CHAP. VIII.

OF THE OBJECTIONS WHICH MAY BE MADE AGAINST ARGUING

FROM THE ANALOGY OF NATURE TO RELIGION.

If every one would consider, with such attention as they are bound, even in point of morality, to consider what they judge and give characters of, the occasion of this chapter would be, in some good measure at least, superseded. But since this is not to be expected; for some we find do not concern themselves to understand even what they write against : since this treatise, in common with most others, lies open to objections, which may appear very material to thoughtful men at first sight; and, besides that, seems peculiarly liable to the objections of such as can judge without thinking, and of such as can censure without judging ; it may not be amiss to set down the chief of these objections which occur to me, and consider them to their hands. And they are such as these :

“ That it is a poor thing to solve difficulties in revelation, by saying, that there are the same in natural religion ; when what is wanting is to clear both of them, of these their common, as well as other their respective, difficulties; but that it is a strange way indeed of convincing men of the obligations of religion, to shew them, that they have as little reason for their worldly pursuits ; and a strange way of vindicating the justice and goodness of the Author of nature, and of removing the objections against both, to which the system of religion lies open, to shew, that the like objections lie against natural providence; a way of answering objections against

religion, without so much as pretending to make out, that the system of it, or the particular things in it objected against, are reasonablemespecially, perhaps some may be inattentive enough to add, must this be thought strange, when it is confessed that analogy is no answer to such objections : that when this sort of reasoning is carried to the utmost length it can be imagined capable of, it will yet leave the mind in a very unsatisfied state ; and that it must be unaccountable ignorance of mankind, to imagine they will be prevailed with to forego their present interests and pleasures, from regard to religion, upon doubtful evidence.”

Now, as plausible as this way of talking may appear, that appearance will be found in a great measure owing to half views, which shew but part of an object, yet shew that indis

tinctly, and to undeterminate language. By these means weak men are often deceived by others, and ludicrous men by themselves. And even those who are serious and considerate, cannot always readily disentangle, and at once clearly see through the perplexities, in which subjects themselves are involved ; and which are heightened by the deficiencies and the abuse of words. To this latter sort of persons, the following reply to each part of this objection severally, may be of some assistance, as it may also tend a little to stop and silence others.

First, The thing wanted, i. e. what men require, is to have all difficulties cleared. And this is, or, at least for any thing we know to the contrary, it may be, the same, as requiring to comprehend the divine nature, and the whole plan of Providence from everlasting to everlasting. But it hath always been allowed to argue, from what is acknowledged to what is disputed. And it is in no other sense a poor thing, to argue from natural religion to revealed, in the manner found fault with, than it is to argue in numberless other ways of probable deduction and inference, in matters of conduct, which we are continually reduced to the necessity of doing. Indeed, the epithet poor may be applied, I fear, as properly to great part, or the whole, of human life, as it is to the things mentioned in the objection. Is it not a poor thing, for a physician to liave so little knowledge in the cure of diseases, as even the most eminent have? To act upon conjecture and guess, where the life of man is concerned ? Undoubtedly it is : but not in comparison of having no skill at all in that useful art, and being obliged to act wholly in the dark.

Further : Since it is as unreasonable as it is common, to urge objections against revelation, which are of equal weight against natural religion ; and those who do this, if they are not confused themselves, deal unfairly with others, in making it seem that they are arguing only against revelation, or particular doctrines of it, when in reality they are arguing against moral providence; it is a thing of consequence to shew, that such objections are as much levelled against natural religion, as against revealed. And objections, which are equally applicable to both, are, properly speaking, answered by its being shewn that they are so, provided the former be admitted to be true. And without taking in the consideration how distinctly this is admitted, it is plainly very material to observe, that as the things objected against in natural religion, are of the same kind with what is certain matter of experience, in the course of providence, and

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in the information which God affords us concerning our temporal interest under his government: so the objections against the system of Christianity and the evidence of it, are of the very same kind with those which are made against the system and evidence of natural religion. However, the reader upon review may see, that most of the analogies insisted upon, even in the latter part of this Treatise, do not necessarily require to have more taken for granted than is in the former, that there is an Author of nature, or natural Governor of the world; and Christianity is vindicated, not from its analogy to natural religion, but chiefly from its analogy to the experienced constitution of nature.

Secondly, Religion is a practical thing, and consists in such a determinate course of life; as being what, there is reason to think, is commanded by the Author of nature, and will, upon the whole, be our happiness under his government. Now, if men can be convinced that they have the like reason to believe this, as to believe, that taking care of their temporal affairs will be to their advantage ; such conviction cannot but be an argument to them for the practice of religion. And if there be really any reason for believing one of these, and endeavouring to preserve life, and secure ourselves the necessaries and conveniences of it; then there is reason also for believing the other, and endeavouring to secure the interest it proposes to us. And if the interest which religion proposes to us be infinitely greater than our whole temporal interest; then there must be proportionably greater reason for endeavouring to secure one than the other: since, by the supposition, the probability of our securing one, is equal to the probability of our securing the other. This seems plainly unanswerable ; and has a tendency to influence fair minds, who consider what our condition really is, or upou what evidence we are naturally appointed to act ; and who are disposed to acquiesce in the terms upon which we live, and attend to and follow that practical instruction, whatever it be, which is afforded us.

But the chief and proper force of the argument referred to in the objection, lies in another place. For it is said that the

. proof of religion is involved in such inextricable difficulties, as to render it doubtful ; and that it cannot be supposed, that if it were true it would be left

doubtful evidence. Here then, over and above the force of each particular difficulty or objection, these difficulties and objections taken together, are turned into a positive argument against the truth of religion : which argument would stand thus. If religion were true, it

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would not be left doubtful, and open to objections to the degree in which it is : therefore that it is thus left, not only renders the evidence of it weak, and lessens its force, in proportion to the weight of such objections; but it also shews it to be false, or is a general presumption of its being so. Now the observation, that from the natural constitution and course of things, we must in our temporal concerns, almost continually, and in matters of great consequence, act upon evidence of a like kind and degree to the evidence of religion; is an answer to this argument: because it shews that it is according to the conduct and character of the author of nature to appoint we should act upon evidence like to that, which this argument presumes he cannot be supposed to appoint we shouldact upon: itis an instance, a general made

up of numerous particular ones, of somewhat in his dealing with us, similar to what is said to be incredible. And as the force of this answer lies merely in the parallel which there is between the evidence for religion and for our temporal conduct; the answer is equally just and conclusive, whether the parallel be made out, by shewing the evidence of the former to be higher, or the evidence of the latter to be lower.

Thirdly, The design of this treatise is not to vindicate the character of God, but to shew the obligations of men ; it is not to justify his providence, but to shew what belongs to us to do. These are two subjects, and ought not to be confounded. And though they may at length run up into each other, yet observations may immediately tend to make out the latter, which do not appear, by any immediate connexion, to the purpose of the former ; which is less our concern than many seem to think. For, 1st, It is not necessary we should justify the dispensations of Providence against objections, any farther than to shew, that the things objected against may, for ought we know, be consistent with justice and goodness. Suppose, then, that there are things in the system of this world,

and plan of Providence relating to it, which taken alone would be unjust ; yet it has been shewn unanswerably, that if we could take in the reference which these things may have, to other things present, past, and to come ; to the whole scheme, which the things objected against are parts of; these very things might, for ought we know, be found to be, not only consistent with justice, but instances of it. Indeed, it has been shewn, by the analogy of what we see, not only possible that this may be the case, but credible that it is. And thus objections, drawn from such things, are answered, and Providence is vindicated, as far as religion makes its vindication necessary.

Hence it appears,

2dly, That objections against the divine justice and goodness are not endeavoured to be removed, by shewing that the like objections, allowed to be really conclusive, lie against natural providence : but those objections being supposed and shewn not to be conclusive, the things objected against, considered as matters of fact, are farther shewn to be credible, from their conformity to the constitution of nature; for instance, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter, from the observation, that he does reward and punish them for their actions here. And this, I apprehend, is of weight. And I add, 3dly, It would be of weight, even though those objections were not answered. For, there being the proof of religion above set down, and religion implying several facts; for instance again, the fact last mentioned, that God will reward and punish men for their actions hereafter; the observation that his present method of government is by rewards and punishments, shews that future fact not to be incredible ; whatever objections men may think they have against it, as unjust or unmerciful, according to their notions of justice and mercy; or as improbable from their belief of necessity. I say, as improbable ; for it is evident no objection against it, as unjust, can be urged from necessity; since this notion as much destroys injustice, as it does justice. Then, 4thly, Though objections against the reasonableness of the system of religion, cannot indeed be answered without entering into consideration of its reasonableness, yet objections against the credibility or truth of it may. Because the system of it is reducible into what is properly matter of fact ; and the truth, the probable truth, of facts, may be shewn without consideration of their reasonableness. Nor is it necessary, though in some cases and respects, it is highly useful and proper, yet it is not necessary, to give a proof of the reasonableness of every precept enjoined us, and of every particular dispensation of Providence which comes into the system of religion. Indeed, the more thoroughly a person of a right disposition is convinced of the perfection of the divine nature and conduct, the farther he will advance towards that perfection of religion, which St. John (1 John iv. 18) speaks of. But the general obligations of religion are fully made out, by proving the reasonableness of the practice of it. And that the practice of religion is reasonable, may be shewn, though no more could be proved, than that the system of it may be so, for ought we know

, to the contrary ; and even without entering into the distinct consideration of this. And from hence, 5thly, It is easy to see, that though the analogy of nature is not an immediate answer