perfections-either that the principle was erroneous, or that it was indistinctly explained, or that the rules deduced from it, were not fufficiently adapted to real life and to actual fituations. The writings of Grotius, and the larger work of Puffendorf, are of too forenfic a caft, too much mixed up with the civil law, and with the jurifprudence of Germany, to anfwer precifely the defign of a fyftem of ethics, the direction of private confciences in the general conduct of human life.'

Our own writers are not free from thefe imputations, to which may be added, their feparating the law of nature from the precepts of revelation; and declining to mention the fcripture authorities in fupport of their other arguments.

The manner is alfo fometimes liable to exception. Moral inftitutes have been delivered in detached propofitions, which are of too tranfitory a nature to fix themselves in the mind: one effaces the other, in a continued feries, velut unda undam.' The oppofite fault to this is a laboured and prolix difcuffion of elements and verbal diftinctions. The principal examples of these two kinds of writings are Dr. Ferguson's Inflitutes of Moral Philofophy, and Dr. Rutherford's of Natural Law.

The subjects of Mr. Paley's work speak to men's business and bofoms: they are generally interefting and important. The question is always ftated with precifion; it is fairly laid down, and in its full force. For this we owe him our thanks; and, in this part, he has had few competitors. Authors frequently fear difficulties, and attempt to elude them, inftead of meeting them with an attention equal to their importance. They tremble for a name, and, to fave it, facrifice the dignity of their fubject, or the fubject itfelf; hence they afford a temporary triumph to the fceptic or the libertine, by the weaknefs of an injudicious defence.

The author apologises for mixing politics with ethics, and for not quoting authorities. That a margin, crowded with names, can give a force to truth, and a dignity to morality, thofe will only think, who have been converfant with the authors on the continent, or who fuppofe, that in much labour there is much learning. A precept of morality is undoubtedly to be appreciated by its intrinfic worth; for a name cannot add force to one obviously juft, or fupport another that may be trifling, or ill-founded. In natural knowlege, the importance of the obfervation is often determined by the credit of the obferver; and with reafon, fince fo few are to be trufted with the ufe of their own eyes.

The next circunftance for which fome apology may be expected, is the joining of moral and political philofophy toge-

ther,

ther, or the addition of a book of polities to a fyftem of ethics. Against this objection, if it be made one, I might defend myfelf by the example of many approved writers, who have treated, de officiis hominis et civis, or, as fome chufe to exprefs it, "of the rights and obligations of man, in his individual and focial capacity," in the fame book. I might alledge also, that the part a member of the commonwealth thall take in political contentions, the vote he fhall give, the counfels he shall approve, the fupport he fhall afford, or the oppofition he shall make, to any fyftem of public meafures, is as much a question of perfonal duty, as much concerns the confcience of the individual, who deliberates, as the determination of any doubt which relates to the conduct of private life; that confequently political philofophy is, properly speaking, a continuation of moral philofophy; or rather, indeed, a part of it, fuppofing moral philofophy to have for its aim, the information of the human confcience in every deliberation that is likely to come before it. I might, avail myself of thefe excufes, if I wanted them; but the vindication upon which I rely, is the following. In ftating the principle of morals, the reader will obferve, that I have employed fome induftry in explaining the theory, and fhewing the neceffity of general rules; without the full and conftant confideration of which, I am perfuaded that no fyftem of moral philofophy can be fatisfactory or confiftent. This foundation being laid, or rather, this habit being formed, the difcuffion of political fubjects, to which, more than almoft to any other, general rules are applicable, became clear and easy. Whereas, had these topics been affigned to a distinct work, it would have been neceffary to have repeated the fame rudiments, to have established over again the fame principles, as those which we had already exemplified, and rendered familiar to the reader, in the former parts of this. In a word, if there appear to any one too great a diverfity, or too wide a diftance between the fubjects treated of, in the courfe of the prefent volume, let him be reminded, that the doctrine of general rules pervades and connects the whole.'

Concerning the perfonal motives which engaged me in the following attempt, it is not neceffary that I fay much; the nature of my academical fituation, a great deal of leifure fince my retirement from it, the recommendation of an honoured and excellent friend, the authority of the venerable prelate to whom these labours are infcribed, the not perceiving in what way I could employ my time or talents better, and my disapprobation in literary men of that faftidious indolence, which, fits till because it difdains to do little, were the confiderations that directed my thoughts to this defign. Nor have I repented of the undertaking. Whatever be the fate or reception of this work, it owes its author nothing. In ficknefs and in health, I have found in it that, which can alone alleviate the one, or give enjoyment to the other-occupation and engagement.'

We

1

We have been diffufe in explaining the author's defign, becaufe we think the work deferves great attention. We fhall now give a fhort analysis of the various fubjects, and subjoin fome extracts, chiefly calculated to illuftrate the manner which diftinguishes the prefent volume.

The great ufe of morality is to regulate the rules of life, viz. the law of honour, that of the land, and the scriptures. Some authors have fubftituted for moral precepts, an instinctive monitor, called the moral fenfe, as a principle of our confti. tution, capable of difcerning right and wrong, and of informing us of the nature of our actions, by a fecret, though often a powerful impulfe. Our author thinks, with reafon, that there is no fuch innate principle. The great fource of confufion, in almost every branch of metaphyfics, has been the velocity with which the mind acts, and the readiness with which the appropriates every thing external to herself. By this means we can feldom diftinguish her natural powers from her acquifitions; for qualities apparently inherent, are often the creatures of her own formation. The fcience wants great affistance from careful and accurate obfervers: Mr. Paley does not add much to it in this light; but he examines with candour, and generally decides with judgment. Human happiness and virtue are the two next objects of confideration, which our author ftyles preliminary. The chapter on happiness is written with great perfpicuity and exactnefs.

6

The fecond book is on Moral Obligation;' and Mr. Paley, with fingular addrefs, establishes the union between morality and religion. Indeed, as he has pointed the question, it is difficult to elude it. He himself feems to think that, independent of the declared will of God, there are not sufficient motives to check vice. Without wishing to weaken the inducements, or to diminish one link in this great chain of union, we cannot implicitly follow our author in this opinion. It is enough to agree that, in a well regulated reflecting mind, motives of either kind will add weight to the others; and it is a pleafing reflection, that each mode of reafoning is capable of proving the neceffity of morality. Perhaps no one has, for a moment, doubted it, fince however different tenets and precepts may be, in this great point every fect agrees.

Our author's plan next leads him to confider Divine Benevolence,' which he establishes fo unexceptionably, that we may fafely follow him in his enquiry into the will of God,' concerning any given action, by the confideration of its tendency, to promote or diminish general happiness. This enquiry, and the proper limitations, leads our author to establish the necef

fity

lity of general rules, and to diftinguish between the general and particular confequences of an action.

The connection of obligation' and 'right,' or rather their oppofition, induces the author to close the first book with some remarks and diftinctions of general and particular rights.' Thefe obfervations are extremely juft, and involve fome important confequences, which we would recommend to those who are eager to fupport monopolies; but unfortunately the defire of gain, or the luft of power, feldom attend to the dictates of morality.

The third book is on Determinate Relative Duties,' as property, its utility, and the various means by which it is ac quired; promifes of different kinds, which are accurately diftinguished, and the remarks on each kind are extremely juft and clear. Contracts of different forts; and from this part of the work we shall felect a fpecimen, because it is less connected with the reafoning of the rest.

'I know few fubjects which have been more misunderstood than the law which authorifes the imprisonment of insolvent debtors. It has been represented as a gratuitous cruelty, which contributes nothing to the reparation of the creditor's lofs, or to the advantage of the community. This prejudice arifes principally from confidering the fending of a debtor to jail, as an act of private fatisfaction to the creditor, instead of a public punishment. As an act of fatisfaction or revenge it is always wrong in the motive, and often intemperate and undistinguishing in the exercise. Confider it as a public punishment, founded upon the fame reason, and fubject to the fame rules, as other punishments; and the juftice of it, together with the degree to which it fhould be extended, and the objects upon whom it may be inflicted, will be apparent. There are frauds relating to infolvency, against which it is as neceffary to provide punishment, as for any public crimes whatever; as where a man gets your money into his poffeffion, and forthwith runs away with it; or, what is little better, fquanders it with vitious expences; or ftakes it at the gaming table; in the alley; br upon wild adventures in trade; or is confcious at the time he borrows it, that he can never repay it; or wilfully puts it out of his power by profufe living; or conceals his effects, or transfers them by collufion to another; not to mention the ob ftinacy of fome debtors, who had rather rot in a jail, than de liver up their eftates; for, to say the truth, the first abfurdity is in the law itself, which leaves it in a debtor's power to with hold any part of his property from the claim of his creditors. The only question is, whether the punishment be properly placed in the hands of an exafperated creditor? for which it may be said, that thefe frauds are fo fubtle and versatile, that nothing but a difcretionary power can overtake them; and that VOL. LX. July, 1785.

D

no

no difcretion is likely to be fo well informed, fo vigilant, and fo active, as that of the creditor.

It must be remembered, however, that the confinement of a debtor in jail is a punishment; and that every punishment fuppofes a crime. To purfue, therefore, with the extremity of legal rigour, a fufferer, whom the fraud or failure of others, his own want of capacity, or the difappointments and mifcarriages to which all human affairs are fubject, have reduced to ruin, merely because we are provoked by our loss, and seek to relieve the pain we feel, by that which we inflict, is repugnant not only to humanity, but to justice; for it is to pervert a provifion of law, defigned for a different and a falutary purpose, to the gratification of private spleen and refentment. Any alteration in thefe laws, which could diftinguish the degrees of guilt, or convert the fervice of the infolvent debtor to fome public profit, might be an improvement; but any confiderable mitigation of their rigour, under colour of relieving the poor, would increase their hardships. For whatever deprives the creditor of his power of coercion, deprives him of his fecurity: and as this must add greatly to the difficulty of obtaining credit, the poor, efpecially the lower fort of tradefmen, are the first who would fuffer by fuch a regulation. As tradefmen muft buy before they fell, you would exclude from trade two-thirds of those who now carry it on, if none were enabled to enter into it, without a capital fufficient for prompt payments. An advocate, therefore, for the interefts of this important class of the community will deem it more eligible, that one out of a thoufand fhould be fent to jail by his creditor, than that the nine hundred and ninety-nine fhould be ftraitened, and embarraffed, and many of them lie idle, by the want of credit.'

'The other fubjects of this book are on Lies and Oaths, or Subfcriptions and Wills. We fhall extract one paragraph from the chapter on Lies, to point out the opinion of the author, on a difputed point, without attempting ourselves to decide on it. Many preliminary steps are requifite to clear it from every difficulty.

Falfhoods, our author obferves, are not lies, where the perfon you speak to has no right to know the truth, or more properly, where little or no inconvenience refults from the want of confidence; in fuch cafes, as where you tell a falfhood to a child, or a madman, for their own advantage; to a robber, to conceal your property; to an affaffin, to defeat, or to divert him from his purpofe. The particular confequence is by the fuppofition beneficial; and, as to the general confequence, the worst that can happen is, that the child, the madman, the robber, the affaffin, will truft you no more: which (befides, that the two firft are incapable of deducing regular conclufions, from having been once deceived, and the two last not likely to come

a fe