contempt of others, who are not of their mind, and side, and way. O they are all-as foolish and bad as any one hath list to call them; and he that raileth at them most ingeniously and impudently, giveth them but their due. And will a man, full of himself and his own, be moved from his presumptions, by any thing that such a hated or scorned people can say? Nay, will he not be hardened in his selfconceit, because it is such as these that contradict him?

Many such causes of this vice there be; but pride and ignorance are the proper parents of it, whatever else be the nurse or friend.

CHAP. XX.

Objections Answered.

I EASILY foresee, that besides the aforesaid impediments, all these following Objections will hinder the cure of false pretended knowledge, and self-conceitedness, and false belief, if they be not answered.

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Object. 1. You move men to an impossibility: to see without light; and for an erring man to believe that he erreth. He that hath not light to see the truth, hath not light to see his ignorance of it. This is no more, than to persuade all men to be wise, and not to err; which you may do long enough to little purpose.'

Answ. It is impossible indeed for an erring man, while such, to know that he erreth but it is not impossible 1. For an ignorant man to know that he is ignorant; (nor for a man without light or sight, to know that he seeth not; though he cannot see that he seeth not). For though nescience be nothing; and nothing is not properly and directly an object of our knowledge, no more than of our sight: yet as we see the limited quantity of substances, and so know little from big, by concluding that it hath no more quantity than we see; so we know our own knowledge, both as to object and act, and we know the degree of it, and to what it doth extend: and so can conclude, I know no more. And though nescience be nothing, yet this proposition, I know no more,' is not nothing. And so nothing is usually said to be known reductively; but indeed it is not properly known at all; but this proposition, de nihilo,' is known, which is something. (I will not here meddle with the question, whether God know nonentities.)

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2. To think, and to know, are not all one: for I may think that I may know; that is, I study to know. Now I can know that I study, or think; and I can perceive, that my studies reach not what I desire to reach, but fall short of satisfaction and so as in the body, though emptiness be

nothing, and therefore not felt as nothing; yet a hungry man feeleth it in the consequents, by accident; that is, feeleth that by which he knoweth that he is empty and so it is with a student as to knowledge.

3. And a man that hath so much experience, as we all have of the stated darkness of our understandings, and frequent errors; may well know, that this understanding is to be suspected, and so blind a guide not over-confidently and rashly to be trusted.

4. And a man that knoweth the danger of error, may know that it is a thing that it should fear and fear should make him cautelous.

5. And though an erring man, while such, cannot know that he erreth; yet, by the aforesaid means, he may cease to err, and know that he hath erred.

6. And lastly, It is a shame for a man to be unacquainted with himself, and especially with his understanding, and not to know the measure of his knowledge itself.

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Object. II. You talk like a Cartesian, that must have all that would know, suppose first that they know nothing, no not that he feeleth and liveth.'

Answ. No such matter. Some things we know necessarily, and cannot choose but know: for the intellect is not free of itself, but only as 'quoad exercitium actus,' it is 'sub imperio voluntatis.' And it is vain to bid men not to know what they cannot choose but know. And it is as vain to tell them that they must suppose, (falsely,) that they know not what they know, as a means to know: for ignorance is no means to knowledge, but knowledge is. One act of knowledge being necessary to more, and therefore not to be denied. I have told you before what certainties are, which must be known, and never forsaken.

Object. III. But your discourse plainly tendeth to draw men to scepticism, and to doubt of all things.'

Answ. 1. I tell you, I describe to you many certainties not to be doubted of. 2. And it is indeed your prefidence that tendeth to scepticism, as is shewed: for men that believe hastily and falsely, find themselves so often deceived, that at last they begin to doubt of all things: it is scepticism which I prevent. 3. But I confess to you, that I am less afraid of scepticism in the world, than ever I was; as

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