THE GENESIS OF KNOWLEDGE.

I KNOW that before me lie pen, ink, and paper, while I sit and ponder upon the origin of knowledge. Neither have I forgotten the multiplicity of views which I have read upon the subject, nor have I ceased from my search to ascertain the causes for such diversity of opinion.

To make the foregoing, or any similar statement, a correct one, three things are essential: a knowing something - I; known somethings-pen, ink, paper, thinking, recollecting, searching; and that relation between the knowing and the known which we denominate knowledge.

Careful inspection shows that between the knowing and the known the relation must be acquaintance or non-acquaintance, and that non-acquaintance may be either ignorance or error. Acquaintance must be one of two-certainty and uncertainty, or doubt; while certainty is faith, or knowledge. The possi ble relations, then, are five, and only five-ignorance, error, doubt, faith, knowledge. Of the processes of manufacture by which pen, ink, and paper have been produced, I am ignorant; as to some particular writer's views-say of Aristotle's on Intuitions-I may be in error; whether the many and conflicting views will ever harmonize into a well-defined and generally accepted system of truth, I am in doubt; that this problem is the opening portal into the very citadel of Christian evidences, I believe; that the pen, ink, and paper are before me; that I ponder, and recollect, and seek; and that the diversity of opinions must have sufficiency of causethese are matters that I know.

What, then, is knowledge? To define is to refer to the including class and to give differential attributes. In this case the including class is already known to be relation. To ascertain the differentia, both the knowing and the known must be inspected. On analysis, the known at once separates into mat

ters of fact, such as pen, ink, paper, and pondering; and into matters of necessary truth, such as the necessity of adequate cause for every event. Introspection shows ignorance to be the absence of all theory, error to be a mistaken theory, doubt to be the oscillation between conflicting theories, faith to be assurance with accepted possibility of error, and knowledge to be assurance with denied possibility of error.

Now, we are ready to define. Knowledge, as to matters of fact, is the necessitated assurance that our conceptions correspond to reality; as to necessary truths, it is such apprehension of their self-evidence as renders impossible the supposition of their untruth. Were it possible for me to have uncertainty as to the reality of the pen, ink, and paper, I could not say I know; and could I imagine that diversity of opinion might exist without cause, knowledge in that case would likewise be a misnomer.

Such being the nature of knowledge, let us see by what processes it becomes ours. In the case of necessary truths the mind seems to depend upon itself alone, originating them on befitting occasion, or accepting them because of their selfevident character. But for matters of fact, recourse must be had to experience. As this is twofold, our own and that of others, nature has supplied us with two great and corresponding receptive faculties-observation, and faith. Thus, for example, in the multiplicity of views which I have read, I knew by observation the style of print, binding, and paper in which they were presented; but it was by faith that I knew them as the views of their respective authors. So vast is the experience of others when compared to "the pent-up Utica" of personal observation, that without faith knowledge would be as Samson shorn of his locks. Its eyes would be put out, and its reduced strength be used only to turn the mill of daily drudgery.

Again, personal experience, by analysis, may be resolved into primitive data and logical inferences. The first are truths known directly from observation, the second are those which the mind itself evolves directly or indirectly from the primitive data, in conformity with the laws of discursive thought.

That I sit and ponder are items of knowledge falling under the first head; that these can result in but slight elucidation without thorough preparation and vigorous application, may illustrate the second. When it is remembered that this process of reasoning is exercised alike upon the material of personal experience and that furnished through faith from the experience of others, it becomes apparent that much the larg est part of our knowledge comes to us in this way. Indeed, one has said that the chief business of life is to draw conclusions.

Again, primitive data may be presentative when the object known comes directly before the mind, as in the case of the pen, ink, and paper; or representative when the object is absent, but memory or imagination answers in its stead, as in case of the multiplied volumes which I have read.

But whether absent or present, every object giving rise to primitive data must belong to one or the other of the two great classes into which all matters of fact are distributed. Pen, ink, paper, sitting, writing, belong to one and the same category; pondering, recollecting, seeking, belong to another and entirely different one. To designate this distinction, the familiar terms matter and mind are employed; and out of it have grown the two great departments of science-physics, and metaphysics. Mind and matter, then, are the fields in which are to be sought the achievements of human knowl edge; and nature, for the exploration of these fields, has provided two great organs of discovery-sense-perception for matter, and self-consciousness for mind.

Armed with these, let us enter upon the task, and see to what results our endeavors shall conduct us. Some physical object comes into contact with one of our bodily senses. This contact may be by the actual impinging of the object upon the organ, as in touch, taste, smell; or it may be by the im pinging of waves which the object sets in motion, as of the air in sound, or of the ether in light. The contact produces at once a physical change in the organ. This change, by proper nerve-conveyance, is carried to the brain. Here, by some process the mystery of which cannot be explained, the

physical affection of the sense gives rise to a mental state. At once, by a necessity of its nature, the mind refers this mental state, usually called sensation, to the external object producing the physical change. This sensation, together with its reference, makes what is known as perception; and the results in the mind are percepts, or singular concrete notions. To these the mind, by its own powers of abstraction and generalization, adds abstracts and concepts. For the study of mind, the process is much abridged. Mental states and activities are presented at once and immediately to consciousness, and upon the material thus furnished the mind compares, classifies, abstracts, and generalizes. The same general terms being applied to the results, it thus becomes that percepts, abstracts, and concepts, mark the sum-total of all the notions the mind can form.

In either department a notion once formed is named, so that it may be fixed in the thought and recalled at pleasure, so that it may be displayed to our associates and handed down to posterity. Such name is called a term. When two notions are compared, and it is decided that they can or cannot be reconciled, the decision is known as a judgment; but if it is put into language, it becomes a proposition. If the decision cannot be made from simple inspection of the notions, but it becomes necessary to seek the intervention of a third one, the process is called reasoning, and the expression of it in language is a syllogism.

Gathering up the results of the foregoing analyses and formulating them in a tabulated series, we have: Sources of knowledge, but two-experience, and the intellect itself. Experience is either personal or alien; personal apprehended by observation, alien by faith. Observation is likewise of two kinds sense-perception, taking hold of the external world of matter; self-consciousness, taking hold of the internal world of mind; while faith has to do with evidence in support of facts and authority in support of opinion. Furthermore, the knowledge which has its origin in the intellect also falls into two classes-intuitions, and reasoning. Intuitions are of two kinds-empirical, and rational; while the

latter, again, are either cognitions or beliefs. Reasoning, in like manner, may be divided into demonstrative-with its two methods, direct and indirect—and moral, embracing induction and deduction.

To illustrate each in its order: The square described on the hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares described on the other two sides, is an example of knowledge obtained by demonstrative reasoning; but that George Washington loved his country more than he loved. personal aggrandizement, becomes knowledge only through moral or probable reasoning. That every thing which begins to be must have an adequate cause, is an intuitive cognition; whilst the reliability of memory, or the existence of externality, is an intuitive belief. Our knowledge of history, and nearly all of geography, is received through faith in evidence; but the ordinary man's knowledge of physical science is almost exclusively the result of faith in authority. Self-consciousness acquaints us with our own mental states, whether they be thinking, feeling, or willing; but all personal knowledge of our own bodies-such as hunger, pain, fatigue, color, beautyand all personal knowledge of other material phenomena, such as light, heat, weight, size, number, are acquired through sense-perception.

Than these, other sources of knowledge have never been claimed; for inspiration may be regarded either as faith in authority or as an abnormal development of the intuitions. But while none other has been claimed, all of these are not universally admitted; and here we are brought face to face with the philosophic battle-field of the ages. Not that any knowledge is denied, but only that opinions differ as to how it is obtained. One party contend that there is nothing in the mind which has not come directly or by inference through experience. The opposite party are positive that the mind has sources of knowledge within itself, and that without these there could be no experience. To this debatable ground of metaphysics various names have been given, such as common sense, a priori truths, first principles, intuitive truths, innate ideas, primary beliefs, truths of the reason, and intuitions.